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ABSTRACT
On the Generation of Cyber Threat Intelligence: Malware and
Network Traffic Analyses
Amine Boukhtouta, Ph. D.
Concordia University, 2016
In recent years, malware authors drastically changed their course on the subject of
threat design and implementation. Malware authors, namely, hackers or cyber-terrorists
perpetrate new forms of cyber-crimes involving more innovative hacking techniques. Be-
ing motivated by financial or political reasons, attackers target computer systems ranging
from personal computers to organizations’ networks to collect and steal sensitive data
as well as blackmail, scam people, or scupper IT infrastructures. Accordingly, IT secu-
rity experts face new challenges, as they need to counter cyber-threats proactively. The
challenge takes a continuous allure of a fight, where cyber-criminals are obsessed by the
idea of outsmarting security defenses. As such, security experts have to elaborate an ef-
fective strategy to counter cyber-criminals. The generation of cyber-threat intelligence
is of a paramount importance as stated in the following quote: “the field is owned by
who owns the intelligence”. In this thesis, we address the problem of generating timely
iii
and relevant cyber-threat intelligence for the purpose of detection, prevention and miti-
gation of cyber-attacks. To do so, we initiate a research effort, which falls into: First,
we analyze prominent cyber-crime toolkits to grasp the inner-secrets and workings of
advanced threats. We dissect prominent malware like Zeus and Mariposa botnets to un-
cover their underlying techniques used to build a networked army of infected machines.
Second, we investigate cyber-crime infrastructures, where we elaborate on the generation
of a cyber-threat intelligence for situational awareness. We adapt a graph-theoretic ap-
proach to study infrastructures used by malware to perpetrate malicious activities. We
build a scoring mechanism based on a page ranking algorithm to measure the badness of
infrastructures’ elements, i.e., domains, IPs, domain owners, etc. In addition, we use the
min-hashing technique to evaluate the level of sharing among cyber-threat infrastructures
during a period of one year. Third, we use machine learning techniques to fingerprint ma-
licious IP traffic. By fingerprinting, we mean detecting malicious network flows and their
attribution to malware families. This research effort relies on a ground truth collected
from the dynamic analysis of malware samples. Finally, we investigate the generation of
cyber-threat intelligence from passive DNS streams. To this end, we design and imple-
ment a system that generates anomalies from passive DNS traffic. Due to the tremendous
nature of DNS data, we build a system on top of a cluster computing framework, namely,
Apache Spark [70]. The integrated analytic system has the ability to detect anomalies
observed in DNS records, which are potentially generated by widespread cyber-threats.
iv
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1.1 Motivation and Problem Description
With the stupendous expansion of information technology, individuals, corporations and
institutions rely mainly on information systems and networks (Internet) to send, receive
and store security critical data. Fields like communication, finance, business, research
and development use such information system networks. However, these networks face
the emergence of innovative cyber-threats and attacks. They represent nests for cyber-
crime activities. Cyber-criminals have been showing a keen interest to create cyber-threats
and orchestrate featured cyber-attacks such as information theft, email-spams, malware
infections, networks of malicious malware robots (botnets), Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks, etc. Cyber-threats and attacks have the following attributes:
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• Originality: Cyber-criminals have created sophisticated networks of infected ma-
chines that use existing service or protocols (e.g., Domain Name Service (DNS),
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) or Peer-to-Peer (P2P)) to steal sensitive information such
as users’ credentials, credit card numbers and email addresses.
• Financial motivation: Observed threats and attacks result in severe lost. For exam-
ple, FBI reported that ten cyber-criminals managing botnets have stolen $850 mil-
lion after obtaining personal financial information from infected machines [152].
• Opportunism: Cyber-criminals tend to take advantage of existing software and sys-
tems vulnerabilities to cause harm in networks. For example, after the disclosure
of security bugs in Unix Bash shell, known as Shellshock [166] on 24th Septem-
ber 2014, hackers targeted many web server deployments to execute Bash arbitrary
commands.
• Service unavailability: Cyber-criminals tend to take down services. For example,
in 2013, a well-established IT security organism was a victim of a Distributed Re-
flection Denial of Service (DRDoS) attack [49]. Cyber-attackers took advantage of
DNS protocol to generate a stream of 300 Gbps of data. They redirect such data
traffic to spoofed IP addresses belonging to the organization.
• Sabotage of critical infrastructures: Hackers design and integrate cyber-weapons
to target critical infrastructures. In 2010, a worm known as Stuxnet [237], targeting
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) infected Iranian networks. It was designed
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to sabotage Iranian nuclear program.
In the prevailing of the illustrated cyber-threat and attack attributes, security experts
have to design appropriate techniques to extract operational cyber-threat intelligence from
malware and network traffic sources. Such intelligence is employed to detect, prevent
and mitigate different threats. In this thesis, we focus on the generation of intelligence
based on malware feeds, malicious traffic and passive DNS logs. We leverage different
classification techniques, graph theory algorithms and patterns identification to generate
an intelligence out of data provided by third parties, e.g., ThreatTrack [210]. This thesis
tackles four threads of research, which are described in the sequel.
1.2 Objectives
The primary intent of this thesis is to generate relevant and timely cyber threat intelligence
for detection, prevention and attribution purposes. We envision to accomplish this through
the analysis of malware samples and network traffic. More explicitly, the main objectives
of this thesis are to:
• Grasp the inner-workings of cyber threats through the reverse engineering of promi-
nent malware samples
• Analyze cyber threats and the underlying infrastructures together with an assess-
ment of their badness and patterns
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• Elaborate, design and implement a technique for the automatic fingerprinting on
cyber threats in IP traffic
• Elaborate, design and implement a scalable detection system, which identifies anoma-
lies in passive DNS streams
1.3 Methodology
In order to fulfill the aforementioned objectives, we define two types of cyber-threat intel-
ligence, namely, malware based cyber-threat intelligence and network based cyber-threat
intelligence. The former aims at the extraction of intelligence based on malware analysis,
whereas the latter targets to harvest intelligence to corroborate the detection and preven-
tion of threats at the network level.
1.3.1 Malware Cyber-Threat Intelligence
To extract such intelligence, we aim at gaining a deep knowledge about innovative threats
to understand their modus-operandi as well as unveiling their cyber infrastructures, i.e.,
domains, IPs, etc. To do so, we use static and dynamic malware analyses to generate in-
telligence needed by security researchers to detect, prevent and mitigate advanced threats
as well as to draw a situational awareness of different infrastructures used to perpetrate
attacks.
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1.3.2 Network Traffic Cyber-Threat Intelligence
In addition to the former intelligence, we target to act on the network level, where we use
network traces collected from the malware dynamic malware analysis and Domain Name
System (DNS) logs to detect the maliciousness and indicators of compromise. To do so,
we consider the use of machine learning techniques to segregate the malicious IP layer
traffic from the benign one and attribute it to threats as well as to look at DNS streams to
detect anomalies generated by threats at the application network layer. In the sequel, we
provide an overview of each contribution discussed in this dissertation.
1.4 Contributions
1.4.1 Analysis of Prominent Threats
Static and dynamic malware analyses are considered as cornerstone artifacts that boost the
learning curve about cyber-criminals underground communities. Valuable information
can be gathered by analyzing malicious binaries. The aim of this research effort is to
answer the following question: (1) How can we grasp cyber-threats inner-workings? A
reply lies in reverse-engineering harmful software, uncovering their dynamics, namely,
code obfuscation, infection methods and communication schemes. Such analysis has its
own unique value for IT security since it allows identification of malware attack vectors.
Therefore, an intelligence can be used to extract patterns or signatures that are useful for
the detection of partially or totally shared malicious behaviors.
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We analyze two media noisy botnets by reverse engineering techniques. We present
a detailed reverse engineering analysis of Zeus and Mariposa crime-ware toolkits to unveil
techniques use by malware creators to perpetrate malicious activities. We report in these
two reverse engineering many observations that are insightful in terms of de-obfuscation
of packed malware as well as communication schemes used by advanced botnets.
1.4.2 Investigation of Cyber-Threat Infrastructures
Nowadays, cyber-criminals use network resources to conduct their malicious activities.
They set up networks of compromised machines to perpetrate attacks on both corpora-
tions and individuals. Infected machines are instructed to steal sensitive data, conduct
reconnaissance, launch DDoS attacks, etc. As such, there is a keen interest to inves-
tigate infrastructures used by cyber-criminals. Being inspired by a first effort done by
Nadji et al. [147], we conduct a research initiative to look thoroughly at cyber-threat in-
frastructures. In this research effort, we target to answer the following questions: (1)
How to characterize infrastructures used by cyber-threats? (2) What are the key players
in cyber-threats infrastructures? (3) What are the shared elements between cyber-threats
among such infrastructures? To tackle the aforesaid questions, we use a graph-theoretic
approach to characterize elements observed in cyber-threat infrastructures. We use in-
fluence concept to rank badness of elements constituting cyber-threat infrastructures. Fi-
nally, we employ a graph hashing technique to identify patterns shared between different
cyber-threat infrastructures.
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We apply a graph-theoretic approach to characterize infrastructures used by mal-
ware. Based on one-year data collected from dynamic malware daily feeds, we charac-
terize cyber-threat infrastructures as graphs. We use Google’s PageRank algorithm [42]
to rank badness of key players, i.e., IP addresses, domains, owners, registrars. In addi-
tion, we employ min-hashing algorithm [208] to identify recurrent patterns appearing in
cyber-threat infrastructures.
1.4.3 Fingerprinting Maliciousness in IP Traffic
Network defense relies on cyber-attacks detection, prevention, analysis, mitigation and
attribution. Cyber-criminals leverage malware to perpetrate amplified, large-scale, de-
bilitating, intimidating and disrupting attacks causing severe privacy/economic conse-
quences. The infected machines send or receive suspicious network flows, which can
be different compromise indicators like worm propagation, botnet, commands, probing
events, DDoS, etc. In such cases, security analysts would like to detect and mitigate such
activities. Thus, there is a desideratum to develop maliciousness fingerprinting techniques
at the network level. By fingerprinting, we mean the ability of malicious traffic detection,
then, its malware family attribution. Thus, we define a research that attempts to identify
maliciousness in IP traffic.
In this research effort, we target to answer the following questions: (1) How to
use malware analysis downstream outcome to fingerprint maliciousness at the network
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level? (2) What are the techniques to detect malicious traffic and attribute it to mal-
ware? (3) Among potential techniques, is there a technique that is better than others or
are they complementary? The goal of this research is to use malicious traffic collected
from dynamic malware analysis as an intelligence (ground truth) to classify malicious
traffic. To do so, we choose two techniques, packet headers and Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) [56, 111] malicious traffic classification and malware families attribution. These
techniques lie in applying machine learning techniques, which are widely used to iden-
tify patterns, i.e., maliciousness patterns. Both techniques are compared based on their
detection and attribution accuracies as well as their level of complexity.
1.4.4 Near-Real-Time and Scalable Detection of Anomalies in Pas-
sive DNS Streams
A part of Internet evolution, DNS protocol plays the phone-book role. It is a masterpiece
that allows hosts accessible worldwide through the internet. Despite its benign utility,
DNS carries out malicious activities. Hackers abuse its flexibility to create short-lived do-
mains used as botnets control nodes. Harmful programs (e.g., Torbig [202]) employ Do-
main Generation Algorithms (DGA) [50] to register domain names resolving bot-masters.
DNS permits communication between infected machines with queries, perpetrating ac-
tivities like key-logging, spamming or spreading infections. In addition, C&Cs exploit
DNS tunneling for malign payloads distribution. Malware families like Morto [145], Ka-
tusha [154] and Feederbot [58] employ this technique to create covert channels for data
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transport. Accordingly, we investigate passive DNS data. We monitor such real-time
stream data for cyber-threats identification.
In this research thread, we focus on answering the following questions: (1) How to
monitor DNS traffic cyber-threats misuse? (2) Which artifacts needed to handle real-time
streams of DNS data? (3) How to identify potential cyber-threat infrastructures based on
DNS protocol misuse? To deal with these research issues, we decide to use a computa-
tional clustering solution to capture near real-time data and extract DNS protocol anoma-
lies. We utilize outlier detection algorithm and scoring functions to identify DNS misuses.
We design and integrate an online near real-time system to identify DNS anomalies. These
anomalies fall into machine generated domains, DNS malware covert channels, fast-flux
malicious networks based on DNS-based features. In addition, we corroborate the system
with the ability to monitor IP spaces of organizations like universities, governmental and
financial organizations. We use a lightning-fast cluster computing framework, namely,
Apache Spark [70] to aggregate, map, and reduce DNS logs for the purpose of anomalies
identification. The work described in this thesis was published in [32, 38–41, 189].
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we present the back-
ground literature and related work. In Chapter 3, we describe reverse engineering analysis
of the Zeus and Mariposa crime-ware toolkits. Chapter 4 puts forward an investigation on
cyber-threat infrastructures. In Chapter 5, we entail the different approaches in the name
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of header flow-based features classification and, Signal and NLP DPI, to detect malicious-
ness in IP traffic. Chapter 6 sets forth our passive DNS anomalies identification system
along with performance benchmarks. Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks together
with a discussion of future works.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, we provide some definitions related to cyber-threat intelligence. The chap-
ter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 puts forward different concepts related to cyber-
threat intelligence, namely, its definition, challenges, model and different sources. Section
2.4 reviews related work tackling the use of graph-theoretic approach for the purpose of
characterization and analysis of networks. Section 2.3 introduces different works, where
prominent threats have been analyzed. Section 2.5 reviews the different works done on





Cyber-threat intelligence is meant to be the relevant information and inductive reasoning
gathered from tracking, analysis and mitigation of security threats. This intelligence is
a mix of physical espionage and information technology [9]. The cyber-threat intelli-
gence efforts target mainly fighting against viruses, hackers and terrorists that consider
the Internet as an artifact to perpetrate malicious activities. The protection of govern-
mental institutions, commercial companies and individuals from cyber-threats is the main
actor of the cyber-threat intelligence. Cyber-threat intelligence parties combat different
forms of threats. Cyber-threat intelligence authorities tend to provide security against
threats. Cyber-threat intelligence experts should have a dual background in IT security
and espionage. The analysis of terror threats is one of the important aspects in cyber-
threat intelligence. It needs the collection of information from third parties in the name of
governments, independent companies, ISPs and universities. This data helps to ascertain
how threats were perpetrated. It can result in useful reports for future investigations and
mitigation.
2.2.2 Cyber-Threat Intelligence Challenges
Nowadays, emerging threats come up with more and targeted attack scenarios. More
advanced and prominent malicious programs and activities have been taking place in
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comparison with threats that appeared ten years ago. Newer attack scenarios follow a
kill chain model. Figure 2.1 illustrates this model, which shows the different stages of
an attack. This Attack chain model represents the modus-operandi of today’s prominent
threats. The authors tend to conduct cyber-crimes, industrial espionage, terrorism and
hacktivism.
Figure 2.1: Attack Chain Model
New threats driven by hackers aim to persist and cause ongoing damages. This fact
motivates the need to move beyond the traditional reactive approach to a more proactive
one. In order to be proactive, IT security experts need to change the nature of the defense
strategy. The intent is to get left of the hack in order to kill the chain of attack at an early
stage. Thus, grasping hackers’ capabilities, actions and intent bring a valuable support for
security in the cyber-space. The challenges of cyber-threat intelligence are characterized
by the following questions:
• How can attacks be detected and recognized?
• How can attacks be mitigated?
• Who is behind perpetuating an attack?
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• What are the objectives of attackers?
• What are the tactics, techniques and procedures that are leveraged by attackers?
• What are the vulnerabilities, misconfiguration and weaknesses that are likely tar-
geted by attackers?
2.2.3 Cyber-Threat Intelligence Model
Cyber-threat intelligence is meant to support a set of core use cases involved in cyber-
threat management and mitigation. Figure 2.2 illustrates cyber-threat intelligence use
cases model. In the sequel, we introduce the different use cases.
Figure 2.2: Cyber-Threat Intelligence Use Cases Model
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Analysis of Cyber-Threats
A security analyst reviews information related to cyber-threat activity from manual or
automated sources. The analyst aims to understand the nature of relevant threats, ascertain
them and characterize them in order to grasp the inner-secrets of threats, which tend
to evolve over time. The knowledge encloses threat behaviors, intents, attribution and
capabilities. Thus, the analyst can put forward threat indicators to prevent further threats
and suggest courses of actions and mitigation.
Specifying Indicators for Cyber-Threats
An analyst produces patterns representing the observable characteristics of cyber threats.
The expert maps the indicators along with threats for the purpose of interpreting, handling
and applying patterns to detect them. For example, in the case of a phishing attack, an ana-
lyst harvests observables (email addresses, source, subject, embedded URLs, attachments,
etc.) from the analysis of the phishing email, identify the relevant tactics, techniques and
procedures that are exhibited in the phishing attack. The expert performs a kill chain
correlation of the attack by blacklisting emails and post them to sharing communities.
Managing Cyber-Threat Responses
Decision makers and operational personnel aim to prevent or detect cyber-threat activ-
ity. In addition, they want to investigate and counter any detected incidents. Preventive
courses of action are remedial in nature to mitigate vulnerabilities, which are targeted
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by exploits. Decision makers and operational personnel work together to understand the
effect of attacks in order to assess the cost and efficiency of potential courses of and
elaborate an appropriate preventive/detective actions.
Sharing Cyber-Threat Information
Decision makers establish policies in order to share different cyber-threat information.
They decide with which other parties the data should be shared and how it should be han-
dled based on agreement frameworks of trust. The sharing policy is implemented to share
indicators and cyber-threat information. The relevant information is shared automatically
or manually by trusted partners.
Cyber-Threat Intelligence Sources
Malware Analysis A malware is a piece of small software, which completes the harm-
ful intent of cyber-criminals. Terms such as worm, bot, rootkit, spyware are used to
categorize malware samples, which mirror common malicious activities. The following
paragraph is intended to digest different malware types. In addition, these types are known
to not be mutually exclusive. A given malware may be hybrid since it can reflect char-
acteristics of multiple classes. In [191, 205], the authors discussed such malicious hybrid
activities. Malware fall into the following categories:
• Virus: Spafford defined viruses as follows: “A virus is a piece of code that adds
itself to other programs, including operating systems. It cannot run independently
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and it requires that its host program be run to activate it”. Viruses propagate by
infecting vulnerable hosts and local files.
• Worm: This kind of malware is known in networked systems. In [196], the author
gave a worm the following definition “a program that can run independently and
can propagate a fully working version of itself to other machines”. The Morris
Worm [196] is the first worm, which came onto scene. In the last decade, the
Code Red worm [143] infected thousands of machines during the first days of its
appearance. More recently, the Storm worm was used to create botnets to send
spams and perpetrate denial of service attacks [101].
• Trojan: It is the software that seems to be legitimate but performs malicious back-
ground activities. This software may mirror useful activities, frequently, screen-
savers, games or browser plug-in objects. It can launch malicious activities once
installed in the system. It is used mainly to download other pieces of malware.
• Spyware: This malicious software steals sensitive information from a user and sends
this information to third parties. The information can be passwords, number of debit
and credit cards, emails and visited websites.
• Bot: A bot is malware, which is controlled remotely by a bot-master. It uses net-
work protocols such as P2P, HTTP or IRC to communicate with controllers. For in-
stance, we can cite Zeus [32] and Mariposa [189]. These malware appeared mainly
in 2009 and 2010, and were behind the perpetuation of malicious activities such as
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stealing information to bot-masters, which were located in many countries.
• Rootkit: It is a malware that has the ability to hide its presence by applying some
advanced techniques. These techniques can be applied at different levels such as
the instrumentation of API calls or interfering with system structures like kernel
modules or drivers. The rootkits are common since they are installed by other
malware, specifically bots and spyware.
Before generating a signature for a given malware, security analysts tend to check
whether it is a real threat or not. Different techniques permit IT security experts to unveil
the risk and intention hidden in potential malware. Resulted insight allows the analyst to
find new trends in malware development and mitigate different threats. The main intent of
IT security experts is to overlook the behavior of a sample. Since analysis tools and tech-
niques are more elaborated, malware authors move to the integration of new innovative
evasion techniques in order to avoid their malware being examined. These techniques fall
mainly into self-modifying binary and the detection of the presence of an analysis tool.
In the sequel, we provide an overview of static and dynamic malware analysis.
• Static Malware Analysis: Static malware analysis tends to dissect malware samples
to find out the different functions that are hidden in malware binaries. Static analysis
can be applied on the source representation of a program. The static analysis tools
are used to harvest relevant information about malware. For instance, a call graph
gives an analyst an insight about malware structure and which function may be
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invoked in the code. In the majority of situations, the source code of malware is not
readable. It is dissembled to machine language. By analyzing binaries, an analyst
can be confronted to binary self-modifying techniques. In addition, malware based
on values that cannot be found such as system date or indirect jump instructions,
may make the analysis more difficult for analysts. Moreover, some malware authors
may fingerprint static analysis methods, so they can detect instances to prevent
running of malware.
• Dynamic Malware Analysis: It consists of analyzing a program’s actions while it is
being run in the system. There are techniques that are related to such analysis and
they span over:
1. Function Call Monitoring: A function call relies on the analysis of code that
performs actions intended for different tasks. These functions tend to be re-
usable in different versions of malware. One possible way to analyze the mal-
ware behavior consists of intercepting functions. Such method is called hook-
ing. It allows to log function invocations and analyze input/output parameters.
The implementation of hooking function has many approaches. It depends on
the availability of programs source code. If the code is available, hooks can
be inserted into appropriate places. Another technique is to use binary rewrit-
ing if a malware is available in a binary form. Binary rewriting falls into two
techniques: either rewriting monitored functions to call hook functions in-
stead or modifying all call locations to invoke the hook. The hook function
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can access the original arguments on the stack and monitor them. Moreover,
if a function is invoked through a DLL function pointer, the value of a pointer
can be changed to point to the hook function. Hunt and Brubacher [91] intro-
duced the Detours library to apply function rewriting in order to implement
hooking function. Their technique consists of creating a trampoline function
that contains overwritten instructions. This function contains an unconditional
jump to the original function after overwritten instructions. These instructions
perform the code analysis. The code may contain any pre-processing and con-
trol the execution flow. The Detours library provides two alternatives to apply
modifications to programs. It has the ability to either modify the binary before
execution or manipulate the in-memory images of loaded binaries.
2. Function Call Traces: This is another technique, which tends to monitor func-
tion calls inputs and outputs. The trace lies in the set of functions that were
invoked by the program with passed arguments. These traces are used to cre-
ate abstract representations of malware behavior. In [48], the authors rep-
resented call traces with graph representations. Such representations permit
them to compare behavior of malicious programs with legitimate software.
Thus, analysts can find out malicious instances of the same malware families
within unknown samples. In [226], authors use traces of known malware to
detect polymorphic variants of unknown samples. The authors applied se-
quence alignment technique to compute function traces similarities. Such a
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technique can take a considerable running time in order to calculate differ-
ences and similarities between traces.
Darknet The term darknet emerged at the beginning of this millennium. First, Mi-
crosoft researchers defined it as “a collection of networks and technologies used to share
digital content” [28]. Later, darknet has been associated with other meanings. Currently,
no single definition has been globally accepted. Thus, darknet, refers to but not limited to
the following definitions:
• Darknet as Dark Address Space: Usually refers to routable public IP addresses
that are not publicized or advertised to the Internet community. These IP addresses
have neither assigned hosts nor DNS entries or search engines’ indexing. Therefore,
noticing the online existence of these elements is not simple without prior knowl-
edge. This address space can be used either for malicious activities or for benign
traffic monitoring.
• Darknet as an Anonymity Environment: An environment that provides communi-
cation anonymity. This is related to the task of achieving private communication
between users.
• Darknet as Dark Web: Also known as Invisible Web or Deep Web. It refers to digital
content, which exists in the public cyberspace. It is known to be untraceable and
inaccessible by regular search engines. Such cyberspace content remains concealed
because there are neither registration records among domain name servers nor direct
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link pointing to it.
• Darknet as Private P2P Communication: It refers to any type of closed, private,
and concealed communication between groups of people. It represents a mixture of
cordoned-off encrypted peer-to-peer networks that overlay the existing Internet de-
sign. Such Darknets, often consisting of a tight-knit group of people, are conceived
based on trust and common interests. Moreover, joining such networks require an
invitation from trusted members.
In this dissertation, we refer to Darknets with the dark address space, since these
network addresses correspond to illegitimate hosts or devices, any observed traffic orig-
inating or targeting the dark address space, is suspicious and hence needs to be inves-
tigated. The intent of monitoring Darknet is to look for pandemic and epidemic cyber
incidents through the unused (dark) address space. Darknets known also as Network
Telescopes are assimilated to astronomical telescopes since large and sensitive telescopes
have a high probability to observe new cyber phenomena. Darknets have been initiated to
passively observe attacks that are perpetrated to target different pools of IP addresses. A
brief review of Darknets’ literature show their usefulness since they are used in:
• Analysis of back-scattered packets: This analysis aims at characterizing responses
to spoofed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In the darknet, we can notice that the
most common responses to a SYN flood packets are TCP packets with ACK/RST.
We can observe common spikes of SYN/ACK and SYN/ACK/RST responses dur-
ing a short duration.
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• Investigation of unique and multiple periodic probes: We observe the time period-
icity on collected data for the purpose of intrusion detection. For instance, we can
isolate TCP flows for scanning services running through ports 139 (Server Message
Block protocol over NetBIOS) and 445 (Direct Server Message Block protocol).
• SMTP hot-spot analysis: We can identify SMTP hot-spot. For instance in [157], the
authors discovered the existence of an IP address, which attracted a large number
of SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) scans. This IP is bound to 14.000 IPs,
which results in 4.5 million scans.
• Detection of worms: For instance, in iSink darknet deployment [229], the authors
detected worms such as Sasser, which uses lsarpc exploit. Moreover, the authors
managed through iSink to observe different Sasser variants and other malware prop-
agation, namely, Agobot and RRBOT.CC.
Passive DNS Passive DNS or passive DNS replication is a technique invented by Flo-
rian Weimer in 2004 to store a partial view of the data available in the global Domain
Name System into a centralized database where it can be queried and updated. Passive
DNS databases are extremely useful for a variety of purposes. Malware and cyber-crime
rely massively on DNS, and the so-called “fast flux botnets” abuse the DNS with frequent
updates and low Time To Live (TTL). Passive DNS provides relevant insights and analyt-
ics upon DNS queries that users and/or malware may be performing. It has the ability to
provide the following information:
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• Pool of IP addresses associated with host-names.
• Tertiary name bound to specific domains.
• When a specific domain was resolved on the network.
• How many times a domain name has been resolved.
• Domains with short time to live (TTL’s) may infer malicious activities.
• Non-approved DNS servers.
• Detection of fast flux and double flux of domains.
Spam Traps Spam-traps are a bench of e-mail addresses that are created not for com-
munication, but rather to harvest spamming and fishing emails. In order to prevent legit-
imate email from being invited, the e-mail address will typically only be published in a
location hidden from view such that an automated e-mail address harvester can find the
email address, but no sender would be encouraged to send messages to the email address
for any legitimate purpose. Since no e-mail is solicited by the owner of this spam-trap
e-mail address, any e-mail messages sent to this address are immediately considered un-
solicited. The term is a compound of the words “spam” and “trap”, because a spam ana-
lyst will lay out spam-traps to catch spam in the same way that a fur trapper lays out traps
to catch wild animals. The provenance of this term is unknown, but several competing
anti-spam organizations claim trademark over it.
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2.3 Prominent Cyber-Threat Analysis
The analysis of prominent threats is of a rewarding importance. It is considered as one
of the cornerstones that IT community uses to gain knowledge about the inner-workings
of different cyber-threats. Thus, beneficial information can be obtained by the analysis
of malware binaries, their network traces, and the change in infected systems behavior.
The analysis of prominent cyber-threats is an intelligence that helps security researchers
to detect, prevent and eradicate such threats. As such, some security research efforts put
an emphasis on the analysis of famous variants of cyber-threats. In the sequel, we discuss
the different works done to unveil secrets of different cyber-threats.
In [149], the authors presented the analysis of an HTTP botnet, namely, BlackEn-
ergy. The analysis provided a detailed information about the botnet architecture, com-
mands and communication patterns. BlackEnergy is a web-based tool that allows to build
bot binaries. The main threat of this botnet is Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).
Chiang and Lloyd studied the Rustock rootkit in [46]. This rootkit contains a spam bot
module. The authors studied the network traces and noticed that the traffic is encrypted
by RC4 algorithm. The Rustock rootkit has multiple levels of obfuscation, which makes
it hard to be detected. The main usage of this tool resides in mail spamming. In addi-
tion to the network analysis, the authors were able to extract the encryption key of the
communication. Daswani et al. [52] put forward a detailed case study of Clickbot.A. This
bot is responsible of click fraud attacks. Their analysis covered the main components of
this botnet as well as the commands and configuration. Porras et al. reverse-engineered
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the Storm botnet in [167]. They detailed the techniques used to hide the binary and how
it has been obfuscated. Storm botnet uses the Overnet protocol for the communication.
This botnet is used to send email spams and DDoS attacks. In [89], the authors investi-
gated the Storm botnet by studying the encryption key generation algorithm that is used
for communication between different peers. In [60], the authors reported their analysis
of the Nugache instance. They analyzed the communication pattern between different
principals. The communication is based on a key exchange protocol. In Nugache bot-
nets, the bot herder instructs bots to listen to a specific IRC channel in order to initiate a
DDoS attack. The authors addressed extra aspects of their initial analysis and estimated
the size of the Nugache botnet by using a bot client crawler. In [200], Stock et al. inves-
tigated the successor of Storm botnet, namely, Waledac botnet. Instead of using common
reverse engineering to grasp the modus-operandi of Waledac botnet, they created a clone
bot named Walowdac, which implements the same communication features of Waledac
without causing any harm. The authors managed to observe that there have been 390, 000
infected machines throughout the world. They succeed to gather information about the
success rates of corresponding spam campaigns and the credentials theft from infected
machines.
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2.4 Network Analysis: Graph Theoretic Approach
Various research efforts use graph theory for the purpose of studying social media net-
works. Java et al. [96] investigate micro-blogging phenomena through studying topo-
logical and geographical properties of Twitter’s social network. They analyze people’s
intentions associated with different communities and show that users with similar inten-
tions tend to connect with one another. Ugander et al. [99] study the structure of the
Facebook social graph using different network features such as degree distribution, path
length, clustering, and mixing patterns. The study concludes three key observations: (1)
Facebook social network is nearly fully connected. (2) The graph neighborhoods of users
have a dense structure. (3) The graph shows assortativity patterns related to users’ friend-
ships as well as age and nationality. Other researchers focus on the use of complex net-
work analysis for the purpose of studying phenomena related to the Internet. In [158], the
authors aim to derive a network model that is capable of explaining common structural
characteristics of Internet Autonomous Systems (AS). They propose a framework, Hy-
perMap, which replicates the geometric growth of complex networks on AS topology and
identifies communities of AS belonging to the same geographic region. The authors show
that their framework also has the ability to predict, with high precision, any missing links
in the topology. Deri et al. [124] represent collected DNS with ”.it” suffix data through
complex graphs. They found that the Italian DNS ecosystem, represented through domain
and resolver degree frequencies, follows power law distributions, and acknowledged the
nature of DNS large scale evolution. In another work [55], the authors aim to rank Internet
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domains based on their popularity across resolvers. The authors validate their approach
on Italian Internet domains. The ranking is based on node degree and Eigen-vector cen-
trality metrics. Regarding threat network analysis, Nadji et al. [147] conduct an outstand-
ing effort to unveil the structure of criminal networks. They use DNS history of known
C&Cs, IP addresses found in blacklists, and spam URLs to build graphs. They develop a
method based on the Eigen-vector metric to identify general structural trends and deter-
mine which strategy should be adopted for an effective remediation through take-down.
The authors show that in many cases, by de-registering five domain names, many criminal
networks can be taken down. Moreover, in one highlighted case, disabling 20% of crim-
inal network hosts reduces the volume of successful DNS look-ups by 70%. Despite the
interesting results shown by Nadji et al, we aim to provide more insightful information
related to cyber-threat infrastructures by including new actors such as malware families,
second-level domains, organizations, owners, etc. We also focus on the study of the evo-
lution of cyber-threat infrastructures to understand their scale and forecast their potential
evolution in the near future.
2.5 Traffic Fingerprinting and Malware Analysis
Regarding fingerprinting malicious traffic at the network level based on machine learning,
we have done a literature review that encompasses two research threads, namely, (1) Net-
work Traffic Analysis and (2) Malware Analysis and Classification. The former helps to
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look at the different techniques used to analyze traffic for the purpose of applications pro-
tocols fingerprinting, intrusion detection and identification of zero-day attacks, whereas
the latter exposes the different works that dealt with malware classification and traffic
analysis.
2.5.1 Network Traffic Analysis
Data mining techniques have been used in the analysis of network traffic for many pur-
poses, i.e., application protocols fingerprinting, anomaly detection for intrusion and zero-
day attacks identification. In protocols fingerprinting, many research efforts have been
proposed. For instance, Density Based Spatial Clustering of Application with Noise [225]
was proposed in 2008 to use clustering algorithms to identify various FTP clients, VLC
media player, and UltraVNC traffic over encrypted channels. Li et al. [116] used wavelet
transforms and k-means classification to identify communicating applications on a net-
work. Alshammari et al. [18,20] put forward research efforts to identify ssh and Skype
encrypted traffic (without looking at payload, port numbers, and IP addresses). Addi-
tionally, comparison of algorithms and approaches for network traffic classification were
proposed separately by Alshammari et al. [19] in 2008 and Okada et al. [153] in 2011,
surveying and comparing various machine learning algorithms for encrypted traffic anal-
ysis.
In addition to application protocols fingerprinting, many research efforts have been
introduced to identify anomalies in traffic for the purpose of intrusion and malicious traffic
29
detection. In 2000, Lee et al. [115] introduced a data mining approach for the purpose
of intrusion detection. They described a data mining framework, which leverages system
audit data as well as relevant system features to build classifiers that recognize anomalies
and known intrusions. Bloedorn et al. [33] in 2001 described data mining techniques
needed to detect intrusions along with needed expertise and infrastructure. Fan et al. [67]
proposed an algorithm to generate artificial anomalies to force the inductive learner to
segregate between known classes (normal traffic and intrusions) and anomalies. In [201],
the authors provided an overview of Columbia IDS Project, where they presented the
different techniques used to build intrusion detection systems. In [114], Lee reported
on mining patterns from system and network audit data, and constructing features for
the purpose of intrusion events identification. This work provided an open discussion
about research problems that can be tackled with data mining techniques. Locasto et
al. [122, 123] brought the use of collaborative security at the level of intrusion detection
systems. They proposed a system that distributes alerts to collaborative peers. They
integrated a component that extracts information from alerts and encodes it in Bloom
filters. Another component is used to schedule correlation relationships between peers.
In [217], Wang et al. integrated a tool, namely, PAYL, which models the normal
application payload of network traffic. The authors used a profile byte distribution and
standard deviation for hosts and ports to train the detection model. They took advantage
of Mahalanobis distance to compute the similarity of testing data against pre-computed
profiles. If the distance exceeds a certain threshold, the alert is generated. Zanero et
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al. [235] presented a hybrid approach, which lies in: (1) an unsupervised clustering algo-
rithm to reduce network packets payload to a tractable size, and (2) an anomaly detection
algorithm, to identify malformed and suspicious payloads in packets and flow of pack-
ets. similarly, Zanero showed explicitly in [234] how Self Organizing Map algorithm
(SOM) is used to identify outliers on the payload of TCP network packets. In [236],
Zanero et al. extended their work by introducing approximate techniques to speed up the
SOM algorithm at runtime. They provided more elaborated results and compared their
work with existing systems. In [209], the authors introduced Payload Content-based Net-
work Anomaly Detection (PCNAD), which is a corroboration to PAYL system. They used
Content-based Payload Partitioning (CPP) to divide the payload into different partitions.
The subsequent anomaly analysis is performed on partitions of packet payloads. They
showed that PCNAD has a high accuracy in terms of anomaly detection on port 80 by
using only 62.64% of packet payload length. Perdisci et al. [163] presented the multiple
classifier payload-based anomaly detector (McPAD). Like PAYL system, the authors use
n-grams but with features reduction to avoid the curse of the dimensionality problem [62].
They applied a feature clustering algorithm proposed in [57] for text classification to re-
duce features. McPAD detects network attacks having shell-code in the malicious payload
as well as some advanced polymorphic attacks.
Song et al. [193] introduced Spectrogram to detect attacks against web-layer code-
injection (e.g., PHP file inclusion, SQL-injection, XSS attacks, and memory-layer ex-
ploits). They built a sensor that builds dynamically packets to construct content flows
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and learns to recognize legitimate inputs in web-layer scripts. They used the Mixture-of-
Markov-Chains to train a model that detect anomalies in web-content traffic. Golovko et
al. [78] discussed the use of neural networks and Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) to de-
tect malicious behavior. The authors studied the integration and the combination of neural
networks in modular neural systems to detect malware and intrusions. They proposed a
multi-neural network approaches to detect probing, DoS, user-to-root attacks, and remote-
to-user attacks. In [35], Boggs et al. elaborated on a system that detects zero-day attacks.
The authors correlated web requests containing user submitted data considered abnormal
by Content Anomaly Detection (CAD) sensors. Boggs et al. filtered the requests with
high entropy to reduce data processing overhead and time. They evaluated their corre-
lation working prototype with data collected during eleven weeks from production web
servers. Whalen et al. [219] adapted outlier detection to cloud computing. The authors
proposed an aggregation method where they used random forest, logistic regression, and
bloom filter-based classifiers. They showed the scalability of their proposed aggregation
content anomaly detection with indistinguishable detection performance in comparison
with content anomaly detection classical methods. In [187], Shirani et al. proposed an
intrusion detection in web-services based on the auto-regressive integrated moving aver-
age (ARIMA) model [127]. The model detects malicious behaviors within web-services
using the predictive model, any behavior that falls out of the model confidence level is
considered as an outlier (malicious).
As being the first step of an attack’s vector, network scanning (reconnaissance)
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has been the target of many research efforts. For instance, Simon et al. [188] formal-
ized the scanning detection as a data-mining problem. They converted collected datasets
as a set of features to run off-the-shelf classifiers, like Ripper classifier. They showed
that the data-mining models encapsulate expert knowledge that outperform in terms of
coverage and precision in scanning identification. The emergence of botnets and mali-
cious content delivery networks has pushed researchers to investigate the identification
and detection of such networks. For example, in [31, 121], the authors put forward meth-
ods to detect IRC botnets. In [31], Binkley et al. presented an anomaly-based algorithm
to detect IRC-based botnet meshes. The algorithm uses a TCP scan detection heuristic
(TCP work weight) and other collected statistics gathered on individual IRC hosts. The
algorithm sorts the channels by the number of scanners producing a list of potential bot-
nets. The authors deployed a prototype in a DMZ and managed to reduce the number
of botnet clients. In [121], Livadas et al. presented machine learning-based classifica-
tion techniques to identify the command-and-control (C&C) traffic of IRC-based botnets.
They proposed two-stages detection system. The first stage consists of distinguishing be-
tween IRC and non-IRC traffic, whereas the second lies in segregating botnet and real
IRC traffic. In [103], Karasaridis et al. put forward an approach to identify botnet C&Cs
by combining heuristics characterizing IRC flows, scanning activities, and botnet com-
munications. They used non-intrusive algorithms that analyze transport layer data and do
not rely on application layer information.
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In [81], Gu et al. introduced BotHunter, which models all bot attacks as a vec-
tor enclosing scanning activities, infection exploits, binary download and execution, and
C&Cs communication. The tool was coupled with Snort [195] IDS with malware exten-
sions to raise alerts when different bot activities are detected. Based on statistical payload
anomaly detection, statistical scan anomaly detection engines and rule-based detection,
BotHunter correlates payload anomalies, inbound malware scans, outbound scans, ex-
ploits, downloads and C&C traffic and produces bot infection profiles. In [82], Gu et
al. used aggregation technique to detect botnets. They explained how bot infected hosts
have spatial-temporal similarity. They introduced BotSniffer, which is a system that pin-
points suspicious hosts that have malicious activities such as sending emails, scanning,
and shared communication payloads in IRC and HTTP botnets by using shared bi-grams
technique. In [80], Gu et al. exposed BotMiner, which aims to identify and cluster hosts
that share common characteristics. It consists of two traffic monitors (C-plane and A-
plane monitors) deployed at the edge of network. The C-plane monitor logs network
flows in a format suitable for storage and analysis. The A-plane monitor detects scan-
ning, spamming, and exploit attempts. The clustering components (C-plane clustering
and A-plane clustering components) process the logs generated by the monitors to group
machines that show very similar communication patterns and activity. The cross-plane
correlator combines the results and produces a final decision on machines that belong to
botnets.
Another noticeable research using aggregation technique was introduced in [230],
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where Yen et al. presented TAMD, an enterprise network monitoring prototype that identi-
fies groups of infected machines by finding new communication flows that share common
characteristics (communication “aggregates”) involving multiple network internal hosts.
Their characteristics span over flows that communicate with the same external network,
flows that share similar payload, and flows that involve internal hosts with similar soft-
ware platforms. TAMD has an aggregation function, which takes as input a collection of
flow records and outputs groups of internal hosts having a similarity value based on the
input flow record collections. To reduce the dimensionality of vectors representing hosts,
the authors used Principal Component Analysis (PCA). To cluster different hosts, authors
used k-means algorithm on reduced vectors. In [44], Chang et al. proposed a technique
that detects P2P botnets C&C channels. They considered a clustering approach (agglom-
erative clustering with Jaccard Similarity criterion function) to capture nodes’ behavior
on the network, then, they used statistical tests to detect C&C behavior by comparing
it with normal behavior clusters. In [151], Noh et al. also defined a method to detect
P2P botnets. They focused on the fact that a peer bot generates multiple traffic traces to
communicate with a large number of remote peers. They considered that botnet flows
have similar patterns, which take place at irregular intervals. They used a flows grouping
technique, where a probability-based matrix is used to construct a transition model. The
features representing a flow state are protocol, port, and traffic. A likelihood ratio is used
to detect potential misbehavior-based transition information in state values. In [207], the
authors introduced a novel system, BotFinder, which detects infected hosts in a network
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by considering high-level properties of the botnet network traffic. It uses machine learn-
ing to identify key features of C&C communication based on bots traffic produced in a
controlled environment. Our approach has the same flavor of BotFinder; however, we cre-
ate a detection model based on machine learning techniques by considering not only bots,
but any malware type. In [59], Dietrich et al. introduced CoCoSpot, which recognizes
botnet C&Cs channels based on carrier protocol distinction, message length sequences
and encoding differences. The authors used average-linkage hierarchical clustering to
build clusters of C&C flows. These clusters are then used as knowledge base to recognize
potentially unknown C&C flows.
2.5.2 Malware Traffic Analysis and Classification
In addition to network analysis for the purpose of malicious and intrusion traffic detection
described earlier, many research efforts have emerged to tackle malware classification.
Part of our methodology shares some similarities with the related work on automatic
classification of new, unknown malware and malware in general, such as viruses, web
malware, worms, spyware, and others where pattern recognition and expert system tech-
niques are successfully used for automatic classification [138]. Malware classification
falls into system-based classification and network-based classification. Regarding the
first strand, Schultz et al. [180] proposed a data-mining framework that automatically de-
tects malicious executables based on patterns observed on some malware samples. The
authors considered a set of system-based features to train classifiers, such as inductive
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rule-based learner (Ripper), which generates Boolean rules, and a probabilistic method
that computes class probabilities based on a set of features. A multi-classifier system
combines the outputs from several classifiers to generate a prediction score. In [25], Bai-
ley et al. proposed a behavioral classification of malware binaries based on system state
changes. They devised a method to automatically categorize malware profiles into groups
that have similar behaviors. They demonstrated how their clustering technique helps to
classify and analyze Internet malware in an effective way. Rieck et al. [174] aimed to
exploit shared behavioral patterns to classify malware families. The authors monitored
malware samples in a sandbox environment to build a corpus of malware labeled by an
anti-virus. The corpus is used to train a malware behavior classifier. The authors ranked
discriminative features to segregate between malware families. In [212], Trinius et al. in-
troduced Malware Instruction Set (MIST), which is a representation of malware behavior.
This representation is optimized to ease and scale the use of machine learning techniques
to classify malware families based on their behavior. Bayer et al. [26] put forward a
scalable clustering approach to group malware exhibiting similar system behavior. They
performed dynamic malware analysis to collect malware execution traces. These traces
are transformed to profiles (features set). The authors used Locality Sensitive Hashing
(LSH) to hash feature values and improved scalability of profiles hierarchical clustering.
Wicherski [221] introduced a scalable hashing non-cryptographic method to repre-
sent binaries using a portable executable format. The hashing function has the ability to
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group malware having multiple instances of the same polymorphic specimen into clus-
ters. Hu et al. [90] implemented and evaluated a scalable framework, namely, MutantX-S,
that clusters malware samples into malware families based on programs’ static features.
The program is represented as set of opcode sequences easing the extraction of n-gram
features. The dimensionality of vectors representing the features is reduced through a
hashing function. Regarding malware network-based profiling and classification, Rossow
et al. [176] provided a comprehensive overview about malware network behavior ob-
tained through the use of Sandnet tool. The authors conducted an in-depth analysis of
the most popular protocols that are used by malware, such as DNS and HTTP. Nari and
Ghorbani [148] classified malware samples based on network behavior of malware. Their
approach transforms pcap files representing malware families into a protocol based be-
havioral graph. The features (graph size, root out-degree, average out-degree, maximum
out-degree, number of specific nodes) are extracted from these graphs and a J48 classifier
was used to classify malware families. In [105], Kheir et al. presented WebVisor, a tool
that derives patterns from Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) C&C channels. The tool
builds clusters based on statistical features extracted from URLs obtained from malware
analysis. The approach is a fine-grained, noise-agnostic clustering process, which groups
URLs for the purpose of malware families’ attribution.
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2.6 Passive DNS Analysis Systems
Many techniques have been proposed for detecting malicious activities and distinguish
them from legitimate domains using passive DNS traffic. Some techniques are used to
detect malicious domains that linked to specific types such as fast flux and spam. In [164],
Perdisci et al. introduced an approach to detect malicious fast flux services through pas-
sive analysis of recursive DNS traces, unlike the other works that are limited to extract
the malicious fast flux domain names from spam emails [88,109,150,160]. Perdisci’s ap-
proach has the ability to distinguish malicious fast flux domain names from legitimate do-
mains by characterizing features that pinpoint fast fluxing IP addresses. In [165], Perdisci
et al, extended the previous work, where they detect passively flux networks from above
local recursive DNS servers in contrast with the first work, where they used from below
recursive DNS servers. In [22], Antonakakis et al. introduced Notos, which is a DNS
dynamic reputation system. It differentiates the malicious activities from benign ones
using many features. It assigns reputation scores for the new domains based on models
of known benign and malicious domains. The score shows if the domain is malicious or
benign. It has been deployed in a large ISP’s network and has been able to find domains
before the public blacklist. In another work [29], Bilge et al. introduced a system to detect
malicious domains, namely, EXPOSURE. They characterize passive DNS logs to segre-
gate between malicious and benign domains. The segregation is based on 15 features.
They conducted experiments on 100 billion DNS requests and deployed their solution
during two weeks in an ISP. They managed to identify malicious domains used in botnet
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command and control, spamming, and phishing. In another work [30], same authors ex-
tended their initial work by deploying EXPOSURE for 17 months. In [197], the authors
put forward a technique to identify botnet using DNS queries. The system uses Naïve
Bayesian classifier to segregate between malicious and benign domain names. The classi-
fier achieves a detection rate of 82% and false positive rate of 8.30%. In [227], the authors
introduced a technique, which correlates successful and failed DNS queries for the pur-
pose of detecting DGA-based botnets based on the entropy of domain names. In [228],
Yadav et al. presented a technique to detect DGA-based botnets by using distribution
of uni-grams and bi-grams for all domains associated with the same IP address, TLD or
SLD. In [47], the authors presented a system, namely, BotGAD (Botnet Group Activi-
ties Detection). They used an unsupervised approach (X-means clustering algorithm) to
group domain names into clusters. Each cluster has a binary matrix, where rows are hosts
sending DNS queries and columns represent time periods. This matrix is used to compute
a cosine similarity score to decide if the cluster represents a botnet group or not. In [23],
Antonakakis et al. proposed another system called Kopis, which is a detection system
for malicious domains using upper DNS hierarchy. Kopis distinguishes between legiti-
mate and malware domains using the global DNS query resolution patterns. In addition,
it has the ability to detect malware domains in the absence of IP reputation information.
The eight months experiment shows that Kopis identified new malware domains before
the blacklist. Antonakakis et al. [24], presented a system that detects DGA-generated
domains by analyzing Non-Existent Domain (NXDomain) responses without the need
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to reverse engineering. It uses two algorithms, which are clustering and classification
algorithms. It clusters similar domain names in terms of structure. The classification
algorithm refers the clusters to known DGAs models. If there is no model to assign, it
generates a new DGA model. The system has been deployed on real time data. It was
able to find new DGA families. In [185], Sharifnya et al. proposed a reputation system
to detect DGA-based botnets based on the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence score
to compute reputation of hosts mapping to a large number of suspicious domain names.
Their approach marked domain names as dynamically generated if their distribution of
uni-grams or bi-grams do not fit the normal distribution. In [186], the same authors pro-
posed a negative reputation system that detects domain flux botnets. Unlike previously
cited works, it relies on the history of the large number of malicious activities to a specific
IP address beside the suspicious failures. It assigns a high negative score to the suspicious
domains. In [102], Kara et al. proposed a detection mechanism for malicious payload
distribution channels in DNS. The authors used a significant amount of DNS traffic to
identify covert channels that abuse DNS protocol. They proposed a technique that counts
the usage of resource records to detect payload distribution channels despite the fact that
they have been rarely exploited.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we expose the different related works for the purpose of studying cyber-
threat analysis. To this quest, we initially entail different definitions related to cyber-
threat analysis such as the use case model, definition of different malware and sources of
cyber-threat intelligence. Then, we introduce some works that describe some prominent
threats found in the wild like Blackenergy, Rustock, Nugache, etc. These works helped
us to gain a learning curve about malware analysis. In addition, we describe some works,
where graph theory was used to characterize and study different networks. These works
allow us to grasp how graph theory can be used to investigate cyber-threat infrastructures.
Moreover, we put an emphasis on works using machine learning techniques to analyze
the network traffic. These works shed the light on different techniques used to fingerprint
applications on traffic or to detect intrusions and anomalies. Finally, we study different
works that use DNS traffic as a source of cyber-threat intelligence. These works have





In this chapter, we present two case studies on the analysis of prominent threats. We
report details about Mariposa botnet and Zeus crime-ware toolkit respectively in Sections
3.2 and 3.3. The analysis of these threats is done with reverse-engineering analysis tools.
We introduce a brief description of each threat as well as the different reverse engineering
steps done to unveil their inner-workings. A discussion about these research efforts is
entailed in Section 3.4.
3.2 Analysis of Mariposa Botnet
In this section, we analyze one of the most popular and prominent botnets, namely Mari-
posa [189], which infected more than 13 million computers located in more than 190
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countries. We describe the botnet architecture, components, commands and communica-
tion. We detail the obfuscation and anti-debugging techniques it uses. Moreover, we de-
tail the infection and code-injection techniques into legitimate processes. In addition, we
explain the spreading mechanisms that are employed in Mariposa as well as the commu-
nication protocols. Furthermore, we analyze the injected bot code. This is accomplished
by a reverse-engineering exercise that uses both network analysis together with reverse-
engineering analysis. The insights from this work are meant to illustrate the know-how
used in current botnet technologies and enable the elaboration of analysis, detection and
prevention techniques.
3.2.1 Mariposa Botnet Description
In this section, we provide an overview of the Mariposa Botnet. We describe how the
botnet works as well as the various features of the bot. Different variants that constitute
Mariposa botnet mainly evolved from the so-called butterfly bot. The authors of Mari-
posa variants enhance the capabilities of the butterfly bot to make it more robust, resilient,
stealthy and threatening. The botnet architecture consists of a set of clients, a server and
a master. The architecture is connectionless because it is based on the UDP protocol (no
guarantee to the upper layer protocols of message delivery). The server plays the role of
the relay between the master and the clients. The UDP protocol is used due to its covert-
ness: The UDP connections are not generally logged in firewalls and gateways, which
is not the case with TCP connections. In order to check the presence of bot clients, the
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server pings clients periodically in a predefined time gap. If it does not receive any reply
from the bot, the server marks it as a time-out bot. Further details about the communica-
tion protocol are described in the next section that reports on the network analysis of the
botnet. We summarize Mariposa’s features as follows:
• Bot client: The bot has innovative capabilities comparing to the majority of bots
that exist in the wild. It has the ability to make direct code injection into remote
processes. This injected code corresponds to the entry point of all activities that are
done by the bot. Mariposa is capable of downloading any extra modules like the
Zeus botnet and execute them on the fly. Besides, it is capable of performing UDP
and TCP flooding, and can tune the flood strength by acting on the data and packet
size, and send random data to the victim host. In addition, the bot has mechanisms
to spread through the infection of USB keys or using MSN messenger and P2P ap-
plications. Moreover, the Mariposa bot contains a module that tracks the visited
websites and a grabber that catches all the posted data that are sent from Internet
Explorer 6, 7, and 8. On the other hand, the bot is endowed with two download-
ers: The first one can download via HTTP, HTTPS and FTP protocols whereas the
second downloads files via the ButterFly Network Protocol. Additionally, it has
a built-in cookie stuffer for IE and Mozilla Firefox. Recently, Mariposa authors
added new features like a flooder and a reverse proxy module, which can turn all
bots into proxy servers.
• Server: The server is a mediator between the master and the bot clients. As such,
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it allows to control the traffic between them by setting the number of frames per
second to diminish the CPU usage and the communication latency ratio. We can
also set up the maximum upload on the server. The latter localizes the bots using
IP geo-localization.
• Master: The master represents the core of all operations. It can get multiple server
connections and has the ability to enable and disable servers and clients. The master
sends commands to bot clients through servers. These commands are various and
can be used to customize the operations that are done by clients. The next section
reports on the results of our network analysis.
3.2.2 Network Analysis
Before digging into the inner details of the static analysis of the bot code, we analyze the
network behaviors of Mariposa in a controlled environment to grasp the botnet behav-
iors. First, let us explain the experimental setup for the network analysis. The controlled
environment is based on VMware Server 2.0.3 [216] running on a Windows XP
system. This software allows running multiple virtual machines in an isolated environ-
ment and gives a certain flexibility to create different types of network architectures. The
network consists of a default virtual network, which behaves as a stub network. In our
analysis, we use four hosts to build a virtual network. These hosts are used to set up the
botnet. We installed a master, a C&C server and a host, which is infected by a Mari-
posa bot. The fourth host is used as sniffing box. It runs a live-CD for network security
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analysts [182]. The utility of this live-CD resides in logging all communications promis-
cuously in order to correlate events and monitor the network activities of the botnet. It
also allows to verify whether backdoors are set or not. In addition, it can bind to any DNS
server. As a result, network records can be created to simulate an Internet-connected
network. For this intent, we used c : \windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts file as a
source of a domain name resolution. The communications within the botnet breaks into
three phases: initialization phase, bot aliveness phase and action phase. All the phases
involve the participation of the master, server and the bot client.
The initialization phase takes place after an infection. Once a bot infects a machine,
it sends a join server command. This command allows a bot to register the IP address
of the bot within the server. The latter acknowledges the registration by sending a join
acknowledgment packet. By receiving this command, the bot sends an acknowledgment to
the server and command-response packet. The latest message contains the bot information
like system information and the country code. The server sends an acknowledgment to the
bot and forwards the command-response to the master, which acknowledges the reception
of this message to the server.
The second phase aims at checking the aliveness of bot clients. The server keeps
sending command-response packets to the bot client in a frequency of four minutes. If a
given bot is alive, it replies with an acknowledgment packet.
The action phase aims to instruct the bots to make actions at the infected hosts. The






















































Figure 3.1: Mariposa Botnet Protocol
to the bot. By receiving the packet, the bot performs the action that is mentioned in the
packet. It acknowledges its action by sending an acknowledgment packet. The server
sends an acknowledgment packet to the master. Figure 3.1 depicts three phases of the




The static analysis constitutes a must when it comes to reverse-engineer malware. Actu-
ally, it allows digging into the inner-secrets of the malware code. In our analysis, we used
IDA pro [53] disassembler and de-compiler to analyze the Mariposa bot client. The
MD5 hash of the malware variant is 3E3F7D8873985DE888CE320092ED99C5. Before
digging into the details of the static analysis, we used SysAnalyzer [94] to get an
initial insight about the client. After running this tool, we noticed that Mariposa infects
explorer.exe process. This process opens the UDP port 1055. Moreover, SysAnalyzer
reveals the registry keys and external references that are accessed by the Mariposa bot.
The static analysis consists of getting over the obfuscation and anti-debugging tech-
niques that are employed by Mariposa as well as reaching the susceptible parts of the
code that execute Mariposa bot features that we previously described in Section 3.2.1.
The Mariposa binary has a metamorphic code [204], comprised of various obfuscation
and anti-debugging techniques. Figure 3.2 depicts the different phases of Mariposa bot
metamorphose. The execution of the bot client has three phases: the obfuscation phase,
the decryption phase and the injection phase.
In the sequel, we introduce the different phases that are related to the de-obfuscation,
anti-debugging traps and different decryption layers.
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Figure 3.2: Overview of Mariposa Bot
De-Obfuscation and First Decryption Layer
Code obfuscation is nowadays a standard practice within Malware. It constitutes the
concealment of the intended meaning of an integrated malicious code. It makes the code
confusing and intentionally ambiguous and more difficult to interpret. In the Mariposa
bot, the obfuscation starts with useless computations. These computations are done within
a loop that iterates 889,976,605 times. At the end of this loop, a jump to an address is
loaded into EAX register. As a consequence, a jump is initiated to start a routine that
XORs the range of data that is located between the addresses0x41D000 and 0x41D4C0
with the constant 0x0CA1A51E5. Afterwards, the address 0x41D047 is pushed into the
stack. As a result, the control flow is transferred to this address. The latter corresponds to
an entry point of the anti-debugging traps.
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Anti-Debugging Traps
Anti-Debugging techniques detect if a program runs within a controlled environment or
a debugger. They are used by commercial executable protectors, packers and malicious
software to prevent or slow-down the process of reverse-engineering [181]. The Mariposa
bot client uses several anti-debugging techniques. These techniques make the reverse-
engineering tasks as strenuous and difficult as possible. They increase the time that is
required for a full analysis of the bot binary. The address 0x41D047 constitutes the entry
point of the code that employs anti-debugging traps. The most important anti-debugging
techniques that have been encountered in the analyzed variant of the Mariposa bot are:
• ICE Breakpoint (In Circuit Emulator): It is one of Intel’s undocumented instruc-
tions with opcode 0xF1. The execution of this instruction generates a single step
exception. This instruction pushes a debugger to think that a normal exception is
generated by the program. It sets the single step bit in the flag register. Thus, the
associated exception handler is not executed.
• QueryPerformanceCounter Function: It is used to compute the hardware perfor-
mance. It reads the values of performance counters that are stored in some proces-
sor registers1. Mariposa uses this function to compare hardware activities with a
threshold value and checks if a process is running under debugging mode or not.
1Contemporary processors use registers that act like performance counters. They count performance of
hardware activities within the processor.
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• GetTickCount Function: It is located in kernel32.dll. It returns the number of mil-
liseconds that the system has elapsed since its last reboot. The highest return value
is 49.7 days. Malware calls the GetTickCount function consecutively to calculate
the difference between two function calls. It allows the malware to detect the pres-
ence of a debugger.
• OutputDebugString Function: It is generally used by encryption programs. The
function receives a string as a parameter. If a program runs under a debugger,
then, the returned value of this function (value of EAX register) corresponds to the
address of the string that is passed as parameter. Otherwise, it returns the value 1.
• Stack Segment Register: This technique consists of pushing and popping the content
of the stack segment in order to mislead the debugger. It forces the debugger to not
break on a PUSH instruction and stop on NOP instruction.
Second, Third and Fourth Decryption Layers
After unveiling and removing the obfuscation and the anti-debugging routines, we reach
the part of code that contains the decryption routines. The second layer of the decryption
corresponds to an iteration of a XOR operation with a 32 bytes key. Each byte within
the data is XORed with a byte from the key. This byte corresponds to a modulo result
of data byte position with the size of the key (32 bytes). This algorithm is iterated three
times for three different chunks of data. The first location of data corresponds to the
range [0x401000, 0x415FB3], the second location of data resides in the range [0x416000,
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0x417A52] and the third location of data is within the range [0x418000, 0x41D21E]. There
exist three 32 bytes keys; each one is used in the algorithm for each chunk of data. These
keys are located at the following addresses: 0x41D015, 0x41D155 and 0x41D1B4. Figure
3.3 illustrates the pseudo code of the second decryption layer. The value x corresponds to










Dec_data=Enc_data[i] XOR Key[i % 32];
}
}
Figure 3.3: Pseudo Code of the Second Decryption Layer
After executing the second layer decryption, the control flow reaches the part that is
responsible of loading the imported functions. The next step consists of running another
decryption routine (third layer decryption). This decryption takes place after the first
layer decryption. It XORs each byte of data in the range [0x41D000, 0x41D21E] with a
constant key 0x39.
After executing the third layer decryption, the program loads its process and thread
identifiers by calling GetCurrentProcessID and GetCurrentThreadID functions. It uses
some anti-debugging traps using the QueryPerformaceCounter and GetTickCount func-
tions. The intent behind this is to check again whether the current process runs under a
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debugger or not. In order to check whether it runs in a sandbox technology, it verifies
the presence of sbiedll.dll in the system. By getting over these traps, we notice that the
program allocates 60, 925 bytes of space from the stack. It decrypts the data in the range
[0x40FE5C, 0x41EC59] by utilizing the algorithm that is illustrated in Figure 3.4, and






Key1=((! Key1) + Key2) / 2;
Source_address= 40FE5C;
Enc_data[0xEDFD] = getData(Source_address, Source_address +0xEDFD );
Dec_data[0xEDFD]=null;
Dest_address = 0xXXXX;//in the stack.
for(i=o; i<Enc_data.length ; i++){
Dec_data[i]= (Enc_data[i] + Key1) XOR Key2;
If(Key1==0xFF){





Figure 3.4: Pseudo Code of the Fourth Decryption Layer
At this point, Mariposa code passes several phases of decryption. However, all the
strings are encrypted. These strings represent API functions and magic words that will be
used by the injected process. Once the fourth layer decryption is executed, the program
runs a decryption routine three times. This routine decrypts all the strings that are located









Key=(Key2+ ~Key1) >> 1;





Figure 3.5: Pseudo Code of String Decryption Algorithm
Code Injection
Despite substantial improvement in host-based security, the code injection technique sus-
tains as the favorite method to compromise operating systems. The method of code in-
jection is used to conceal evil processes inside legitimate processes. The execution of a
process inside another address space can be achieved in several ways. We can enumer-
ate windows hooks [93], dll injection and direct code injection [223]. The Mariposa bot
uses the Direct Code Injection (DCI) technique to inject malicious code inside the ad-
dress space of explorer.exe. Instead of writing a separate DLL, the DCI technique copies
the malicious code to the remote process directly via WriteProcessMemory function and
starts its execution with an invocation of the createRemoteThread function. The direct
code injection (DCI) technique can be summarized into the following steps:
• Retrieval of the handle of the remote process by calling the OpenProcess function
• Allocation of memory in the remote process address space in order to inject code.
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This is achieved by calling the VirtualAllocEx function.
• Writing a copy of the initialized INJDATA structure to the allocated memory by
invoking the WriteProcessMemory function
• Execution of the injected code via the CreateRemoteThread function
Before code injection, Mariposa creates some directories and files. The created
directories and files are:
• Directory Path: C : \Recycler\s− 1− 5− 21.
• Directory Path: C : \Recycler\S − 1 − 5 − 21 − 7524899924 − 6962119414 −
608760223− 8454. The directory access control is set to read, write and execution
permissions.
• File Name: C : \Recycler\S − 1 − 5 − 21 − 7524899924 − 6962119414 −
608760223− 8454\Desktop.ini.
• File Name: C : \Recycler\S − 1 − 5 − 21 − 7524899924 − 6962119414 −
608760223− 8454\windll.exe.
Then, the program calls the GetVersion function to get the version of the operating
system. The reason behind this call resides in checking whether the operating system is a
Windows NT or not. If so, it uses the CreateRomoteThread function 2. At the beginning
of the injection process, the program calls the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot function to take
2CreateRemoteThread function works only in Windows NT versions.
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a snapshot of the running processes in the system. It enumerates the existing processes by
calling Process32First and Process32Next functions. Once explorer.exe process is found,
it retrieves its process identifier (process ID).
After getting the process ID, the program calls OpenProcess function to open ex-
plorer.exe process. Then, it calls VirtualAllocEX function to allocate memory within the
targeted process and NtWriteVirtualMemory function to write into explorer.exe process.
Once the code is written in a virtual memory location, the program calls the CreateRe-
moteThread function in order to run the injected code.
Injected Thread Activity
The code that is injected into explorer.exe is the pivotal part of Mariposa bot. In the follow-
ing, we discuss the behaviors of the injected code. To this end, we attached the process ex-
plorer.exe to IDA pro debugger and set a breakpoint at the entry point of the newly cre-
ated thread to get full control of the execution. The thread creates a mutex object namely
c__kdjcpeoij. The mutex object is used to ensure singular execution of the bot. The intent
is to avoid a possible running of multiple bot instances, which can crash the system, or at
best slow down the machine. It uses the WaitForSingleObject function with a predefined
waiting time to ensure singular execution. Once the single instance checking is ensured, it
creates two files: C : \Recycler\S−1−5−21−7344526690−8558129233−739613093−
1787\windll.exe and C : \Recycler\S − 1 − 5 − 21 − 7524899924 − 6962119414 −
608760223 − 8454\Desktop.ini. After the file creation, the thread copies the whole bot
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code to C : \Recycler\S − 1 − 5 − 21 − 7524899924 − 6962119414 − 608760223 −
8454\windll.exe. At this point of execution, Mariposa uses the WsaStartup function to
initiate the use of Winsock DLL, which is responsible for the socket communication. It
also opens the registry key software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentV ersion\
Winlogon, and creates a new entry, namely, Taskman. It sets the value of this entry to C :
\Recycler\S−1−5−21−7524899924−6962119414−608760223−8454\windll.exe
in order to make a direct injection of code when the machine reboots. It also creates an-
other entry named shell with the value C : \Recycler\S − 1− 5− 21− 7344526690−
8558129233− 739613093− 1787\windll.exe.
At this stage, the bot creates two pipes. The first one is \\.\pipe\cdcpr55 whereas
the second is an anonymous pipe. The first pipe is created in pipe_access_inbound mode,
which supports client to server transfer only. Once the pipes are set, the program calls the
InternetOpen function in order to use the WinInet library functions. Mariposa bot uses
three hard-coded domain names to resolve the IP address of the C&C server. It picks the
first domain name and sends the encrypted magic word to the resolved IP address, and
waits for the reply from the server. If the server does not respond, it picks the second or
third domain name and tries to connect to the server using the resolved IP address. The





The sequence of actions that are taken by the Mariposa bot to reach the server and
receive commands are:
• The function Inet_addr is called to convert the domain names into a proper address.
• The bot retrieves the host information from the corresponding host name using the
gethostbyname function.
• The bot calls the htons function, which converts an unsigned short number from a
host to a TCP/IP network byte order 3.
• The bot encrypts the magic word (bpr1 is the magic word in this variant of Mari-
posa). The encryption/decryption algorithm is detailed in [95].
• The bot sends the magic word using the sendto function.
• The bot receives a reply from the server using the recvfrom function.
• The bot decrypts and decodes the received command. The bot can then trigger
appropriate actions that are instructed by the master.
3Network byte order defines the bit-order of network addresses as they pass through the network. The
TCP/IP standard network byte order is big-endian. In order to participate in a TCP/IP network, little-endian




The Mariposa bot comes with a spreader module. This module breaks into three different
components, namely, USB spreader, MSN spreader, P2P spreader. In the Mariposa botnet,
the master can send commands to enable and disable the spreaders. In the sequel, we
introduce these different components:
• USB spreader: At the beginning, the program creates a new top-level window by
executing CreateWindowEx function. The returned handle is used by the Register-
DeviceNotification function in order to receive notification from the system when a
flash drive is inserted. Once a user inserts a USB key, it locks the autorun.inf file
and modifies the file accordingly. As a result, no software or malware can launch
an auto-run. The file stays locked until a user decides to remove the USB key.
Mariposa makes a copy of itself into the USB key.
• MSN spreader: The Mariposa bot infects MSN messenger by hooking sending and
receiving functions. The MSN spreader is activated if a bot receives an enabling
command. This command contains a custom link, which is used to download a bot
in the user’s machine.
After receiving the MSN spreader activation command, the bot looks for the msn-
msgr.exe process. This operation is done periodically if the process is not running
in the system. Once the msnmsgr.exe process is found, the Mariposa bot retrieves
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its process identifier. Then, it calls the OpenProcess function to get the handle
of this process. Afterwards, it creates a duplicate handle of the current process
by calling GetCurrentProcess and DuplicateHandle functions. At this point, the
Mariposa bot starts a new routine, which is responsible for injecting code inside
the virtual address space of msnmsgr.exe process. This routine is called twice. In
the first call, it allocates 256 bytes of space by calling VirtualAllocEX function and
injects code using NtWriteVirtualMemory function. In the second call, it injects
string utility functions and the custom link that is sent by the master. It creates a
thread by calling CreateRemoteThread function. After the injection process, the
bot hooks ws2_32_send function in order to make the injected code executed for
each message that is sent from a user to a recipient. This is done by calling the
VirtualProtectEx function to allows writing in the virtual memory. At the end, it
calls the NtWritevirtualMemory function to overwrite with the address of injected
code.
• P2P spreader: When the bot receives a command that enables the P2P spreader, the
program calls the GetEnvironmentVariable function in order to get the registry entry
for the current user. The intent behind this resides in checking if P2P applications
are installed or not. The Mariposa bot looks for the following P2P applications
in the system: Ares, BearShare, iMesh, Shareaza, Kazaa, DC++, eMule
and LimeWire. Once, it detects the presence of a P2P application, it copies itself
into the shared folder with a fake name that is issued by the master.
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Uploader and Downloader Modules
During the analysis of the main thread, we noticed that when the bot receives update/-
download commands, it triggers two new threads. To debug these threads in IDA pro,
we set a breakpoint at the beginning of each thread. When Mariposa bot transfer its con-
trol to one of these threads, we suspended the original thread in IDA pro and continued
debugging with the new thread.
Thread 1 Mariposa starts this thread when the bot receives a download command. Af-
ter receiving this command, the bot checks the command. If the latter corresponds to
descargar4, the thread launches the following activities:
• It targets the temporary location in the system to download a new executable.
• It calls the InternetOpenUrl function with the supplied url.
• If the InternetOpenUrl function succeeds, the bot creates a file in the temporary
location by calling the CreateFile function.
• It downloads the file using the InternetReadFile function.
• It writes the file onto the disk by invoking the WriteFile function.
• It uses the CreateFile function again to create the file.
4Descargar is a Spanish word, which means download
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After downloading the file, the bot checks the first two bytes to ensure whether the
downloaded file is an executable or not. If so, it runs the file by calling the CreateProcess
function and exits the thread by calling the ExitThread function.
Thread 2 This thread starts when the bot receives an upload command. After receiving
the command, the bot checks the command and compares it with subir5. If the comparison
is successful, the thread executes the following activities:
• It calls the InternetCrackUrl function to read different url components.
• By getting the url components, it calls the InterConnect function to set a connection
with the url.
• It uses the HttpOpenRequest function to create an HTTP request.
• It invokes the InternetReadFile function to read data to be sent.
• It sends the data using the HttpSendRequest function.
• Finally, it closes the connection handle using the InternetCloseHandle function.
After uploading the file, the thread calls the exitthread function to close the thread.
5Subir is a Spanish word, which means upload
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Components Diagram
By conducting a thorough reverse-engineering task, we noticed that Mariposa bot has
complex interactions between its functional components. Figure 3.6 illustrates the differ-



















































Figure 3.6: Component Diagram
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3.3 Analysis of Zeus Botnet Crime-ware Toolkit
In this section, we present a reverse engineering effort done on the Zeus crime-ware
toolkit [32]. The latter is one of the powerful crime-ware tools that emerged in the Internet
underground community to control botnets. Zeus has infected over 3.6 million computers
in the United States. Our analysis aims to uncover the obfuscation levels from packed
Zeus code. In the prevailing of this thought, we describe the bot building and infection
processes. In addition, we put forward a method to extract the encryption key from the
malware binary and use it to decrypt the communications of the botnet and its configu-
ration information. We combine reverse engineering and network analysis to understand
behaviors of this new generation crime-ware toolkit. After performing the reverse engi-
neering exercise, we found out that C&C communications indicates that the authors used
RC4 algorithm. We uncovered the format of messages that are sent through a network.
3.3.1 Zeus Botnet Description
The Zeus crime-ware toolkit is a set of programs which have been designed to setup a bot-
net over a high-scaled networked infrastructure. Generally, the Zeus botnet aims to make
machines behave as spying agents with the intent of getting financial benefits. The Zeus
malware has the ability to log inputs that are entered by the user as well as to capture and
alter data that is displayed into web-pages [87]. Stolen data can contain email addresses,
passwords, online banking accounts, credit card numbers, and transaction authentication
numbers. In our analysis, we examine the Zeus crime-ware toolkit v.1.2.4.2, which is
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considered as the latest stable publicly available version in the underground community.
The overall structure of the Zeus crime-ware toolkit consists of five components:
• A control panel, which contains a set of PHP scripts that are used to monitor the
botnet and collect the stolen information into MySQL database and then display it to
the bot-master. It also allows the bot-master to monitor, control, and manage bots
that are registered within the botnet.
• Configuration files that are used to customize the botnet parameters. It involves
two files: the configuration file config.txt that lists the basic information, and
the web injects file webinjects.txt that identifies the targeted websites and
defines the content injection rules.
• A generated encrypted configuration file config.bin, which holds an encrypted
version of the configuration parameters of the botnet.
• A generated malware binary file bot.exe, which is considered as the bot binary
file that infects the victims’ machines.
• A builder program that generate two files: the encrypted configuration file con-
fig.bin and the malware (actual bot) binary file bot.exe.
On the C&C side, the crime-ware toolkit has an easy way to setup the C&C server
through an installation script that configures the database and the control panel. The
database is used to store related information about the botnet and any updated reports
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from the bots. These updates contain stolen information that are gathered by the bots from
the infected machines. The control panel provides a user friendly interface to display the
content of the database as well as to communicate with the rest of the botnet using PHP
scripts. The botnet configuration information is composed of two parts: a static part and
a dynamic part. In addition, each Zeus instance keeps a set of targeted URLs that are fed
by the web injects file webinject.txt. Instantly, Zeus targets these URLs to steal
information and to modify the content of specific web pages before they get displayed on
the user screen. The attacker can define rules that are used to harvest a web form data.
When a victim visits a targeted site, the bot steals the credentials that are entered by the
victim. Then, it posts the encrypted information to a drop location that is meant to store
the bot update reports. This server decrypts the stolen information and stores it into a
database.
3.3.2 Network Analysis
In this section, we explain the network communication that occurs between the C&C
server (the server containing the control panel) and an infected machine. Such analy-
sis can be used to write IDS rules and anti-virus detection routines. In order to perform
the network analysis, we built a sandbox environment to collect and analyze the network
traces that are generated from the communication between the C&C server and one of the
bot instances. We configured a web server, which acts as the C&C server and the drop
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location. This server hosts all resources that are required to operate the botnet (con-
fig.bin file, PHP scripts and the MySQL database). To customize the malware, we
used the builder program to generate the malware binary file, which is configured to com-
municate with a C&C server. Within our environment, fake websites are generated to
reflect real scenarios of botnet attacks. All necessary entries of the configuration file as
well as the web injects scripts are modified to target the fake website. After infecting a
machine with the bot binary file, we collected network traces for one day. During this
session, the user of the infected machine visited the targeted website and then used login
credentials, personal information, and credit card information for testing purposes.
By analyzing the bot network communications, we can learn the overall behavior
of the Zeus botnet. The network behavior of the Zeus botnet constitutes a starting point,
where we can dig into the crime-ware toolkit functions. Since the Zeus botnet is based on
HTTP protocol, it uses a pull-method to synchronize the botnet communications. From
the collected network traces between a bot and a C&C server, we observe that the bot
periodically checks specific servers for an up-to-date configuration and bot binary files.
Moreover, HTTP communication messages between the two entities are encrypted. By
observing the network trace, we managed to determine the following communication pat-
tern between the C&C server and the infected machine:
• The infected client starts the communication by sending a request message GET
/config.bin to the C&C server. This message is a request to fetch the configu-
ration file for the botnet.
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• The C&C server replies with the encrypted configuration file config.bin.
• The client receives the encrypted configuration file and decrypts its content by using
an encryption key, which is embedded inside the bot binary file.
• In situation where the bot-master wants to involve the infected machine to manage
the botnet, the infected machine has to provide its external IP address and report any
use of Network Address Translation (NAT). In order to know the external IP address
that is seen by the botnet servers, the infected machine makes a request to a specific
server. Afterwards, this server informs the infected machine about their externally
facing IP address. The server’s URL is provided in the static configuration file.
• The bot posts the stolen information and its update status reports to the C&C server
POST/gate.php.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the communication pattern between the C&C server and the
infected machine. The communication pattern is repeated frequently depending on a tim-
ing variable, which is defined in the botnet configuration file.
3.3.3 Static Analysis
The increasing usage of malicious software has pushed security experts to try finding the
secrets related to the development of malware design. A common technique to detect the
existence of a given malware is by tracking system modifications. The changes include
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Figure 3.7: Communications Pattern of Zeus
infection of processes, packing/unpacking of binaries, and changes to the registry keys.
One way to look for these changes is to reverse engineer the malware and try to reveal
what is hidden behind the assembled code. In our case, this kind of analysis provides an
invaluable insight into the inner-working of the crime-ware toolkit in general and about
the malware binary in particular. In the stream of this thinking, we investigate the builder
program and malware binary file. To this end, we mainly employ IDA Pro to disassem-
ble the binaries and debug them to understand their business logic. The analysis is two
folds: First, the analysis that is related to the builder program. Second, the analysis that
is linked to the malware binary file.
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Analysis of the Zeus Builder Program
The builder is one of the components of the Zeus crime-ware toolkit. It uses the configu-
ration files as an input to generate the bot binary file and the encrypted configuration file.
We analyze the builder program first because it uses a known obfuscation technique that
can be easily removed. In addition, the GUI allows us to categorize different subroutines,
which make up the builder program functionalities. Using the PaiMei reverse engi-
neering framework [5] (which provides many reverse engineering tasks such as fuzzer
assistance, code coverage tracking, and data flow tracking), we were able to see exactly
what functions of the builder program are invoked by a specific action. This immensely
aids in simplifying the reverse engineering efforts as it allows us to focus on a few key
subroutines. In the following, we summarize the reverse engineering analysis of the func-
tions of the builder program.
• Building the Configuration File Functionality: This function is responsible for en-
coding the clear text of the configuration files of the botnet into a specific structure.
Afterwards, it encrypts the whole structure with the RC4 encryption algorithm us-
ing the configured encryption key.
• Building the Malware Binary File Functionality: The main function of the builder
program resides within this functionality, which is responsible for building the cus-
tomized malware binary files. In general, it builds the malware executable file into
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a portable executable (PE) standard format. Moreover, it sets some parameters ac-
cording to the current configuration file and then produces the malware binary file.
• Malware Infection Removal Functionality: The builder has a functionality that as-
certains the presence of Zeus bot and removes it. When this functionality runs, it
performs a detection routine by checking the existence of special registry keys that
are inserted during the bot infection process. Also, it detects the presence of some
files in the system. If these files are detected, the builder program cleans some reg-
istry keys and instructs the bot to shutdown itself and then deletes the stored Zeus
binary file from the system. The expected behavior of the bot when it receives the
shutdown command is to disinfect itself from the currently running processes. The
analysis reveals the file names that the builder checks their presence in the system.
Table 3.1 represents these file names with their description.
File Description
C:/WINDOWS/system32/sdra64.exe A copy of a bot which has infected “system32” folder.
C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/local.ds A data storage file which is used to store the configuration
file that is used by a given bot locally in the system.
C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/user.ds A data storage file which is used to log the users’ activities
that have been recorded by the bot.
Table 3.1: Files Created During the Bot Infection
Zeus Bot Binary Analysis
As depicted in Figure 3.8, the bot binary file contains four segments: A “text/code” seg-
ment, an “imports” segment, a “resources” segment, and a “data” segment. Therefore, we
begin our analysis at the malware Entry Point (EP) that resides in the “text/code” segment.
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The initial analysis of the disassembly reveals that only a small part of the “text/code”
block is valid computer instructions. The rest of the binary is highly obfuscated, which

















Figure 3.8: Segments of the bot.exe Binary File
• De-obfuscation Process: By using the IDA Pro debugger, we were able to debug
the malware and step through the instructions to analyze and understand the logic
of the de-obfuscation routines. Each routine reveals some information which is
used by the other routines until all obfuscation layers are removed. The first de-
obfuscation routine contains a 4-byte long decryption key and a one-byte long seed
value. These two values are used to decrypt a block of data from the “text/code”
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segment and then write the decrypted data in the virtual memory. The result of
the first de-obfuscation routine revealed some new code segments. These segments
contain three de-obfuscation routine, as shown in Figure 3.9. During our analysis,
the initial memory offset address for the code segments was 0x390000. After
the address space of the second de-obfuscation routine, there was an 8-byte key
that IDA Pro incorrectly identified as code instructions. Figure 3.10 illustrates
the location of the 8-byte key. In the following, we explain the main logic of the
second de-obfuscation routine.
De-obfuscation 2









Figure 3.9: De-Obfuscated Code in the Virtual Memory
1. First, the routine copies two binary blocks from the “text/code” segment, con-
catenates them together, and then writes them into the virtual memory. The
first text block contains data with many zero value bytes that will be filled by
the next text block, as shown in Figure 3.11.
2. The routine scans every byte on the first text block and when it encounters a
“hole” (zero byte), it overwrites the zero byte with the next available byte in
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Figure 3.10: Eight-byte Key






Figure 3.11: Virtual Memory Used by the Second De-Obfuscation Routine
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the “filler” text block. This is repeated until all “holes” are filled (see Figure
3.12).
Figure 3.12: Result from the Second De-Obfuscation Routine
The filled text segment turns to be the main outcome of the second de-obfuscation
routine. However, this text segment is still not readable and not considered as
computer instructions. By utilizing the 8-byte key, the third de-obfuscation rou-
tine starts by decrypting the output of the second de-obfuscation. Similar to the
first de-obfuscation routine, this routine utilizes the 8-byte key and performs an
exclusive-OR (XOR) operation instead of an addition operation. Finally, the fourth
de-obfuscation layer contains heavy computations to initialize and prepare some
parameters for the rest of the malware operations. It uses the decrypted bytes re-
vealed by the previous routines to modify the rest of the “text/code” segment. After
this routine completes, we can observe the real starting point of the Zeus malware.
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Even though the “text/code” segment is now valid, the Zeus bot binary employs
two additional layers of obfuscation. These two layers are de-obfuscated during the
installation procedure. They consist of logical loops that transform arbitrarily long
strings into a readable text. The first layer is performed on a set of strings that the
malware uses to load the DLL libraries, retrieve function names, and for other pur-
poses during the installation process. Similarly, the second layer is used to decrypt
URLs in the static configuration of the configuration file. The main logic of these
two routines are described in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 First Routine
Input: seed = 0xBA,enc_string
Output: new_string
new_string = String(enc_string.length())
for inti ∈ Range(0, enc_string.length()) do
new_string[i] = (enc_string[i] + seed)%256
seed = (seed+ 2)
end for
return new_string




for inti ∈ Range(0, enc_url.length()) do
if i%2 == 0 then
new_url[i] = (enc_url[i] + 0xF6− i ∗ 2)%256
else




• Bot Installation Process: After the first four de-obfuscation routines are executed,
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the malware begins the installation process. The installation process aims at prepar-
ing and then launching the malicious activities of the malware. In the following, we
explain the main procedure of the installation process.
1. The Zeus malware dynamically loads the LoadLibrary and the GetPro-
cAddress methods from Kernel32.dll library.
2. It decrypts the set of strings, which become DLL methods names, into the
virtual memory according to Algorithm 1.
3. The LoadLibrary and the GetProcAddress methods are then used to
load the further methods, as decrypted in step 2, from the Windows DLLs.
4. The Zeus malware enumerates the current process table looking for targeted
processes such as the main process name for the Outpost personal firewall ap-
plication from Agnitum Security outpost.exe and the main process name
for the personal firewall of the ZoneLabs Internet security zlclient.exe.
If any of these processes is found, then the Zeus malware aborts the installa-
tion process.
5. The Zeus malware appends the path C:/Windows/System32/sdra64.-
exe to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows-
NT/CurrentVersion/Winlogon/Userinit registry key. This entry
enables the Zeus malware to initiate its installation process again during Win-
dows start-up.
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6. Finally, it injects its entire Zeus binary file from the memory address 0x4000-
00 to 0x417000 into the virtual memory of winlogon.exe process. Af-
ter that, Zeus passes the control to this process by creating a new user thread,
which is immediately executed.
Similarly, the bot uses these steps when the infected machine is restarted. However,
there are few steps that are performed only during the initial Zeus installation pro-
cess. These steps are related to the creation of a local copy of the malware in the
infected system for further activities. In the following, we list the main process of
creating a local copy of the malware.
(a) The Zeus malware searches for any existing copies of previous Zeus infection
files sdra64.exe, and then erases them from the infected machine. This
behavior would occur when the Zeus binary file is being updated with a newer
version of the malware.
(b) It makes an exact copy of itself and then saves it to C:/Windows/System-
32/sdra64.exe. To evade signature-based detection systems, it appends
some randomly generated bytes to the end of the file.
(c) In order to hide itself, the bot duplicates the Modification, Access, and Cre-
ation times (MAC times) information from Ntdll.dll library, and applies
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them to the sdra64.exe. The intent of this is to make sdra64.exe ap-
pears to be a system file that has been around since Windows was first in-
stalled.
(d) In another level of hiding the created file, it sets the sdra64.exe file at-
tributes to system and hidden, so that the user cannot see the file using the
standard file explorer.
At this stage, the malware is already injected within the winlogon.exe running
process. On the other hand, the currently running bot exits and leaves the control
to the injected process. However, the installation procedure is continued by the
user thread that was started in the winlogon.exe process, as described in step
6. From the injection process, we infer that the entire Zeus binary file is copied
into the winlogon.exe process. Therefore, the injected Zeus instance starts by
removing the remaining two layers of the obfuscation by applying Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2. When the injected malware decrypts all the strings, the Zeus instance
employs the piggyback thread technique (to control the infected system through le-
gitimate process) within the winlogon.exe process. However, Zeus instances
only perform few tasks before they create another thread and exit themselves. This
is another attempt by the designers of the Zeus malware to evade detection. Af-
terwards, the Zeus instance starts injecting itself into another process, namely the
svchost.exe process. This injected process initiates a communication channel
with the C&C server to download the latest updates on the configuration file and
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the malware itself. Later, the targeted processes get injected with the latest malware
payload and then activate the process of stealing information through API hooking
techniques. During the malware update process, the following changes were ob-
served on the file system:
1. A new folder is created at the path C:/Windows/System32/lowsec.
Hiding techniques similar to those that are applied to the file sdra64.exe
are also applied to the created folder.
2. Two new files, local.ds and user.ds, are created and placed in the new
created folder. The file user.ds stores the dynamic configuration file, and
the file local.ds logs the stolen information until the Zeus malware is ready
to send it to the drop location.
The malware that resides on the winlogon.exe process acts as the brain for the
Zeus malware activities. It communicates and coordinates all the infected processes
using the named pipe _AVIRA_2109. Table 3.2 shows the list of the commands
that are supported by the Zeus malware.
• Key Extraction: Zeus botnet uses a configuration file that contains a static informa-
tion. Specifically, this part of the configuration is stored inside the malware binary
file in a specific structure. During the de-obfuscation processes, this structure is re-
covered and placed in the virtual memory (In our analysis, starting at 0x416000).
All information in the structure is completely de-obfuscated except for two URLs:
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Command Purpose Return Value
1 Retrieve Zeus version number 4 bytes in a buffer
2 Retrieve name of the botnet Ascii string in buffer
3 Uninstall Bot n/a
4 Open the local.ds file or create it if it does not exist n/a
5 Close the local.ds file n/a
6 Open the user.ds or create it if it does not exist n/a
7 Close the user.ds n/a
8 Close the sdra64.exe n/a
9 Open the sdra64.ex n/a
10 Retrieve loader file path Wide character string
11 Retrieve configuration file path Wide character string
12 Retrieve log file path Wide character string
13 Crash the winlogon process intentionally n/a
Table 3.2: List of the Zeus malware commands
url_compip and url_config. These URLs can be de-obfuscated using Algo-
rithm 2. The URL url_compip is the web location to determine the IP address of
the infected host, and the url_config is the web location to download the con-
figuration file for the botnet. The static configuration structure also contains an RC4
substitution table that is generated by the encryption key specified in the configura-
tion file. Throughout our analysis, we noticed that the substitution table was gener-
ated by the RC4s key-scheduling algorithm and then we verified that the encryption
employed by Zeus is done by the RC4 algorithm. The recovered static configuration
can be used in different ways to gain some control over the botnet. The most valu-
able piece of information is the substitution table, which can be used to decrypt all
the communications of the Zeus botnet. Moreover, it can be used to decrypt the con-
figuration file as well as the stolen information. In order to recover the static con-
figuration structure described above, we have to go through all the de-obfuscation
phases. This requires executing the malware until it finishes all the de-obfuscation
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layers. Emulation techniques are considered as a safe and fast procedures to achieve
our goals. Using Python scripting language along with the IDAPython plugin [6],
we were able to emulate all the de-obfuscation routines and extract the substitution
table from the static configuration structure. These extracted keys allows decrypt-
ing the botnet communication traffic and all the encrypted files. Similarly, it allows
us to extract any information from the static configuration structure, such as the
URLs for any future updates, which point to the C&C servers. Our experimental
results show that any sub-version of Zeus (v.1.2.x.x) can be fully analyzed using
our methodology because it holds the same logical blocks.
Packet Decryption
After extracting the RC4 encryption key, we used it to decrypt the botnet communications.
By decrypting the transmitted HTTP payload, we are able to uncover the structure of the
messages between the bot and the C&C server. We analyzed the structure of the HTTP
POST messages (POST /gate.php) which carries all the updates and reports from the
bots to the C&C server. Each bot posts a variable number of encrypted bytes based on
the sent data to the C&C server in a specific structure. The payload is encrypted using an
RC4 encryption algorithm only. As depicted in Figure 3.13, we restore the structure of
the messages as follows:
1. Each message starts with a header that consists of 28-bytes. This header contains
an MD5 hash value for the rest of the message.
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8E020000 0000000000000000 0C0000005B626D42FC682051D56D72A4
20270000 00000000 0D010000 0D010000
Message length Unknown Md5 hash value












4-bytes 4-bytes 4-bytes 4-bytes
4-bytes 8-bytes 16-bytes
Figure 3.13: A Decrypted Sample Message
2. As shown in Figure 3.13, the rest of the message follows in the form of repeated
data blocks where each block consists of:
(a) An entry header with 16-bytes that contains information about the current data
entry. The first 4-bytes serve as the type of the reported information, which can
be recognized by the bot and the control panel. The third 4-bytes determine
the length of the carried information.
(b) A variable number of bytes that is specified in the entry header. These bytes
represent one piece of the information that is transmitted within this packet.
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It should be noted that the encrypted communication of the Zeus botnet is vulner-
able to the RC4 key-stream re-use attack because there is no Initialization Vector (IV)
setup in every session, i.e., the same RC4 key-stream is reused to encrypt all messages.
3.4 Conclusion
The aforementioned case studies have been highly considered by malware researchers
at the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) Canada as well as aca-
demic and industry researchers worldwide. The analysis done in both case studies set a
knowledge to a malware research initiative leading to other case studies done by Rahimian
et al. [171] and Andriesse et al. [21]. The former has shown that Citadel botnet is an
advanced version of Zeus botnet, the latter addressed a P2P variant of Zeus, namely,
GameOver Zeus. In addition, other works have been conducted at Concordia University,
e.g., works done on malware authorship attribution [16], fingerprinting re-usability of
malware functions [17] and the identification of malware binaries creation process [170].
Based on the different findings illustrated in this chapter, showing how threats like Mari-
posa and Zeus can be innovative, it is of paramount importance to investigate who poten-
tially pulls the strings behind elaborated threats. As such, we decide in the next chapter,
to look at the cyber-threat infrastructures used to orchestrate botnets and advanced threats
activities. We discuss an investigation done on one year malware dynamic analysis re-





In this chapter, we present a study to investigate cyber-threats and the underlying in-
frastructures. More precisely, we detect and analyze cyber-threat infrastructures for the
purpose of unveiling key players (owners, domains, IP addresses, organizations, mal-
ware families, etc.) and the relationships between these players. To this end, we propose
metrics to measure the badness of different infrastructure elements using graph theoretic
concepts such as centrality concepts and Google PageRank. In addition, we quantify
the sharing of infrastructure elements among different malware samples and families to
unveil potential groups that are behind specific attacks. Moreover, we study the evolu-
tion of cyber-threat infrastructures over time to infer patterns of cyber-criminal activi-
ties. The proposed study provides the capability to derive insights and intelligence about
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cyber-threat infrastructures. Using one year dataset, we generate important results regard-
ing emerging threats and campaigns, important players behind threats, linkages between
cyber-threat infrastructure elements, patterns of cyber-crimes, etc. The remainder of this
chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe our approach to investigate
cyber-threat infrastructures. In Section 4.3, we provide statistics and insights generated
from the analysis of cyber-threat infrastructures. Finally, we conclude with a discussion
and future works in Section 4.4.
4.2 Approach
In this section, we present a framework to collect insights and intelligence out of dynamic
malware analysis. Malware samples tend to exhibit a cooperative strategy with remote
malicious domains and IPs to perpetrate malicious activities, e.g., stealing credentials,
spams propagation, advanced DDoS attacks, etc. In the light of these facts, we aim to
design and integrate an approach to generate cyber-threat intelligence for the purpose of
identifying the infrastructures used by malware to threaten the cyber-space. Our approach
to generate cyber-threat intelligence is depicted in Figure 4.1. The approach falls into: (1)
data collection, (2) cyber-threat graph generation, (3) descriptive statistics, (4) badness



















































Figure 4.1: Approach Overview
4.2.1 Data Collection
We collect malware samples on a daily basis from a trusted third party. These malware
samples are analyzed through a sandbox technology to monitor malware behavior on
either physical or virtual machines. The malware behavior is stored in XML reports. We
usually manage to get an average of 45, 000 malware reports per day. For each report,
we extract the domains visited by malware samples, IPs resolving to these domains and
IPs directly connected by malware through FTP, SMTP, IRC servers as well as plain UDP
and TCP connections. Meanwhile, we use VirusTotal [211] malware naming schema to
get malware family information out of 54 anti-virus engines. In addition, we use Whois
database [220] to get domains and IP records. The intent is to gather domains’ owners,
administrative and technical support people, organizations, registrars, physical addresses,
network names and name-servers.
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Figure 4.2: Cyber-threat Infrastructure Schema
Based on the data collected from dynamic malware analysis and Whois database,
we define a cyber-threat infrastructure as the set of entities involved in malware activities
(Figure 4.2). The different components that constitute a cyber-threat infrastructure are:
malware, domains, IP addresses, FTP servers, SMTP servers, IRC channels, timestamps,
organizations, registrars, technical people, administrative people and domain owners. The
interaction between the infrastructure components is as follows: A malware tends to visit
domains, which can be command and control servers (C&Cs) or re-directions of legiti-
mate domains to malicious proxies or C&Cs. These domains are resolved to IP addresses.
They also usually have second-level domains. On another hand, malware can connect to
FTP servers to upload stolen information or download other malware binaries. Malware
can also connect to SMTP servers to conduct spamming activities or IRC channels to in-
teract with IRC botnets. They can also connect directly through non-conventional TCP
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and UDP protocols for the purpose of cooperating with infected machines or C&Cs. FT-
P/SMTP servers and IRC channels can be hosted within a second-level domain server.
The latter is registered within a registrar and sponsored by an organization. It can have
an administrative contact, a technical support contact and an owner. Each domain or a
second-level domain has a creation timestamp, expiration timestamp and passive DNS
first/last seen timestamps. An organization can have more than one IP block and be lo-
cated in different countries.
We represent cyber-threat infrastructures as a complex network of directed graphs.
The vertices of the graph represent components of cyber-threat infrastructures, i.e., mal-
ware, domains, IPs, FTP/SMTP servers, IRC channels, organizations, registrars, techni-
cal/administrative people, domain owners and physical addresses. Collection timestamps
are properties of malware nodes, whereas first/last seen timestamps, creation and expira-
tion timestamps are properties of second-level domains.
Figure 4.3 illustrates a directed graph representing a cyber-threat infrastructure. The
red vertices represent malware samples connecting to domains (blue vertices). Both of
these domains resolve to the same IP address (yellow vertex). Owners, organizations and
registrars are represented by green vertices.
The increasing number of vertices appearing in cyber-threat infrastructures make











Figure 4.3: Example of a Cyber-threat Infrastructure
Figure 4.4: Components representing Cyber-threat Infrastructures
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infrastructures. To overcome the complexity of cyber-threat graphs, we use a graph ab-
straction technique, where we decompose heterogeneous directed graphs (vertices rep-
resenting many types) into homogenous weighted graphs. To illustrate the abstraction,
we consider the case of malware samples sharing two domains. Initially, each vertex vi,
representing a malware sample, is linked to two vertices, vd1 and vd2, representing visited
domains. This sub-graph is abstracted to two linked vertices vd1 and vd2, representing
domains. The edge between vd1 and vd2 is labeled with the number of malware shared by
these domains. Figure 4.5 depicts the abstraction of cyber-threat infrastructure graphs. By
performing abstraction, we create the following sub-graphs: (1) Domain-Malware graph:
Domains are linked if they are visited by shared malware samples. (2) Domain-IP graph:
Domains are linked if they resolve to shared IPs. (3) IP-Malware graph: IPs are linked
if shared malware samples connect to. (4) Owner-Malware graph: Owners are linked if
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they own domains that are visited by shared malware samples. (5) Owner-Physical ad-
dress graph: Owners are linked if they register different domains with the same physical
addresses. (6) Organization-Malware graph: Organizations are linked if they have IPs
connected by shared malware samples.
4.2.3 Badness Scoring
In this research effort, we put an emphasis on finding what are the key players in cyber-
threat infrastructures. The importance of vertices in a network graph is known as vertex’s
centrality. The latter represents a real-valued function produced to provide a ranking,
which identifies the most important nodes [37]. Despite the fact that different centralities,
namely, degree centrality [177], closeness centrality [51, 199], betweenness centrality
[75], and Eigen-vector centrality [36], are widely used in the analysis of different social
networks, we are mostly interested in evaluating the importance or influence of different
characters in cyber-threat infrastructures. For this purpose, some algorithms have been
defined, such as, Hypertext Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm [106] and Google’s
PageRank algorithm [42]. In our approach, we adopt Google’s PageRank algorithm due
to its efficiency, feasibility, less query time cost, and less susceptibility to localized links
[79]. In the sequel, we briefly introduce the PageRank algorithm and the random-surfer
model.
Definition 4.2.1 (PageRank). Let I(vi) be the set of vertices that link to a vertex vi and
let degout(vi) be the out-degree centrality of a vertex vi. The PageRank of a vertex vi,
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+ (1− d) 1|D| (4.1)
In the aforementioned formula, the constant d is called damping factor. Its value is
generally assumed to be set to 0.85 [42]. From Equation 5.1, we can have one equation per
vertex vi with an equal number of unknown PR(vi) values. Assuming that the PageRank
values PR(vi) sum up to 1 (sumni=1PR(vi) = 1), then the PageRank algorithm tries
to find out iteratively different PageRank values. This algorithm has been developed
intuitively considering a user surfing the Web, starting from a web page and randomly
visiting another web page through a link. If the user is on page vj with a probability
d (damping factor), then the probability for this user to visit another page vi is equal to
1
degout(vj)
. With a probability of 1− d, the user will stop following links and pick another
random page in V . Since the web-surfing process shows randomness, the authors of the
PageRank algorithm claim that the PageRank values can be computed through a stochastic
process. Thus, a stochastic transition matrix W is defined. The vertices ranking values





+ (1− d) 1|D|
~1 (4.2)





if a vertex vj is linked to vi
wij = 0 otherwise
The notation ~R stands for a vector where its ith element is PR(vi) (PageRank of
vi). The notation ~1 stands for a vector having all elements equal to 1. The computa-
tion of PageRank values is done iteratively by defining a convergence stopping criterion
. At each computation step t, a new vector ( ~PR, t) is generated based on previous
vector values ( ~PR, t − 1). The algorithm stops computing values when the condition
|( ~PR, t) − ( ~PR, t − 1)| <  is satisfied. In our case, since graphs are abstracted to
weighted undirected graphs, the out-degree centrality of a vertex vi is similar to the de-
gree centrality. However, the weights of edges for each vertex are normalized with values
between 0 and 1. The definition of the stochastic matrix W is slightly changed to:
wij = eij × 1degout(vj) if a vertex vj is linked to vi
wij = 0 otherwise
eij: edge (vi,vj) (normalized weight value)
The reason behind using PageRank algorithm to compute badness of vertices, lies
in: (1) Scores are computed through a stochastic approach, which reflects randomness
in the evolution of a model. With respect to cyber-threat infrastructures, we assume that
there exists a random evolution, on a daily basis, in the appearance of malware sam-
ples, domains, IPs, servers, organizations, owners and registrars. Such appearance of new
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vertices impacts the evolution of badness scores. (2) The random web-surfer model il-
lustrates how web pages can be accessed with a probability value (damping factor). In
analogy with cyber-threat infrastructures, the probabilistic approach is interesting since
it reflects potential actions done through infected machines: A malicious domain can be
visited through an infected machine, an IP address can be connected by infected machines
or resolved to a malicious domain or a server, an FTP server can be used to upload stolen
information, an SMTP server can be used to launch spam or phishing campaigns, an IRC
channel can be used to instruct bots to launch DDoS attacks, malware propagation or
other malicious activities.
4.2.4 Patterns Inference
Here, we aim to closely study how cyber-threat infrastructures evolve over time. To
this end, we target the identification of discernible regularities and irregularities in such
infrastructures by isolating observable patterns in the generated graphs. In cyber-threat
infrastructures, a pattern is associated with possible relationships between domains, IPs,
owners and organizations. To infer patterns, we compute similarities between graphs
collected on a daily basis.
Computation of similarity between graphs is a challenging task especially when
dealing with large-scale evolving graphs. To overcome this challenge, we resort to the
so-called graph kernels [77, 172, 215]. A graph kernel is a function that computes the
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h11, h12, ..., h1m
Figure 4.6: Fingerprinting Approach
kernel methods generate vectors with high dimensions that are not easy to handle. To ad-
dress this issue, graph kernel methods require an important process known as fingerprint-
ing [172]. The latter consists of producing compact representations, known as signatures
(or fingerprints), for graph structures based on the generated vectors. Graph similarities
are then computed using these fingerprints. To generate graph fingerprints, we use the
min-hashing technique. Our approach of computing graph similarities is inspired by the
work done by Teixeira et al. [208] who introduced a fingerprinting technique for graph
kernels based on min-hashing. In the sequel, we introduce our methodology used to ob-
serve the presence of patterns and how they are inferred. First, we present the different
steps to compute similarities between graphs, as illustrated in Figure 4.6. These steps fall
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into: (1) decomposition, (2) vector generation, and (3) fingerprinting.
Decomposition
During this step, we decompose each graph, obtained from the abstraction process, into
a set of substructures. These substructures may be obtained based on paths, cycles, trees,
etc. In our approach, we decompose graphs based on paths between graph vertices. In
other words, two vertices v1 and v2 form a substructure if there is an edge between v1 and
v2.
Vector Generation
This step consists of mapping graph substructures into vectors. Algorithm 3 implements
the vectors’ generation process. It takes, as input, a set of substructures S(G), obtained
from decomposing a graph G. For each substructure, we convert it into an integer value
using the formula in line 3, where α is a random number, P is a big prime number such
that 0 < α < P , and L is the labeling function that returns the number of shared malware
between vi and vj .
Algorithm 3 Vector Generation
Input: Graph G,Set of substructures S(G)
Output: V ector V
i := 1
for Substructure(vi, vj) ∈ S(G) do
x := (α L(vi, vj))(mod P )






The vectors generated from the graph substructures might have high dimensionality espe-
cially for large-scale graphs. To reduce the dimensionality of a vector, we use a technique,
known as fingerprinting, to produce a compact representation that is easy to handle. To
this end, we adopt the ideas presented in [208] to fingerprint graphs based on min-hashing.
The fingerprinting method is presented in Algorithm 4. It takes, as input, a vector gen-
erated from the substructures of a graph G and a set of m hash functions h1, h2, ..., hm.
It produces, as output, a fingerprint of graph G, which is a compact representation of the
input vector. The fingerprint consists of a vector of m min-hash values, where m is the
number of hash functions.
Algorithm 4 Fingerprinting
Input: Vector V of a graph G
Input: Set of hash functions H: h1, h2, ..., hm
Output: Graph fingerprint F
for i := 1; i <= |H|; i++ do




Graph similarities are represented through a matrix, where each value is proportional
to the number of values, in the min-hash vectors, that are shared between graph pairs
(Figure 4.6). This matrix is important to group graphs with proportional similarities into
groups that can be good candidates to detect patterns between corresponding min-hash
99
values. The graph similarity matrix provides a big picture of the evolution of cyber-threat
infrastructures over time. However, it needs to be leveraged to extract patterns effectively.
To this end, we propose an algorithm to infer patterns as explained hereafter.
Pattern Time-Based Inference
To extract patterns, we elaborate a time-based inference algorithm (Algorithm 5). This
algorithm takes, as inputs, a similarity matrix, an analysis period (in terms of days), a
time window (usually one day), and a density threshold to filter days where we have low
similarities in the matrix. The algorithm collects common patterns, by sliding the time
window through the analysis period, and checks if the similarity value is higher or equal to
the density threshold. If so, we compute the intersection between patterns found on days
representing the row and column index in the similarity matrix. The collected patterns
are stored in a list structure that we sort at the end to collect the most or less occurring
patterns.
Algorithm 5 Pattern Inference
Input: Simlarity Matrix M ,Analysis Period t,Time Window w,Threshold th
Output: List of patterns P
for i := 1; i <= t; i++ do
for j := i+ 1; j <= i+ w; j ++ do
if M [i][j] >= th then










In the sequel, we present the results of our analysis of cyber-threat infrastructures. The re-
sults include descriptive statistics, badness ranking and patterns inference. It is important
to mention that due to the sensitivity of the collected data, we have anonymized domains,
IPs, organizations and owners.
4.3.1 Dataset Description
Our dataset consists of one year malware data collected from 25th August 2013 to 25th
August 2014. Table 4.1 presents some statistics regarding the collected data. It is impor-
tant to mention that the domains are filtered and do not contain legitimate domains that
are listed in the top one million Alexa white-list domains [1].
Collected Data Statistics
Malware samples 4, 717, 628
Domains 9, 303, 378
Second-level domains 151, 757
IPs that domains resolve to 240, 174
IPs that malware connect to 118, 270
Domain Whois records 110, 414
IP Whois records 287, 005
Table 4.1: Statistics of the Dataset
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we present some descriptive statistics that we generated from our analysis
of cyber-threat infrastructures.
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Domains & Resolving IPs











Table 4.2: Domains vs. Number of Malware
Table 4.2 lists the top-10 most visited second-level domains by malware. We notice
that five out of ten of these domains are legitimate. This can be explained by the fact
that malware samples tend to test connectivity by visiting legitimate domains or redirect-
ing access to legitimate domains to fake web-pages. Malware also connect to legitimate
domains to download vulnerable patches of operating systems or software to exploit vul-












Table 4.3: Domain vs. Number of Resolving IPs
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Table 4.3 lists the top-10 most fast-fluxing domains (domains that resolve to many
IPs). We observe the presence of domains that have the same second-level domain,
nb*.com, and resolve to many IP addresses. One main observation from the aforemen-













Table 4.4: Resolving IPs vs. Number of Domains
Table 4.4 illustrates the most shared resolving IPs between domains. We observe
the presence of resolving IPs belonging to the same IP space. There are two IP spaces
containing many resolving IP addresses. These IPs are listed in blue color. The pres-
ence of common IP spaces implicitly infers that cyber-criminals are prone to use an IP
infrastructure to perpetrate malicious activities, or infect vulnerable IP spaces to let them
be part of their botnets. The IP address listed in red color represents the most resolved
IP. By tracking back associated domains, we observe that it resolves to domains dynam-
ically generated and belonging to the same second-level domain. The domain generator
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associated with this IP generates a set of letters and digits. The length of the chars se-
quence is 30. The second-level domain is *eker.com. Malware families associated with
the top listed IP are: antiav, barys, graftor, injector, ramnit, sality, slugin, swisyn, symmi,












Table 4.5: Network Name vs. Number of Resolving IPs
Table 4.5 lists the number of resolving IPs per network name belonging to organi-
zations. We observe that China has the highest number of resolving IPs since 9 out of 10
network names spread throughout different Chinese regions. There is only one American
network name that is present in the top-10 of network names containing resolving IPs.
Connected IPs
Table 4.6 lists the number of malware that connect to IPs. Connected IPs are directly
accessed by malware through conventional protocols (e.g., FTP, IRC, and SMTP) and un-
conventional TCP and UDP ports. In contrast to resolving IPs, connected IPs are spread













Table 4.6: Connected IP vs. Number of Malware
This can be explained by the absence of fast-fluxing. IPs are dedicated to be a depot of
stolen information, a spamming server, IRC channel, or a nest of other malware samples
ready to be downloaded. The top listed connected IP has been associated with a VPN
anonymity service. We observe a high interaction with this IP and the following mal-
ware families:antiav, barys, esfury, hype, injector, navipromo, pirminay, ramnit, slugin,












Table 4.7: Network Name vs. Number of Connected IPs
Table 4.7 illustrates the number of connected IPs within top-10 network names. We
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observe that 8 out of 10 network names are located in Asian countries. The number of
organizations is 9, among which 3 are Chinese organizations, 2 are Korean and American
organizations. However, top ranking network names belong to a Malaysian and an Indian
organization respectively. The Malaysian network name is associated with 3 malware
samples, namely, a variant of zlob, a variant of zbot, and a variant of proxyTroj. The latter
is a proxy Trojan, which infects computers to play the role of a Command & Control and









Perfect Privacy LLC 274
E*l Y. 187
Whois Privacy Protection Service 184
Private Registrant 163
Oneandone Private Registration 123
Spy Eye 120




Table 4.8: Registrant vs. Number of Domains
Table 4.8 lists the different registrants and the corresponding number of domains.
We notice that people behind suspicious domains use privacy services to protect their
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identities. Thus, there exists a big number of domains that share the same private reg-
istrants. In the aforementioned table, 12 out of 15 registrants are protected by privacy
services and one registrant has a regular name (E*l Y.). We observe also the presence
of a registrant with the name of a well-known malware family, namely, Spy Eye [194].
The domains registered with Spy Eye have been visited by 830 malware samples, mainly
belonging to the following malware families: conjar, fareit, nebuler, zbot and zusy (zbot
variant). All these families are Trojan bots involved in password stealing, downloading
other malware samples, modifying system files and registry, adding startup items to sys-
tems, etc. We also notice that there are 104 domains registered with a message (This do-
main for sale toll free: *-822-*). This phenomenon is known as domains parking, where
blackhat Search Engine Optimization (SEO) people are used to infect machines with mal-
ware samples to contact these domains and make them visible for different search engines.
The more a domain is visible, it is easier to sell it.
Address # Domains
P.O. Box ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ Panama 708
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Northsight blvd PMB**9 USA 379
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Gran bay parkway w. USA 272
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ P.O. Box ∗∗ Beach Australia 228
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗Memorial Dr. #935 USA 186
Ilyinka Street ∗∗ Russia 120
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 24th Street USA 115
∗ ∗ ∗ Lee Road Suite ∗ ∗ 0 USA 108
∗ ∗ ∗Main street #∗ ∗ 9 USA 108
∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ Boulevard Massena France 87
Table 4.9: Physical Address vs. Number of Registered Domains
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Table 4.9 lists the different physical addresses associated with registered second-
level domains. We notice that 708 second-level domains are registered with an address
located in Panama. This address corresponds to a privacy service that hides relevant regis-
trants’ information. This service is prone to suspicious activities since it serves spamming
domains, websites of companies involved in robot-calls and scam abuses.
4.3.3 Badness Ranking
One of the goals of this research effort is to quantify the badness of cyber-threat infras-
tructures’ elements. We use the badness metric on a daily basis to monitor the aliveness
of badness for different IPs, domains, owners or organizations. In the sequel, we provide
a description of different observations found on the computation of badness scores.











Table 4.10: Top-10 Domains Badness Scores
Table 4.10 illustrates the top-10 average badness scores for domains observed on
one year. We notice that 7 out of 10 domains have “.ru” extension. One of the obtained
domains is dynamically generated. An interesting fact is that 5 out of 7 “.ru” domains
108
are registered with the same information (registrant is known as “Private Person” and the
same name servers). The number of associated malware is 830. In addition, these domains
share a lot of malware families, spanning over bot Trojans and bitcoiners, mainly badur,
bitcoinminer, graftor, kryptik (cryptolocker), loadmoney, minggy, strictor, symmi, and
zusy (zbot variant). We suspect that people belonging to the same criminal group use the
same registrant information and are behind bitcoining campaigns and botnet activities.











Table 4.11: Top-10 Connected IPs Badness Scores
Table 4.11 illustrates the top-10 average badness scores for connected IPs. The top
ranked badness IP is the same leading IP “93.xxx.xx.xx0”, observed in Table 4.6. The
same observation can be done on IPs “113.xx.xxx.xx6” and “125.xx.xxx.x4”, which are
present in both Tables. The reason is that these IPs have maintained a badness score
throughout the whole year, whereas other IPs, listed in Table 4.6, have not maintained
their badness score as much as IPs listed in Table 4.11. It is important to notice the
presence of the IP “239.255.255.250”, which is SSDP multicast reserved IP. This IP is
mainly used by what are called Universal Plug and Play (UP&P) malware families, e.g.,
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conficker, downadup and their variants. These malware infect other machines through
vulnerabilities found in Windows server services (e.g., RPC Handling Remote Code Ex-
ecution Vulnerability). In [14, 133], the authors illustrate how UP&P devices can be used
as an infection vector through SSDP protocol. Such vector of infection is still active since
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93.xxx.xx.xx0 46.xxx.xxx.xx9 113.xx.xxx.xx6 220.xxx.xxx7 125.xx.xxx.x4
Figure 4.8: Top-5 IPs Score Trend
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In Figures 4.7 and 4.8, we present the evolution of the badness scores for the top-
5 domains and connected IPs. We observe that the badness of domains has a periodic
badness persistence. For instance, the domain “*entre.ru” had high badness scores during
the first 60 days and the domain “*box.net” had high badness scores during the last 70
days. Similarly, the domain “*spectr.ru” had high badness scores during a period of 40
days, the domain “*file.ru” had high badness scores during a period of 75 days, and the
domain “*sung.ru” had high badness scores during 30 days. However, we can observe
some sporadic changes in scores for all the domains (spikes after observing low badness
ranking). For instance, the domain “*entre.ru” had some changes of scores at days 95,
149, 334 and 345. Similarly, the domain “*spectr.ru” had some changes of scores between
day 195 and day 210 and the domain *sung.ru” had changes of scores at days 96, 150,
335 and 346. In contrast to domains, connected IPs show more sporadic patterns (abrupt
changes of scores). All the observed IPs had idle time period, where their badness scores
were equal to 0. For instance, the IP “93.xxx.xx.xx0” had an abrupt change in day 147
and the IP “113.xx.xxx.xx6” had an abrupt change in day 200.
Figure 4.9 illustrates different owners sharing malware samples in July 2014. The
colored graph network contains different communities, obtained by applying a fast un-
folding community detection algorithm [34], where each color represents a community.
We managed to obtain 23 communities. The graph nodes have been anonymized. Notice
also that the bigger is a node, the higher is its badness score. For instance, the per-
son “A.Di.M” has the highest badness score (0.029), followed by the person “D.VAN.A”
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(score of 0.028). The third place is shared between three persons, namely, “M.K.S.M”,
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Figure 4.9: Registrants Communities and Badness Scores
4.3.4 Patterns Inference
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate the similarity matrix obtained during one year period. A
major observation is that domains have more patterns than connected IPs. Similarly, to
badness ranking, patterns in domains are more persistent and periodic. We observe high
density in the first and last semesters in domain patterns similarity matrix. Connected IPs
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Figure 4.10: Domain Patterns Similarity Matrix
show less periodicity than domains. The presence of patterns tend to be ephemeral and
the maximum period is commonly in the order of 1 to 60 days. However, there exists
some IPs that have some persistence. Such case is illustrated hereafter in the pattern use
cases.
Patterns Days Mal. Owners
f*[dd]75.com;a*[dd]75.com 332 6,045 Registration Private
f*[dd]75.com;w*[dd]88 329 6,046 Registration Private
w*[dd]88.com;a*[dd]75.com 317 5,966 Registration Private
Table 4.12: Domain Patterns Use Case
Table 4.12 shows patterns involving dynamic domains generated in the same way.
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Figure 4.11: IP Patterns Similarity Matrix
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In this case, we have three domain names with two letters followed by two digits. All these
domains share a big number of malware samples (in order of 6, 000 malware samples).
In addition, they have the same owner protected by the same privacy service. Such use
case acknowledges the observation found in Table 4.8, i.e., the hosting companies with a
privacy service are nests for suspicious domains.
Patterns Days Mal. Network Names
220.xxx.xxx.7;125.xx.xxx.x4 317 2123 ORG1-BJ;ORG5
220.xxx.xxx.7;124.xxx.xxx.x1 311 2068 ORG1-BJ;ORG1-HE
221.xxx.xxx.x8;125.xx.xxx.x4 289 1938 ORG6;ORG5
220.xxx.xxx.7;221.xxx.xxx.x8 289 1948 ORG1-BJ;ORG6
124.xxx.xxx.x1;125.xx.xxx.x4 278 1925 ORG1-HE;ORG5
124.xxx.xxx.x1;221.xxx.xxx.x8 123 1836 ORG1-HE;ORG6
Table 4.13: IP Patterns Use Case
Table 4.13 shows IP patterns connected by thousands of malware samples. All these
IPs are located in China, where we observe 4 organizations with 5 network names. All
the patterns have appeared during long time periods: more than 300 days for the two
first patterns, 289 days for the third and fourth patterns and 123 days for the last pattern.
This use case indicates that there is a cluster of IP patterns that represents a collaborative
malware activity in China.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an approach to investigate cyber-threats and the un-
derlying infrastructures. To this end, we have used graph-theory concepts to rank the
badness of different infrastructure elements. This allowed us to identify key players and
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quantify the sharing among these players. This is of paramount importance as it helps to
unveil potential criminal groups. Moreover, we have presented a methodology to track
the evolution of cyber-threat infrastructures over time and infer patterns of cyber-criminal
activities. Using one year dataset collected from dynamic malware analysis, we have de-
rived important insights about cyber-threats. In the next chapter, we rely on another data
extracted from dynamic malware analysis to generate network cyber-threat intelligence.
We use network traces to design and integrate techniques to fingerprint maliciousness in
IP traffic. The fingerprinting is two-fold: a packet header flow-based approach and deep





In this chapter, we address the problem of fingerprinting maliciousness of traffic for the
purpose of detection and classification. We aim first at fingerprinting maliciousness by
using two approaches: Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and IP packet headers classifica-
tion. To this end, we consider malicious traffic generated from dynamic malware analysis
as traffic maliciousness ground truth. In light of this assumption, we present how these
two approaches are used to detect and attribute maliciousness to different threats. In this
chapter, we elaborate a comparative study between two traffic maliciousness fingerprint-
ing techniques, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and IP packet headers classification. We
evaluate each approach based on its detection and attribution accuracy as well as its level
of complexity. The outcomes of both approaches have shown promising results in terms
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of detection; they are good candidates to constitute a synergy to elaborate or corroborate
detection systems in terms of run-time speed and classification precision. In Section 5.2,
we describe how we collect malicious traffic. In Section 5.3, we expose how we finger-
print maliciousness based on packet headers flows. Section 5.4 entails how we fingerprint
maliciousness of packets based on DPI. We entail different results of both approaches in
Section 5.5. We discuss the advantages and drawbacks of proposed fingerprinting ap-
proaches in Section 5.6. Finally, we conclude the chapter with few remarks in Section
5.7.
5.2 Traffic Maliciousness Ground Truth
We execute collected malware samples in a controlled environment (sandbox) to generate
representative malicious traffic. This is used as a ground truth for maliciousness finger-
printing. The sandbox is based on a client-server architecture, where the server sends
malware to clients. It is important to mention that the dynamic analysis setup allows mal-
ware to connect to the Internet to generate inbound/outbound malicious traffic. Figure 5.1
illustrates the dynamic malware analysis topology. We receive an average of 4, 560 mal-
ware samples on a daily basis from a third party. We execute the malware samples in
the sandbox for three minutes. We chose this running period to make sure that we can
handle up to 14, 400 malware runs per day. The period gives the ability to run all mal-
ware samples with a re-submission. The latter is important in case where malware does
not generate network traffic during the initial runs. For each run, a client monitors the
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behavior of each malware and records it into report files. These files contain malware
activities such as file activities, hooking activities, network activities, process activities,
and registry activities. The setup of dynamic malware analysis lies in a network, which is
composed of a server and 30 client machines. The server runs with an Intel(R) CoreTM
i7 920@2.67 GHz, Ubuntu 11 64 bit operating system and 12.00 GB of physical memory
(RAM). Each client runs with an Intel(R) CoreTM 2 6600@2.40 GHz, Microsoft Win-
dows XP Professional 32-bit operating system and 1.00 GB of physical memory. Such
physical machines are used for the reason that some malware samples cannot run in vir-
tual machines. As a downstream outcome of the aforementioned dynamic analysis, we
gathered the underlying traffic pcap files that were generated. The dynamic malware anal-
ysis has generated approximately 100, 000 pcap files labeled with the hashes of malware,
which corresponds to a size of 3.6 GB. In our work, we considered inbound and out-
bound traffic generated by malware labeled by Kaspersky malware naming schema [3].
The reasons behind using this naming schema are as follows: (1) We noticed that it
manages to cover the naming of the majority of malware samples considered in exper-
iments. (2) The malware naming provided by Kaspersky follows the malware convention
name (Type.Platform.Family.Variant). The number of bidirectional flows is 96, 235 and










1- The Server sends malware sample to clients.
2- The Server collects malware behavior reports and pcaps.
1- Clients run malware samples and report their activities in reports and pcaps.
2- Clients send reports and pcaps to the server.
Figure 5.1: Dynamic Malware Analysis Topology
5.3 Packet Headers Flow-Based Fingerprinting
In this section, we describe how packet headers flow fingerprinting is done. By finger-
printing, we mean (1) malicious traffic detection and (2) malware family attribution. First,
for detection, we extract bidirectional flow features from malicious traces generated from
dynamic malware analysis, together with benign traces collected from trusted third par-
ties. These features are used by classification algorithms to create models that segregate
malicious from benign traffic (see Section 5.3.1). Regarding attribution, we elaborate non-
deterministic malware family attribution based on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [65].
The attribution is done through probabilistic scores for different sequences of malicious
labeled unidirectional flows. The obtained models act as probabilistic signatures charac-
terizing malware families.
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5.3.1 Malicious Traffic Detection
Malicious traffic detection’s goal is to isolate malicious communication sessions. These
sessions include flows used to perform various malicious activities (e.g., malware pay-
load delivery, DDoS, credentials theft). These flows are usually intermingled with a large
portion of IP traffic that corresponds to benign activities over computer networks. As
such, maliciousness detection amounts to the segregation of malicious from benign flows.
To this end, we represent flows through a set of attributes (features) that capture their
network behaviors. By leveraging these features, we create classifiers that automatically
generate models to detect malicious traffic. With this in mind, we define four phases to
infer maliciousness at the network level: selecting and extracting the bidirectional flow
features, labeling of the traffic (malicious and benign), training machine learning algo-
rithms, and evaluating the classifiers produced by these algorithms. Figure 5.2 illustrates
















Figure 5.2: Flow-Based Detection Approach
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Benign Traffic Datasets
For the purpose of building a classification model that distinguishes between malicious
and benign traffic, we collected benign traffic from WISNET [8] and private companies.
These datasets have been built to evaluate Intrusion Detection Systems in terms of false
alerts and to detect anomalies in network traffic. In our work, we use such datasets to
build baseline knowledge for benign traffic. These datasets have been used together with
the malicious traffic dataset to assess classification algorithms in terms of accuracy, false
positives and negatives. Table 5.1 shows the number of benign flows in each dataset.
The different datasets used in this work illustrate four different location datasets, namely,
residential setting, research laboratory, ISP edge router and private company networks.
Source Bidirectional Flows Traffic Source
WisNet (Home) 10, 513 (85MB) Residential setting
WisNet (ISP) 65, 000 (1.1GB) Research laboratory
WisNet (SOHO) 16, 504 (1.3GB) Edge router of an ISP
Private 64, 004 (5.6GB) Private company
Table 5.1: Benign Datasets
Bidirectional Flow Features Extraction
We capture malicious network traces from the execution of malware binaries in Threat-
Track’s sandbox [210]. We label these traces accordingly as malicious, while the clean
traffic traces obtained from trusted third parties [8] are labeled as benign. Flow features
are extracted from these labeled network traces to capture the characteristics of malicious
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and benign traffic. It is important to mention that these features can be extracted even
when the traffic is encrypted, as they are derived from flow packets headers. The flow
features exploited are mainly based on flow duration, direction, inter-arrival time, number
of exchanged packets, and packets size.
Features
1 Flow Duration
2 Number of forward packets
3 Number of backward packets
4 Protocol
5 Minimum inter-arrival time for forward packets
6 Maximum inter-arrival time for forward packets
7 Mean inter-arrival time for forward packets
8 Std deviation inter-arrival time for forward packets
9 Total forward packets size
10 Minimum forward packets size
11 Maximum forward packets size
12 Mean forward packets size
13 Std deviation forward packets size
14 Minimum inter-arrival time for backward packets
15 Maximum inter-arrival time for backward packets
16 Mean inter-arrival time for backward packets
17 Std deviation inter-arrival time for backw. packets
18 Total backward packets size
19 Minimum backward packets size
20 Maximum backward packets size
21 Mean backward packets size
22 Std deviation backward packets size
Table 5.2: Bidirectional Flow Features
A bidirectional flow is a sequence of IP packets that share the 5-TCP-tuple (source
IP, destination IP, source port number, destination port number, protocol). The outbound
traffic is represented by the forward direction, while the backward direction represents the
inbound traffic. In terms of design and implementation, the module in charge of network
traces parsing, labeling, and feature extraction reads traffic using jNetPcap API [2], which
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decodes captured network flows in real-time or offline. This module produces values for
different features from network flows. The resulted values are stored in features files that
are provided to Weka [7]. The network traces parser represents each flow by a vector of
22 flow features. Table 5.2 illustrates the description of the bidirectional flow features.
Traffic Classification
The feature files resulting from the previous phase are provided as input to classification
algorithms. The intent is to build models that have the ability to distinguish between
malicious and benign flows. To this end, we use machine learning algorithms, namely,
Boosted J48, J48, Naïve Bayesian, Boosted Naïve Bayesian, and SVMs. The classifica-
tion module is based on a Java wrapper that runs these machine learning algorithms. The
module has two execution phases: learning and testing. In the learning phase, we build
the classifier using 70% of malicious and benign traces. In the testing phase, we evaluate
the classifier with the rest of the data (30%). It is important to mention that training and
testing datasets do not overlap with each other. In the sequel, we give a brief overview of
the classification algorithms.
J48 Algorithm: It is a Java implementation of C4.5 classification algorithm [169].
J48 [73] builds the tree by dividing the training data space into local regions in recursive
splits. The split is pure if all observations in a decision branch belong to the same class.
To split the training dataset, J48 computes the goodness of each attribute (feature) to be
the root of a decision branch. It begins by computing the information need factor. The J48
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algorithm splits recursively datasets to sub-datasets and computes the information need
per feature. If the split is not pure (presence of many classes), the same process will be
used to split the sub-dataset into pure classes. The split stops if each sub-dataset belongs
to one class (pure split). The decision tree result is composed of nodes (the attributes) and
terminal leaves (classes). That will be used to identify the unseen data when the model is
deployed [84].
Naïve Bayesian Algorithm: It is based on Bayes’ theorem [84]. It is a statistical
classifier, which outputs a set of probabilities that show how likely a tuple (observation)
may belong to a specific class [84]. Naïve Bayesian assumes that the attributes are mutu-
ally independent. Naïve Bayesian starts by computing the probability of an observation.
Once the probabilities are computed, Naïve Bayesian associates each observation with the
class that has the higher probability with it. Naïve Bayesian is an incremental classifier,
which means that each training sample will increase or decrease the probability that a
hypothesis is correct.
Boosting Algorithm: It is a method used to construct a strong classifier from a
weak learning algorithm. Given a training dataset, the boosting algorithm incremen-
tally builds the strong classifier from multi-instances of a weak learning machine algo-
rithm [76]. Boosting algorithm takes, as input, the training dataset and the weak learn-
ing algorithm. It divides the training dataset into many sub-datasets (x1, y1), ..., (xi, yj),
where xi belongs to X (a set of observations) and yj belongs to Y (set of class attribute
values), and calls the weak learning algorithm to build the model for each sub-dataset.
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The resulted models are called decision stumps. The latter examine the features and re-
turn the decision tree with two leaves either +1 if the observation is in a class, or −1
if it is not the case. The leaves are used for binary classification (in case the problem is
multi-classes, the leaves are classes). Boosting algorithm uses the majority voting schema
between decision stumps to build a stronger model.
SVM Algorithm: The Support Vector Machines (SVM) [74, 85] algorithm is de-
signed for discrimination, which is meant for prediction and classification of qualitative
variables (features) [156]. The basic idea is to represent the data in a landmark, where
the different axes are represented by the features. The SVM algorithm constructs a hyper-
plane or set of hyper-planes in a high-dimensional data. Then, it searches for the hyper-
plane that has the largest distance to the nearest training data points of any class. The
larger is the distance, the lower is the error of the classification.
5.3.2 Malicious Traffic Attribution
The attribution of malicious traffic to malware families corroborates detection since it (1)
shifts the anti-malware industry from the system level to the network level, and (2) eases
the mitigation of infected machines. It gives the ability to networking staff to undertake
actions against botnets, depots of stolen information, spammers, etc. For instance, if
an administrator notices the presence of malicious traffic in the network, and this traffic
can be attributed to a bot family. He/She responds to the threat by blocking malicious
connections and quarantine infected machines for a removal of malware. Thus, to enhance
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maliciousness fingerprinting at the network level, we decide to integrate the malware
family attribution. To do so, we use network traces obtained from dynamic malware
analysis and index them with malware families. For each set of traces belonging to a
malware family, we extract sequences of unidirectional flows. These flows are labeled
through a clustering method. The labeled sequences obtained are used to train HMMs
for different malware families. Figure 5.3 illustrates how malware families’ attribution is
performed.
















Figure 5.3: Non-Deterministic Approach for Malware Family Attribution
Malware Family Indexation
As a downstream outcome of dynamic malware analysis, we collect approximately 100, 0-
00 network traces (pcap files). Each trace is labeled by the corresponding malware sample
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hash. We use Kaspersky malware name schema to recognize the malware family of each
hash. Subsequently, we index network traces based on their malware family. In this work,
we obtain 294 malware families.
Sequencing Flows
For each malware family, we browse collected network traces to extract unidirectional
flows. These flows fall into inbound and outbound flows, which are used to build se-
quences of flows. For each sequence, a flow precedes another flow if its timestamp occur-
rence precedes the timestamp of the following flow. Obtained sequences are indexed by
their corresponding malware family.
Labeling Sequences
In order to label different flows belonging to a sequence, we adopt a clustering approach.
The reason behind doing so is to characterize outbound and inbound malicious flows into
clusters representing their network behaviors. To do so, we represent flows by vectors of
45 features. Table 5.3 illustrates unidirectional flow features. To perform clustering of in-
bound/outbound traffic, we generate feature files that are readable by CLUTO clustering
toolkit [112]. This was used in diverse research topics such as information retrieval [241]
and fraud detection [162]. To label flows, we use the k-means Repeated Bi-Section al-
gorithm [198] implemented in CLUTO. This algorithm belongs to partitional clustering




1 Total number of packets.
2 Flow duration
3 Minimum inter-arrival time
4 First quartile of inter-arrival times
5 Median of inter-arrival times
6 Mean of inter-arrival times
7 Third quartile of inter-arrival times
8 Maximum inter-arrival time
9 Variance of inter-arrival times
10 Minimum of control data size
11 First quartile of control data size
12 Median of control data size
13 Mean of control data size
14 Third quartile of control data size
15 Maximum of control data size
16 Variance of control data size
17 Total not empty packets
18 Total packets size
Ethernet
19 Minimum size in Ethernet packets
20 First quartile size in Ethernet packets
21 Median size in Ethernet packets
22 Mean size in Ethernet packets
23 Third quartile size in Ethernet packets
24 Maximum size in Ethernet packets
25 variance size in Ethernet packets
Network
26 Minimum size in IP packets
27 First quartile size in IP packets
28 Median size in IP packets
29 Mean size in IP packets
30 Third quartile size in IP packets
31 Maximum size in IP packets
32 Variance size in IP packets
Transport
33 Total ACK packets
34 Total PUSH packets
35 Total SYN packets
36 Total FINE packets
37 Total Urgent packets
38 Total Urgent bytes
39 Minimum TCP segment size
40 Maximum TCP segment size
41 Mean TCP segment size
42 Minimum TCP window size
43 Maximum TCP window size
44 Mean TCP window size
45 Total empty TCP window packet
Table 5.3: Unidirectional Flow Features
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a low computational cost [15, 113]. The k-means RBS algorithm derives clustering solu-
tions based on a global criterion function [239]. This algorithm initially creates 2 groups,
each group is then bisected until the criterion function is optimized. The k-means RBS
algorithm uses the vector space model [178] to represent each unidirectional flow. Each
flow is represented by a dimension vector fv = (f1, f2, . . . , fi), where fi is the ith uni-
directional flow feature. To compute similarity between vectors, we use the cosine func-
tion [178]. In order to cluster different unidirectional flows, we use a hybrid criterion
function that is based on internal and external functions. The internal function tries to
maximize the average pairwise similarities between flows that are assigned to each clus-
ter. Unlike the internal criterion function, the external function derives the solution based
on how the various clusters are different from each other. The hybrid function combines
external and internal functions to simultaneously optimize both of them. Based on the
k-means RBS algorithm, we create a set of experiments: inbound flow clustering solu-
tions and outbound flow clustering solutions. We choose a solution where the internal
similarity metric (ISIM) is high and the external similarity metric (ESIM) is moderate.
Hidden Markov Modeling
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a popular statistical tool that models timeseries or
sequential data. In this work, we use HMMs to create non-deterministic models that pro-
file malware families. We want to establish a systematic approach to estimate attribution
of unidirectional flow sequences to different malware families. We choose HMMs due to
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their readability since they allow sequences to be significantly interpreted, represented,
and scored. We observe that collected flows have different lengths, and therefore decide
to train HMMs based on sub-sequences with fixed length m. In order to fix the number
of states in HMMs, we set a sliding window n to represent different combinations of in-
bound and outbound flows. For instance, if we want HMM states to represent a singular
flow, there exist two possibilities: IN and OUT . If we want HMM states to represent a
sequence of two flows, there are four possibilities: IN/IN , IN/OUT , OUT/OUT and
OUT/IN . Similarly, if we want HMM states to represent a sequence of n flows, we ob-
tain 2n states. To train HMMs for each malware family with corresponding sequences, we
use the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [132] integrated in the HMMall tool-
box for MATLAB [146] to learn hidden parameters of each 2n state HMM representing a
malware family.
Hidden Markov Models Initialization
To create models for different malware families, we initiate baseline HMMs. The states
are computed based on a sliding window that we apply on observed sequences. The
sliding window allows us to extract sub-sequences from sequences. For instance, for
a sequence (a, b, c) and a sliding window of length 2, we obtain sub-sequences (a, b),
(b, c). If we consider a HMM based on a sliding window of 1 flow, we result in 2 states
HMM since we can have an inbound flow or an outbound flow. If a HMM is based






























Figure 5.5: Four-State Initialization HMM
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inbound/outbound pair, an outbound/outbound pair and an outbound/inbound pair. In
initialized HMMs, prior probabilities are uniformly distributed over different states. For
instance, if we consider a sliding window of length 2, we obtain 4 states HMM with a prior
probability of 0.25 for each state. The transition probabilities matrix is initialized such
that for each transition between a state si and other states, the probabilities are uniformly
distributed. If a state has 2 transitions, each transition has a probability of 0.5. The
emission probabilities matrix associates a state with an observation vector. Each element
of the vector is a probability of observing an inbound or outbound clustering label. For
the sake of simplicity, we illustrate, in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 initialization HMMs for a
sliding window length of 1 and 2 respectively. The observation probabilities are uniformly
distributed. Let us consider x as the number of input labels and y as the number of output
labels. For a 2-state HMM, we associate with the state IN an observation vector, where:
∀i ∈ [1, x]: b(ini) = 1/x
∀j ∈ [1, y]: b(outj) = 0
Similarly, we associate with the state OUT an observation vector, where:
∀i ∈ [1, x]: b(ini) = 0
∀j ∈ [1, y]: b(outj) = 1/y
For a 4-state HMM, we associate with the state IN/IN an observation vector,
where:
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∀i ∈ [1, x]: b(ini) = 1/x
∀j ∈ [1, y]: b(outj) = 0
Similarly, we associate with the state OUT/OUT an observation vector, where:
∀i ∈ [1, x]: b(ini) = 0
∀j ∈ [1, y]: b(outj) = 1/y
Regarding states OUT/IN and IN/OUT , the observation vector is as follows:
∀i ∈ [1, x]: b(ini) = 1/(x+ y)
∀j ∈ [1, y]: b(outj) = 1/(x+ y)
Recursively, for a 2n-state HMM, the observation vectors are the same as a 4-state
HMM. If the states contain IN and OUT , the probabilities are equal to 1/(x+ y). If the
states contain just IN , the probabilities are equal to 1/x for all inbound labels and 0 for
all outbound labels. Similarly, if the states contain just OUT , the probabilities are equal
to 1/y for all outbound labels and 0 for all inbound labels.
5.4 Signal and NLP DPI Fingerprinting
In the sequel, we describe the DPI approach to detect maliciousness in network traffic.
The methodology used to analyze malicious packets is described in Section 5.4.1, whereas
the different knowledge base machine learning techniques are introduced in Section 5.4.2.
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Section 5.4.3 describes the different steps to classify packets. In this approach, we look
at the packets, including both headers and payloads. Packets are considered as signals
inputs for fast spectral-based classification.
5.4.1 Core Principles
The essence of the whole packet analysis lies in the core principles, which fall into ma-
chine learning and Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques. A set of malicious
packets (a network trace) is treated as a data stream signal, where n-grams are used to
build a sample amplitude value in the signal. In our case, we use bi-grams (n = 2) (two
consecutive characters or bytes) to construct the signal. The reasons behind using bi-
grams lay in: (1) It has shown its effectiveness in detecting C&Cs channels [82]; (2) it
is well established artifact integrated in the MARF framework and used to analyze signal
and Natural Language Processing (NLP).
Similarly to the aforementioned approach, the whole packet methodology has two
phases: (1) The training phase, where MARFPCAT learns from different samples of net-
work traces and generates spectral signatures using signal processing techniques; and (2)
the testing phase, where MARFPCAT computes how similar or distant training network
traces are from testing network traces. This approach is meant to behave like a signature-
based anti-virus or IDS, but using fuzzy signatures. However, we use as much as possible
combinations of machine learning and signal processing algorithms to assess their preci-
sion and runtime in order to select the best trade-off combination.
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At present, we look at complete pcap files, which can affect negatively the MARF-
PCAT’s malware family attribution accuracy in the presence of encrypted payload. How-
ever, MARFPCAT processes network traces quickly since there is no pre-processing of
pcap traces (flows identification and extraction). MARFPCAT has the ability to control
thresholds of different algorithms, which gives flexibility in selecting the appropriate clas-
sification technique.
5.4.2 Knowledge Base
Collected malware database’s behavioral reports and network traces are considered as a
knowledge base, from which we machine-learn the malicious pcap samples. As such,
conducting the experiments fall into three broad steps: (1) Teach the system from the
known cases of malware from their pcap data. (2) Test on the known cases. (3) Test
on the unseen cases. In order to prepare data for training and testing, we used a Perl
script to index pcap traces with malware classes, and we used the same malware naming
conventions mentioned earlier. The index is in the form of a meta MARFCAT-IN XML
file, which is used by MARFPCAT for training or testing.
In contrast to the packet headers approach, where the benign traffic is collected
from third parties; the benign traffic is considered as a noise sample found in pcap traces.
To segregate such traffic from the malicious one, we use the low-pass filters and silence
compression. In addition, the signal of the benign traffic can be learnt and subtracted from
malicious traffic (malicious signal) to increase fingerprinting accuracy.
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5.4.3 MARFPCAT’s DPI Methodology
In this part, we describe the different steps that are performed to fingerprint maliciousness
by using DPI approach. We compile manually annotated meta-XML index files with a
Perl script. The index file annotates malware network traces (pcaps) indexed by their
families. Once the annotation is done, MARF is automatically trained on each pcap file
by using a signal pipeline or a NLP pipeline (see Figure 5.6). The algorithms used in
the training phase are detailed in [134]. The MARFPCAT tool loads training data as a
set of bytes forming amplitude values in a signal (e.g, 8kHz, 16kHz, 24kHz, 44.1kHz
frequency). Uni-gram, bi-gram or tri-gram approaches can be used to form such a signal.
A language model works in a similar way, with the exception of not interpreting the n-
grams as amplitudes in the signal. After the signal is formed, it can be pre-processed
through filters or kept in its original form. The filters fall into normalization, traditional
frequency domain filters, wavelet-based filters, etc. Feature extraction involves reducing
an arbitrary length signal to a fixed length feature vector, which is thought to be the most
relevant features in the signal (e.g., spectral features in Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
and Linear Prediction Coefficient (LPC)), min-max amplitudes, etc. The classification
stage is then separated to either train by learning the incoming feature vectors (usually
k-means clusters, median clusters, or plain feature vector collection combined with, for
example, neural network training), or testing them against previously learned models.
The testing stage is done on the training and testing data, originally two separated sets
with and without annotations. In our methodology, we systematically test and select the
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Figure 5.6: MARF’s Pattern-Recognition Pipeline
best (a tradeoff between speed and precision) combination(s) of the different algorithms
available in the MARF framework for subsequent testing.
5.4.4 NLP Pipeline
In this section, we present the inner-workings of MARF framework’s. The latter uses
algorithms that come from the classical literature (e.g., [128]) and detailed in [141]. NLP
pipeline loading refers to the interpretation of the files being scanned in terms of n-grams
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and the associated statistical smoothing algorithms resulting in a vector, 2D or 3D ma-
trix. In the case of static code vulnerability analysis, NLP pipeline has shown high pre-
cision [141]. However, its runtime was ≈ 10 times longer for an equivalent signal pro-
cessing run. A such, for the time being we stopped using NLP pipeline for maliciousness
fingerprinting in traffic. We plan to revive it with a more optimized implementation since
MARF framework is an open-source software.
Initially, we compile meta-XML files to index malware traffic instances. For each
indexed network trace, we use default uni-gram language models specification, described
in [134]. Then, we train the system based on the index to build the knowledge base (ma-
chine learning). This is done by loading n-grams and use statistical smoothing estimators.
We test again the training data against built models to deduce the best algorithms combi-
nations for the learning phase. Once the learning phase is done, we test obtained models
against testing data (network traces indexed by malware families). To improve the test-
ing of different learning models, we use a demand-driven distributed evaluation, which is
described in the sequel.
5.4.5 Demand-Driven Distributed Evaluation
To enhance the scalability of DPI evaluation approach [238], we converted the MARFP-
CAT stand-alone application to a distributed application using an educative model of com-
putation (demand-driven) implemented in the General Intensional Programming System
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(GIPSY)’s multi-tier run-time system [83, 97, 159, 214], which can be executed distribu-
tively using Jini (Apache River) [69]. To adapt MARFPCAT to the GIPSY’s multi-tier
architecture, we create Problem-Specific Distributers Generator and Worker tiers (PS-
DGT and PS-DWT respectively). The generator produces demands of what needs to be
computed in the form of a file (binary) to be evaluated, and deposits such demands as
pending into a store managed by the demand store tier (DST). Workers pick up pending
demands from the store and then process them (all tiers run on multiple nodes) using a
traditional MARFPCAT instance. Once the result is computed, the PS-DWT deposits it
back into the store with the status set to computed. The generator “harvests” all computed
results and produces the final report for a test cases. Multiple test cases can be evalu-
ated simultaneously, or a single case can be evaluated distributively. This approach helps
coping with large amounts of data and avoiding recomputing tests that have already been
computed and cached in the DST.
The initial basic experiment assumes the PS-DWTs have the training sets data and
the test cases available from the beginning (either by a copy or via mounted volumes);
thus, the distributed evaluation concerns only the classification task as of this version.
The follow up work will remove this limitation. In this setup, a demand represents a file
to scan, which is deposited into the DST. The PS-DWT picks up the file and checks it
per training set that is already there, and returns a ResultSet object back into the DST
under the same demand signature that was used to deposit the path to scan. The result
set is sorted from the most to the least likely with a value corresponding to the distance
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or similarity. The PS-DGT picks up the result sets, performs the final output aggregation,
and saves the report.
One of the output formats that MARFPCAT supports is FORENSIC LUCID [137],
a language used to specify and evaluate digital forensic cases. Following the methodol-
ogy of FORENSIC LUCID data export described in [139, 140], we use it as a format for
evidential processing of the results produced by MARFPCAT. The work [139] provides
details of the language; it suffices to mention that the report generated by MARFPCAT
in FORENSIC LUCID is a collection of warnings, which form an evidential statement in
FORENSIC LUCID.
5.4.6 Wavelets
As part of a collaboration project, wavelet-based signal processing for the purposes of
noise filtering is used in this work to compare it to no-filtering, or FFT-based classical
filtering. It has been also shown in [116] that wavelet-aided filtering could be used as
a fast pre-processing method for network application identification and traffic analysis
[119]. We rely on the algorithm and methodology described in [13, 107, 108, 183]. At
this point, only a separating Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [86] has been tested.
Since the original wavelet implementation [183] is in MATLAB [129, 179], we use the
codegen tool [131] from the MATLAB Coder toolbox [130] to generate C/C++ code.
Then, we implement it in MARF and MARFPCAT language, namely JAVA. In addition,
the function for up/down sampling used by the wavelets function described in [144], is
141
also integrated in MARF framework.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Non-DPI Approach
In the sequel, we present results obtained for Non-DPI fingerprinting approach. The
results fall into 3 parts: (1) classification results, (2) attribution results, and (3) computa-
tional complexity of the approach.
Classification
The purpose of this classification exercise is to determine whether we can segregate ma-
licious from benign traffic. In addition, we make a comparison between different classi-
fication algorithms in terms of accuracy and recall. Our intent is to identify a classifier
with high accuracy, low false positives, and low false negatives.
The results illustrated in Figures 5.7a, 5.7b, 5.7c, 5.7d, 5.7e and 5.7f demonstrate
that the Boosted J48 and J48 algorithms have shown better results than other machine
learning algorithms. They achieved 99% accuracy and less than 1% false positives and
negatives, respectively. The SVM algorithm has achieved good results with an accuracy
ranging between 89% and 95%. In contrast, Naïve Bayesian and Boosted Naïve Bayesian
algorithms have not achieved good results. As such, we can claim that the Boosted J48
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Figure 5.7: Classification Algorithms Results
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After finding that J48 is the most suitable algorithm, we used the 10-fold cross-
validation method to select the training and testing data. This is done to ensure that the
J48 algorithm maintains high accuracy and low false positive and negative rates, even if
the training and testing data change. Figures 5.8a, 5.8b, 5.8c and 5.8d summarize the
performance of the J48 algorithm in each data set by providing the accuracy and the rates
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Figure 5.8: J48 Classifiers Performance and Generalization
The boosted J48 and J48 algorithms have achieved high accuracy detection and low
rates of false positives and negatives in multiple datasets. The fact that we use different
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datasets has shown that the J48 classification approach is robust since it maintains greater
than 98% accuracy with less than 0.006 average false alerts for each dataset, as illus-
trated in Figure 5.8e and Figure 5.8f respectively. Thus, these two algorithms provide the
means necessary to make malicious traffic differentiable from benign traffic. Moreover,
the results conclude that our approach, based on classifying the flow features, can achieve
maliciousness detection in different benign traffic with a very high detection rate and low
false alerts. The J48 algorithm does not rely on features dependency and tends to perform
better with a limited number of classes, which is the case of our work since we have two
classes. On the other hand, Naïve Bayesian shows bad results since it relies on the inde-
pendence of features, which is not the case in maliciousness classification. For example,
packet length depends on frame length. Regarding SVM, we use it with the default option
where linear classification is performed. This raises a problem with probabilities of class
membership.
Attribution
In order to attribute malicious flows to malware families, we apply a clustering technique
to label different inbound and outbound unidirectional flows. We consider k-means RBS
clustering solutions for inbound and outbound traffic. The solutions are generated heuris-
tically by incrementing by two the number of clusters for inbound and outbound flows.
To evaluate the solutions, we take into account: (1) the high Internal Similarity Metric
(ISIM) average in all clusters, and (2) the moderate External Similarity Metric (ESIM)
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average in all clusters. The ISIM average mirrors the cohesion between items (unidirec-
tional flows) within different clusters. The ESIM average defines the isolation between
different clusters. In our labeling process, we consider solutions that vary from 2 to 18
clusters. We consider up to 18 clusters to preserve the potential to have a sufficient num-
ber of labels for both inbound and outbound flows. Figures 5.9a and 5.9b illustrate the
ISIM and ESIM averages for different inbound and outbound clustering solutions. The
selection of labeling solutions is based on two criteria: (1) a high ISIM average ratio
(greater than or equal to 0.95), and (2) a moderate ESIM average ratio between clusters
(less than or equal to 0.5). As such, we consider only those solutions which vary from 12






















(b) Outbound Flows Clustering
Figure 5.9: ISIM, ESIM vs. Clustering Solutions
By coupling inbound and outbound clustering solutions, we obtain 16 possible la-
beling combinations. For each combination, we compute the uniqueness of the collected
sequences. We observe the ratio of labeled sequences that are not shared by malware fam-
ilies. The higher the uniqueness of the sequences ratio, the higher the ability to segregate
malware families. We can thus limit the attribution of malicious flows to a limited number
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of malware families. Table 5.4 shows the uniqueness ratio for each labeling combination.
Based on the obtained ratios, we choose a solution with 16 inbound flows and 18 out-
bound flows, since it has the highest uniqueness ratio. This labeling combination is used
to initialize HMMs and train them for each malware family.
Table 5.4: Uniqueness Ratio per Combination of Clustering Solutions
OUT Flows Clustering
12 14 16 18
IN Flows Clustering
12 0.7230 0.7097 0.7227 0.7315
14 0.7225 0.7242 0.7261 0.7337
16 0.7325 0.7358 0.7350 0.7361
18 0.7289 0.7319 0.7311 0.7282
We train HMMs by tuning the sliding window (number of states) to set up the num-
ber of states and the length of the training sequences. The training is based on an EM
algorithm, which iterates the computation of hidden parameters until the log-likelihood
reaches the maximum value. Before digging into the evaluation of HMMs, we need to
determine which length of training sequences we should consider to build models. To do
so, we vary the length of sequences and take note of how it impacts the prediction ability
of HMMs representing malware families. Table 5.5 illustrates the number of profiled mal-
ware families per HMM state and sequence length. By increasing the length of training
sequences, we obtain fewer numbers of HMMs for malware families. This is due to the
fact that some malware families do not have sequences of length greater than 2. It is thus
impossible to create training data to model them. Intuitively, if we increase the length of
training sequences (≥ 6), the number of HMMs will reduce. If we want to create HMMs
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for all malware families, we have to consider training sequences of length 2. With re-
gards to detection, the cost of detecting 2 malicious flows is less expensive than detecting
between 3 to 6 malicious flows. If we consider training sequences of length 2, we need
to investigate two aspects: (1) the tradeoff between HMM expressiveness and learning
effort, and (2) the uniqueness ratio of sequences per malware family. These issues are
explained in what follows.
Table 5.5: Number of Malware Families per State and Sequence Length
Sequence Length
2 3 4 5 6
HMM States
2 294 294 274 256 242
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Figure 5.10: Uniqueness of Sequences
• HMM expressiveness vs. HMM learning effort: The former is meant to provide a
high number of states to HMMs in order to generate more probabilistic HMM pa-
rameters with a greater ability to estimate potential sequences of malicious flows.
However, increasing the sliding window to generate more states for HMMs results
in generating more learning effort for HMMs. By varying the number of states from
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2 to 4, the number of iterations increased for the majority of malware families. Ta-
ble 5.6 shows the number of iterations per HMM configuration (2 states to 4 states,
sequence length of 2 to 4). For 2 states HMMs obtained from training sequences
of length 2 to 3, the number of iterations does not exceed 2. For 2 states HMMs
obtained from training sequences of length 4, the number of iterations varies from
3 to 40. Similar results are shown for 4 states HMMs obtained from training se-
quences of length 2 to 4. Since the training sequence of length 2 allows profiling all
malware families, it is recommended to use 2 states HMMs with training sequences
of length 2 if we do not consider expressiveness of HMMs, or to use 4 states HMMs
with training sequences of length 2 if we require more expressive HMMs.
Table 5.6: HMMs vs. Number of Iterations
1 2 [3,20] [21,40] [41,60] [61,200]
HMM 2-2 16 278 0 0 0 0
HMM 2-3 0 294 0 0 0 0
HMM 2-4 0 0 183 78 9 3
HMM 4-2 0 0 145 125 19 5
HMM 4-3 0 1 178 86 8 4
HMM 4-4 0 0 191 71 8 4
• Length of training sequences: Does limiting the length of training sequences to 2
impact the uniqueness of sequences per malware family? To answer this question,
we test different sequences of length 2 on all malware family HMMs. Figure 5.10
illustrates the distribution of training sequences with the number of malware fami-
lies (i.e., HMMs). We observe that approximately 21.5% of sequences are predicted
by 1 malware family, and approximately 89% of sequences are predicted by at most
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22 malware families. As such, we can conclude that the tradeoff between prediction
and uniqueness is maintained since a big proportion of sequences are predicted by
22 HMMs over 294 HMMs.
Computational Complexity
In this section, we investigate computational complexity for different techniques used to
non-DPI fingerprint malicious traffic. Computational complexity falls into:
• Features Extraction: In [117], the authors studied the computational complexity
and memory requirements associated with flow features extraction in the context
of classification. The authors claimed that extracting each feature from traffic is
associated with a computational cost less than or equal to O(n × log2 n), and a
memory footprint less than or equal to O(n), where n is the number of packets in
a flow used for extracting the feature. The total cost of extracting K features is
bounded to O(K × n× log2 n).
• J48 Decision Tree: J48 (its C4.5 Java implementation) has a training time complex-
ity of O(m × n2), where m is the size of the training data and n is the number of
attributes [203]. Regarding the classification, the complexity is O(n× h), where h
is the height of the tree and n is the number of instances [104].
• Labeling: To label unidirectional inbound and outbound flows, we use a K-means
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RBS algorithm (a clustering partitional algorithm). The advantage of these algo-
rithms is that they have a relatively low computational cost [240]. A 2-way cluster-
ing solution can be computed in time linear to the number of flows. In our case, the
number of iterations used by the greedy refinement algorithm is less than 20. By
assuming that the clusters are reasonably balanced during each bisection step, the
time required to compute n− 1 bisections is O(n× log2 n).
• HMMs Convergence: In our approach, we use the EM algorithm (also known as
the Baum-Welch algorithm) [54]. It is based on the computation of forward and
backward probabilities for each state and transition. The computing complexity is
of orderO(n2×t), where n is the number of states and t is the number of transitions
[175]. However, in our experiments, we consider training HMMs with labeled
sequences by varying the length of sequences. In addition, the EM algorithm has a
computation which iterates until the maximization of the log-likelihood is satisfied.
As such, the computing complexity is of order O(n2 × t × l × i), where l is the
length of sequences and i is the number of iterations.
5.5.2 DPI Approach
In the sequel, we present results obtained for DPI fingerprinting approach. We introduce:
(1) classification and attribution setup, (2) classification results, and (3) computational
complexity of this approach.
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Classification and Attribution Setup
The MARFPCAT’s algorithm parameters are based on the empirically-determined default
setup detailed in [134, 136]. To perform classification, we load each pcap as a wave form
signal. The latter encloses flows having both the header and payload sections. It is impor-
tant to mention that all classification experiments are done through modules tuned with
default parameters (if desired, they can be varied, but due to the overall large number of
combinations, no parameters tuning has been considered). The default settings are picked
up throughout MARF’s lifetime, empirically and/or based on the related literature [134].
Hereafter, we provide a brief summary of the default parameters used for each module:
• The default quality of the recorded WAV files used in the experiment is 8000 Hz,
mono, 2 bytes per sample, Pulse-Code Modulation (PCM) encoded.
• LPC – has 20 poles (and therefore 20 features), thus produces a vector of 20 features
and a 128-element window.
• FFT – does 512× 2-based FFT analysis (512 features).
• MinMaxAmplitudes – 50 smallest and 50 largest amplitudes (100 features).
• MinkowskiDistance – has a default of Minkowski factor r = 4.
• FeatureExtractionAggregator – concatenates the default processing of
FFT and LPC (532 features).
• DiffDistance – has a default allowed error 0.0001 and a distance factor of 1.0.
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• HammingDistance – has a default allowed error of 0.01 and a lenient double
comparison mode.
• CosineDistance – has a default allowed error of 0.01 and a lenient double
comparison mode.
• NeuralNetwork – has 32 output layer neurons (interpreted as a 32-bit integer
n), a training constant of 1.0, an epoch number of 64, and a minimum error of
0.1. The number of input layer neurons is always equal to the number of incoming
features f (the length of the feature vector), and the size h of the middle hidden
layer is h = |f − n|; if f = n, then h = f/2. By default, the network is fully
interconnected.
Classification Results
In this section, we summarize the results obtained per test case using NLP-processing of
malicious network traces classification. We present various selected statistical measure-
ments of the precision in recognizing different malware classes under different algorithm
configurations. In addition, we use the “second guess” measure to test the hypothesis
that if our first estimate of the class is incorrect, the next in-line one is probably cor-
rect. In Appendix A, we list the classification results sorted by fingerprinting accuracy.
In Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.13, we set forth no-filtering classification results. In this
case, no noise filtering is applied, which impacts positively in fingerprinting runtime.
Figure 5.11 illustrates the corresponding summary per various algorithm combinations.
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Figure 5.13 shows some malware families’ classification results. It is noteworthy to men-
tion that while the latter has overall low precision, many individual malware families are
correctly identified. The low precision at the combination level is explained primarily
by the “generic” malware class (the largest) that skewed the results and was not filtered
in this experiment. The same experiments are replicated using wavelet transform-based
filters in Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.14. Overall, we notice the same decline in precision as
in the earlier filter-less solution, raising the question of whether pre-processing is really
needed to quickly pre-classify a packet stream while lowering precision and hindering ac-
curacy. It is also interesting to note that some malware classes (e.g., VBKrypt) are poorly
identified in the first guess, but correctly in the second guess (illustrated by red spikes to
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Figure 5.11: No-Filtering Malware Algorithms Results
The initial global scan results are listed in Table A.1, Table A.2, and Table A.3 (see
Appendix A). Many of the malware families are nearly identified with an accuracy of
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Figure 5.14: Wavelet Malware Family Results
classes labeled as “generic”. A lot of distinct malware families belong to such classes. The
presence of such malware families results in noise and overfitting when training, which
impacts negatively on the overall per-configuration (combination) precision. However,
despite the presence of noise, many classes (771 of 1, 063) are classified with an accuracy
of 100%. The rest of malware classes have less than 75%, dropping quickly to low classi-
fication accuracies, (e.g., Virus:Win32/Viking.gen!B [generic], PWS:Win32/Fareit.gen!C
[generic], and VirTool:Win32/Fcrypter.gen!A [generic], etc).
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Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of the MARFPCAT data depends on the algorithms chosen
at each stage of the pipeline. Most of them are one-dimensional processing modules with
an average complexity of O(n) where n is the number of the elements at each stage. Here
is the breakdown for some of the tasks:
• Sample loading has to do with interpreting the pcap data in a wave form, which is a
straightforward interpretation of every two bytes per an amplitude. Thus, it depends
on the size of the pcap file in bytes b – O(b/2).
• The pre-processing stage’s complexity depends on the algorithm chosen. Raw has
no processing, just passes data further, so the complexity is of O(1). Normal-
ization complexity is O(n). FFT-based low-pass filters have the complexity of
O(2×O(FFT )) to convert to time domain and back.
• Feature extraction depends on the chosen algorithms. Most common algorithms are
FFT and LPC. LPC has a complexity of O(n× (log2 n)2) in general. MinMax has
a complexity of O(2n× log n) (to sort and copy).
• Classification has the complexity of the chosen classifier, such as distance or sim-
ilarity measures. Cosine similarity has a complexity of O(n2), but for normalized
data, the complexity is O(n). Euclidean, Chebyshev, and Diff distances have a
complexity of O(n), Minkowski distance has a complexity of O(n6); and Ham-
ming distance has a complexity of O(n+ log(n+ 1)) at the worst.
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5.6 Discussion
In this section, we review the current results of this experimental work, including its ad-
vantages, disadvantages and practical implications. First, we discuss the positive and
negative aspects of the non-DPI (Section 5.6.1) followed by the DPI (Section 5.6.2) ap-




In the sequel, we present the key advantages of the flow packet headers approach:
• Classification accuracy: Using packet header bidirectional flow attributes to clas-
sify malicious and benign traffic has shown excellent accuracy with low rates of
false positives and negatives. J48 classifier has the ability to segregate malicious
from benign traffic based on packet header attributes.
• Independence from packet payloads: All detection and attribution features are ex-
tracted from packet headers. The detection and attribution, therefore, avoid noisy
data generated by encrypted traffic.
• Generalization: To segregate malicious from benign data, we use different benign
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datasets collected from different sources, namely, home networks, laboratory net-
works, corporation networks, and ISP networks. Different models achieve high ac-
curacy in terms of differentiation between malicious and benign traffic. A 10-fold
cross validation has been used to check whether the detection accuracy is main-
tained.
• Detection attributes: Decision trees in general are considered as a set of conditions
involving the values of attributes. The classifier behaves as a white-box, where the
attributes play roles in the decidability of flows maliciousness. The J48 decision
tree models generate decision rules where the roots are usually features that highly
overlap malicious and benign datasets. The distinctive features are mainly used
as leaves to make final decisions on benign and malicious traffic. We notice, for
instance, that forward and backward inter-arrival time values, duration of flow, and
number of forward packets and bytes are good indicators that distinguish between
malicious and benign traffic.
• Labeling attributes: Using inbound/outbound flow attributes for the purpose of traf-
fic characterization is a good mean to create (sequences) patterns for malicious
flows. These patterns are subjected to mining tools (HMMs) to attribute malicious-
ness to malware families.
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• Possibility to fingerprint zero day attack: Characterizing the detection and attribu-
tion through flow features may provide opportunities to fingerprint unknown mal-
ware families that share identical network behavior with known malware families.
For example, it has been shown in [171] that Citadel malware (appeared in 2013) is
a variant of Zeus malware (appeared in 2009).
• Decoupling between detection and attribution: In general, this is considered a pos-
itive aspect in the sense that attribution is implicit to detection. The attribution
does not impact the detection accuracy. However, there is a negative aspect of this
decoupling that we discuss in the sequel.
Disadvantages
Hereafter, we present a list of issues identified in packet flows headers approach.
• Datasets overfitting: Decision trees that fit training and testing data too well may
not be as good as it has been shown in our experiments. Overfitting trees can have
a low re-substitution error but a high generalization error. As such, it is a must to
consider more benign datasets to check whether the obtained models are subjected
to generalization errors. J48 decision trees are static classifiers and are not resilient
to additional noisy benign data (traffic). It is thus imperative to investigate the noise
resiliency of obtained classifiers and to determine how we can build a committee
modeling approach based on multi-decision trees.
• Complexity: Fingerprinting of maliciousness based on packet header flow features
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generates a computational complexity related to the extraction of features, the clas-
sification and clustering of feature’ vectors, as well as the construction and se-
quencing of flows. For instance, we observed the following runtime for features
extraction, models detection and labeling:
1. Bidirectional flow features extraction takes on average 0.94 seconds (0.042
seconds per feature).
2. Unidirectional flow features extraction takes on average 1.19 seconds (0.026
seconds per feature).
3. Detection:
– Malicious vs. Home Model: 15 milliseconds per feature vector.
– Malicious vs. SOHO Model: 16 milliseconds per feature vector.
– Malicious vs. ISP Model: 21 milliseconds per feature vector.
– Malicious vs. Private Model: 18 milliseconds per feature vector.
4. Labeling:
– Inbound flows: The 16-k clustering solution takes about 7.298 seconds
(0.1300 milliseconds per feature vector).
– Outbound flows: The 18-k clustering solution takes about 9.556 seconds
(0.1671 milliseconds per feature vector).
A deployment of such approach in a real-time traffic needs a traffic sampling tech-
nique since the computation of flow features on the fly is expensive. Moreover,
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detection and attribution models must response quickly to vectors of flow features
created on sampled data. This means that we need to synchronize flow features
extraction with detection and attribution.
• Corroborating attribution: The HMMs-based attribution is not mature. We need to
establish an algorithm to limit the non-determinism of HMMs. This can be done
by considering longer sequences when we have non-determinism between malware
families. For example, with a malicious flows sequence of length 2 that is classi-
fied by ten 2 sequences trained HMMs, we can consider a potential third detected
flow to create a new sequence of length 3 and classify it with 3 sequences trained
HMMs. As such, ten 2 sequences trained HMMs play the role of filters, whereas
the 3 sequences trained HMMs limit the number of malware family attribution pos-
sibilities.
• Decoupling between detection and attribution: In a way, this is a double-edged
sword. The negative aspect lies in the fact that it generates deployment challenges,
which break into flows sampling, flows construction, and strong detection to implic-
itly obtain a good attribution. Thus, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis
to deploy this Non-DPI fingerprinting solution. The analysis should cope with the





In the sequel, we present the key advantages of the DPI approach:
• Performance: The DPI approach has shown an ability to learn and classify relatively
quickly than flow packet headers approach. For instance, results shown in Table A.2
took from 58 milliseconds to 598 milliseconds per pcap file. The complete run
considering all algorithms’ combinations, including training and testing phases took
27 minutes and 74 seconds. Some results go as low as below 10 milliseconds per
pcap file (including loading, pre-processing, feature extraction, and classification).
A complete training on an algorithm combination was 1 to 3 seconds depending
on the algorithm. Detailed performance statistics from the log files can be released
depending on the need and appropriateness at an external resource, such as arXiv
[118].
• Learning scalability: Given the ability shown in training runtime, DPI approach
has the flexibility to learn on a large knowledge base to test on known and unknown
cases as well as label them. The results shown in terms of runtime allow to design
and integrate easily an online learning system, where the detection and attribution
can be improved by time. This approach can be used to quickly pre-scan projects for
further analysis by humans or other tools that do in-depth maliciousness analysis.
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• Flexibility: Tuning algorithms’ combinations allows the selection of the best learn-
ing process for malware classes. Accordingly, we can identify appropriate algo-
rithm combinations that maintain the tradeoff between accuracy and runtime. This
approach can be used on any target malware without modifications to the method-
ology.
• Pluggability: The developed tool, namely, MARFPCAT, can learn from binary sig-
natures obtained from other intrusion detection systems (e.g, Snort [195], Bro [161],
etc.). In addition, since it is an open-source, it can be easily plugged to existing fire-
walls or intrusion detection systems.
Disadvantages
Hereafter, we list of the most prominent issues related to the DPI approach. Some are
more “permanent”, while others are solvable and intended to be addressed in a future
work.
• Dependency: The detection accuracy depends on the quality of the collected knowl-
edge base (see Section 5.4.2). The annotation of pcap indexes are done manually,
hence, it is prone to errors.
• Accuracy: Despite the fact that some malware families are identified with a high
accuracy, MARFPCAT has shown limited accuracy for some malware families, es-
pecially the ones clustered as being “generic”.
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• Fuzziness: DPI fingerprinting has many algorithms’ combinations (currently ≈
1800 permutations), which try to get the best top N. This can lead to incoherence in
some classification cases when there is a shift from a combination to another.
5.6.3 Summary
Our core finding is that the two approaches are not necessarily in competition with each
other, but are rather complementary with DPI being much faster (no parsing and picking
out select headers; in addition, signal processing techniques and related classifiers were
simpler and more efficient in comparison with the flow packet headers approach). The
DPI approach can work with either one or two packets already and does not depend on
benign traffic learning (which, if it did, would be like a noise signal), whereas the header-
based flow approach strictly requires a flow before it can classify. Thus, the DPI approach
can prioritize classification targets, specifically for the headers-based approach (and go
deeper as necessary). While listening first on the network interface, MARFPCAT can
predict or hint to maliciousness, whereas flow packet headers can increase subsequently
the confidence in maliciousness fingerprinting.
5.7 Conclusion
In this work, we presented a research effort dedicated to fingerprinting maliciousness at
the traffic level. The maliciousness fingerprinting falls into: NLP/wavelets Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) and flow packet headers. Moreover, we produced a comparison between
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these two approaches.
Regarding the DPI approach, considering results shown by MARFCAT in the clas-
sification of vulnerable code, we used NLP and wavelets classification of signals tech-
niques to fingerprint maliciousness. Despite showing some problems in classifying the
generic malware families, it managed to show a large scalability and accuracy for less
noisy malicious traffic. As a result, we released a MARFPCAT alpha version, the MAR-
FCAT’s predecessor, as open-source [135]. The distributed demand-driven version of
MARFPCAT is available in GIPSY open source repository.
Regarding flow packet headers approach, we employed several supervised machine
learning algorithms, namely, J48, Boosted J48, Naïve Bayesian, Boosted Naïve Bayesian,
and SVM in order to classify malicious and non-malicious traffic. The aforementioned
learning algorithms were used to build classification models. Thus far, the results show
that the J48 and Boosted J48 algorithms performed better than other algorithms. They
reached over 99% precision with a rate of false positives less than 1%. In summary,
we illustrated that it is possible to detect malicious traffic and differentiate it from non-
malicious traffic by using attributes extracted from packets. This is a preliminary result
toward the classification of malicious traffic at the network level. Therefore, we aim to
investigate the degree to which our classification results are generalizable to a wide class
of representative networks. Despite the fact that fingerprinting maliciousness at the IP
level is important, a focus must be shown to another network layer, namely, the application
layer. Among numerous application layer protocols, DNS acts as a platform that binds
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internally host-names and IPs, and externally web-surfers to existing domains. As it has
been demonstrated in Chapter 4, IPs and domains are cornerstones of different cyber-
threat infrastructures. As such, there is a need to investigate DNS protocol streams for the
purpose of identifying its misuses and indicators of compromise. In the next chapter, we
will describe the big data system used to cope with the nature of passive DNS streams for
the purpose of anomaly detection.
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Chapter 6
Near-Real-Time and Scalable Detection
of Anomalies in Passive DNS Streams
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present a near-real time anomalies identification system in passive
DNS streams. By anomalies, we mean suspicious domain names, DNS records misuses,
fast-fluxing malicious networks, where the change of IP addresses, geo-locations (coun-
tries and cities), and short Time To Live (TTL) requests are observed. The system is
integrated on top of a high computational clustering solution namely, Apache Spark, to
handle streams of passive DNS logs on near real-time. In addition, we corroborate the
system with the ability to monitor specific DNS profiles for organizations. The remainder
of this chapter is as follows: Passive DNS anomaly detection approach is discussed in
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Section 6.2. The experimental results are reported in Section 6.3. Finally, some conclud-
ing remarks on this work, together with a discussion of future research, are provided in
Section 6.4.
6.2 Passive DNS Anomalies and Abuse Detection
6.2.1 Approach
DNS protocol has been turned to a platform to perpetrate malicious activities. Thus, there
has been a desideratum in the generation of cyber-threat intelligence based on DNS traffic
replica, known as passive DNS. The latter is a technique, defined by Weimer [218], which
captures inter-server DNS messages through sensors. These messages are forwarded to a
collection service for further analysis. Some research efforts [22, 23, 29, 30, 164] put an
emphasis on using Passive DNS to detect DNS abuses and malicious activities. In spite
of interesting results obtained by proposed systems in the aforesaid works, they have not
integrated all-in-one solution to gather threat-intelligence. They use mainly classification
techniques to segregate malicious domains from benign domains or to detect fast-flux ma-
licious services. In essence, we aim to address the generation of cyber-threat intelligence
from passive DNS by trying to answer the following questions: (1) How to transform
intensive real-time passive DNS feeds into cyber-threat intelligence? (2) What are the
techniques that ensure scalability and allow the identification of anomalies in passive
DNS?
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We target to design and integrate a system that monitors all domains and their DNS
records, observed in passive DNS stream of data. The main intent is to deploy a system
that detects in a near real-time, potential anomalies and abuses of DNS protocol observed
on captured logs. However, the design and deployment of our system has to overcome
some challenges related mainly to the high volume of data. Thus, we need to consider
scalable techniques to monitor DNS ecosystem for the purpose of anomalies and abuses
identification, as well as a reliable storage system to archive results. The system aims to:
(1) Aggregate real-time data for the purpose of online analysis. (2) Segregate different
types of DNS record messages observed on data streams. (3) Identify suspicious domain
names and alias. (4) Extract features representing time series analytic. (5) Detect anoma-
lies based on collected features. (6) Pinpoint abuses of DNS records. (7) Correlate with
other sources of cyber-threat intelligence. (8) Monitor and archive historical DNS activi-
ties observed in some organizations. In the sequel, we describe the system architecture.
The emergence of big data processing frameworks offers encouraging approaches
to collect, retrieve, and analyze intelligence out of different sources like malware feeds,
spam-traps, Darknet and passive DNS. Accordingly, it is possible to discover threats
in near-real time. Motivated by contributions reported in [120, 184, 222, 231] that used
Apache Spark for big data analysis, we decide to employ it to monitor the huge load of
passive DNS data to extract anomalies. Such framework is a promising, multi-purpose
data processing designed for intensive in-memory and distributed clustering computa-
tions. It emphasizes on improving performance of applications that cannot be expressed
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efficiently as acyclic data flows, where a working set of data across multiple parallel oper-
ations [233]. It includes two use-cases, namely, iterative jobs and interactive computing,
where Hadoop [71] is deficient. A key asset of Spark lies in introducing the Resilient Dis-
tributed Dataset (RDD) [232]. RDDs are known to ensure the abstraction of data such that
large data sets can be cached effectively in memory or disk. They represent immutable
collection of objects grouped into partitions. Spark uses RDDs to allow re-usability of
memory cached objects, which improves significantly performance in work-flow execu-
tion.
In addition to in-memory and disk caching, Spark supports many data abstractions,
namely, graphs, streaming logs (e.g., Twitter feeds), databases (e.g., MySQL, Cassandra)
and hadoop data formats. Moreover, Spark has a mature programming model, which has
been initially integrated by SCALA programming language [64], then wrapped to other
languages, i.e., object-oriented programming Java [155], script programming Python [72],
and statistical computing language R [68]. Spark provides programmers with the ability
to: (1) Construct RDDs from files in a shared file system, (2) divide collections into
slices that can be sent to multiple nodes, resulting in computation parallelism, (3) smooth
transformation of data from one type to another (e.g, a log to a mapping object) and, (4)
alter persistence of objects through two actions, namely, the cache action, which leaves
the dataset lazy but kept in memory for re-usability, and, save action, which dumps data
into a distributed file-system like Hadoop File System (HDFS).
Spark supports also several parallel operations, namely, Filter, Collect, Reduce,
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Map-Reduce and Foreach. The Filter operation allows eliminating items into collections,
that do not satisfy a Boolean predicate function. The Collect operation sends all elements
of a dataset to a driver for a parallel gathering of items into a collection (e.g., arrays, lists,
etc.). The Reduce operation combines dataset elements through an associative function.
The Map-Reduce, known also as grouped reduce function, which allows to map datasets
to common mapping objects like tuples and reduce them by a key entry and an associative
function. The Foreach operation allows a streaming loop through collection to execute
functions like exporting results to databases or copying them into shared variables in a
program. In the sequel, we detail the system architecture described in Figure 6.1.
6.2.2 System Architecture
The passive DNS anomaly detection system is meant to monitor DNS replica logs sent
on a minute-by-minute basis. These logs contain passive DNS entries enclosing infor-
mation about different record types (e.g., “A”, “AAAA”, “CNAME”, “TXT”, etc). DNS
anomaly detection system falls into the following components: (1) Dispatcher, (2) Record
Extraction, (3) Geo-location, (4) Prediction per Partial Matching (PPM) detection and, (5)
Record misuses filter.
Dispatcher
The dispatcher component plays the role of transforming passive DNS logs into streams of













































Figure 6.1: DNS Anomaly Detection Architecture
(2) RDDs containing AAAA records, (3) RDDs containing CNAME records and, (5)
RDDs containing records (e.g., “TXT”, “OPT”, “SRV”, “NULL”) that are candidates for
DNS abuses like covert channels and tunneling. The dispatcher uses Spark filter action to
check the type of the record and push it to RDDs.
Record Extraction
This component plays the role of the bridge that takes RDD streams as inputs and generate
tuples labeled by record type. Record extraction use the map operation to get different
tuples needed for components that identify different anomalies.
Geo-location
DNS protocol allows a domain to be mapped to different IPs. Usually, DNS server an-
swer consists of DNS “A” records, when the host maps to IPv4 addresses or DNS “AAAA”
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records, when the host maps to IPv6 addresses. Malicious domains resolve to infected ma-
chines located in different Autonomous Systems (ASNs), countries, and regions. There-
fore, the attackers build botnets that spread worldwide; and each node with these botnets
may play the role of a C&C server. With insight, we use a geo-location database, namely,
MaxMind [4] to geo-locate different IPs collected from “A” records (IPv4 addresses). We
plan for a near future to use it also for “AAAA” records (IPv6 addresses). Despite the
fact that benign domain names (e.g., google.com, yahoo.com, etc.) use IP addresses lo-
cated in many countries and cities, our system uses, on the fly, a white-list to filter such
domains. We focus only on domains that do not appear in the white-list. The system has
a conservative approach, since it quarantines all domains changing frequently cities and
countries. Collected information is cross-validated with other features, namely, other IP-
based features and TTL-based features described in the rest of the components. To detect
changes of countries and cities, we collect them into immutable sets labeled by domains.
We use Spark filter action to check if these collections have a cardinality higher than one.
PPM Detection
Malicious programs use a technique called domain fluxing, where malware samples change
the fully qualified domain names. They employ such domain names as C&Cs, depot of
stolen information, spam campaigns, bitcoining and infection vectors (drive by down-
load malware). The easiest way to achieve domain fluxing is to use a domain generation
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algorithm (DGA) that dynamically generates random domain strings for botnet commu-
nication, spamming, etc. In addition to domain fluxing, malware misuse canonical name
(“CNAME”) records to manage botnets. Usually, they use suspicious domains to point to
alias domains, which look like benign.
In order to detect domain fluxing activities and misuse of “CNAME” records, we
use a technique proposed by Begleiter et al. [27] to segregate between benign and mali-
cious domains. As such, we use Prediction per Partial Matching (PPM) algorithm, which
belongs to Variable order Markov Model (VoMM) algorithms [27]. It is an algorithm that
predicts a symbol based on previous symbols. PPM algorithm has two phases, which are:
training phase and prediction phase. At the training phase, it builds a structure, namely,
digital tree (Trie), which stores the sub-sequences of the training sequences and the counts
of the symbols that appear after them. At the prediction phase, it calculates the probabil-
ity estimation of sub-sequences of a new sequence and compares it with the estimation
of the training set. Our abnormal domains detector computes the probability of a domain
name to verify whether it is benign or not. In our case, the training dataset is composed
of different domain white-lists (e.g., Alexa top one million domains [1], Quantcast US
domains ranking [168]). PPM algorithm has two steps to build the training sequences.
First, it reverses each domain name. Second, it adds 2 delimiters at the beginning of each
reversed domain name. For example, google.com is reversed to ##moc.elgoog. The de-
limiters are used to separate domains and not let them being concatenated, which avoids
appearance of noisy context in the training sequence. The domains are reversed to let the
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training be based on domain TLDs. Once the sequences are ready, the PPM classifier is
built by storing the count of symbols that occurs after sub-sequences of a specific length
(distance) in the training sequences.
Then, the classifier is used to calculate the average per symbol probability of the
50% of the training sequences, which are uniformly sampled. The computed average is
considered as a pivot score. The reason behind choosing half of the training sequences
lies in the fact that the pivot score should represent the average benign domain name.
To determine if a new domain is abnormal or not, we first reverse the domain name and
add the delimiters. After that, we use the PPM classifier to compute the average per
symbol probability. Then, we calculate the ratio of the average per symbol probability
and the pivot score. If the ratio is less than a threshold (0.8), the domains is considered as
abnormal. Otherwise, it is considered as benign.
Aggregation
This component has the ability to monitor attributes of passive DNS records for the pur-
pose of anomaly detection. The gathering of streams is done every minute since records
are received once a minute. However, we use Spark streaming capability to aggregate
statistics of attributes during a predefined time window (2 hours for specific IPs and top
level domains, 1 hour for the rest of passive DNS records) to collect sufficient samples of
attributes, where we can apply anomaly detection techniques to segregate between benign
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and malicious behaviors. Thanks to the map-reduce Spark action, we reduce tuples gen-
erated by the record extraction component (see Section 6.2.2 and Figure 6.1) and group
them by domain names. The aggregation is done on the following attributes:
Number of Queries The number of queries that target a specific domain name is ap-
proximately in the same range over a specific period of time. This feature is a good in-
dicator to detect the following anomalies: (1) If there is an IP address that maps to many
suspicious domains (fluxing domains), it is more likely that these domains have abrupt
changes in their “A” or “AAAA” queries number. Domains fluxing is a phenomenon where
a domain is usually less active for a certain period of time and suddenly exhibits abrupt
increase in the number of queries then followed by an abrupt decrease. In [29, 30], Bilge
et al stipulates that such behavior is an indicator of domain fluxing, a technique used by
cyber-criminals to use many machine generated domains to change C&Cs and proxies.
This technique makes cyber-threat infrastructures more robust and flexible against take-
downs. To detect abrupt changes, we use Chauvenet test [45]; the latter detects outliers by
rejecting time series points that do not fit the normal distribution probability. The test has
two inputs, the time series data and a significance level α (set to 0.5 in Chauvenet Crite-
rion Test). Initially, the mean of time series data (M ) is computed as well as the standard
deviation (S). Then, we create a normal distribution using the mean and standard devia-
tion. For each value in time series data, we compute its cumulative probability from the
normal distribution (P ). Thus, the criterion value (P ′) is computed by multiplying the in-
verse probability of P by 2. If the product of the criterion value (P ′) and the length of the
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time series data is less than the significance level, then the time series value is considered
as an outlier. Algorithm 6 summarizes the different computations’ steps done to identify
outliers for queries number.
Algorithm 6 Chauvenet Test
Input: Data





for V ∈ Data do
P=CumulativeProb(D,V )
P ′ = 2× (1− P )





Number of IP changes per domain Each DNS response from “A” or “AAAA” resource
records contain IP addresses that map to a domain name. Usually, malicious domains
map to different IP addresses. We use Spark map action to collect immutable sets of
IPs on 2 minutes slide window time. Then, we use another Spark map-reduce action to
index different immutable sets with domains and transform them to time series. This is
done every hour. To generate the time series, we compute the cardinality of items (IPs)
observed in a set that appears at time t+ 1 and not appearing a time t. Although unusual,
some benign domains use many IPs to load balance queries sent by Internet users. To
overcome this issue, we use a white-list to filter false positives. In addition, we create a
scoring function based on a time series observed per domain. Domains having high scores
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are considered to be investigated. Domains having low scores are discarded. We score
the time series as follows: if the time series contain only zero values, they are omitted.
For each time series, we compute: (1) the number of positive shifts (shifts) between
values observed at times t and t + 1, (2) the number of values that are greater or equal
to the average of time series’ values (avgs), and (3) the number of values that are greater
than 0 (vals). Let T be a time series, the IP changes scoring function is computed by
Algorithm 7. Figure 6.2 illustrates how a score is computed for a domain representing a
bitcoin network. We observe from the example that the score is high (0.75), which means
that it is worth being investigated.




S = Size(T )
for i := 0; i < S; i++ do
if i 6= S − 1 & T [i] < T [i+ 1] then
shifts++
end if
if T [i] > M then
avgs++
end if




Score := 13 × [(shifts/S − 1) + ((avgs+ vals)/S)]
return Score
TTL values Each DNS response has a TLL (Time to live) field. It indicates how long























Shifts = 8 Average=67.63
Values>0= 10 Values>=Average= 6
Size=11 Score=0.33*[(8/10)+(6+10)/11]≈0.75
Figure 6.2: Example of Number of IPs Change
values as one day or more to get the benefit of DNS caching [11]. However, Content
Delivery Networks (CDNs) systems specify the TTL to low values. They combine a low
TTL with Round Robin technique [10] in order to make the systems scalable and avail-
able all the time. Round Robin is a technique that provides many IP addresses rather than
a single IP address. In case one of the IP addresses is not available, another IP address
will be available since the TLL value is low. Many malicious systems such as fast-flux
systems use the round-robin technique with the low TTL to prevent DNS Blacklists [61]
detection. Low TTL values observation has been used by many techniques to detect Fast-
Flux systems besides other observations such as number of distinct IP addresses. In [29],
Bilge et al. explained that some malicious networks change TTL values frequently. In
these networks, some infected machines are selected to be proxies and C&Cs, and TTL
values are assigned with different levels of priorities. There is a high probability that a
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proxy running on an ADSL IP is less reliable than a proxy running on a university or an
organization server. Therefore, low TTL values are assigned to dynamic IPs (home In-
ternet connections) and high TTL values are assigned to static IPs (Servers). The authors
corroborate this assumptions with TTL values observed in Conficker botnet domains. In
order to detect malicious networks, we use a TTL scoring function, which relies on the
following parameters: (1) Unchanged low TTL values, (2) the usage ratio of specific TTL
ranges, (3) the number of TTL changes. The TTL scoring function is computed by Al-
gorithm 8. This algorithm has two parts. The first part checks if TTL values with time
series are the same. If so, we pick time series that have TTLs less or equal to one hour
(3600 seconds). We assign the score based on TTL values that belong to different ranges
illustrated in Algorithm 8. The second part deals with time series that contain different
TTL values. In this case, we compute the ratio of TLL values per range as well as the
number of TTL value changes. Regarding the ratio of TTL values per range, we multiply
it with a priority number. The lower are TTL values in a range, the higher is the priority
number. For instance, the range [0, 1] has a high priority number (6) since this range is
an indicator of an intensive fast-flux activity. The range ]3600,∞[ has the lower prior-
ity number, since the TTL values are more than one hour. The first part of the score is
computed by summing different ratios multiplied by their priority number. The result is
divided by six to normalize it to a values between 0 and 1. The second part consists of
computing the number of TTL value changes observed in a time series. The final score
is the sum of both parts divided by two. Figure 6.3 illustrates a TTL score computation
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TTL changes = 10/11 ≈ 0.91
TTL ranges = (6*0)+(5*1)+(4*5)+(3*5)+(2*0)+(1*0)/(6*11) ≈ 0.61
Score=(0.91+0.61)/2≈0.76
Figure 6.3: TTLs Change Example
Record Misuses Filter
The democratization of DNS protocol has pushed cyber-criminals to abuse it and use it as
a carrier for communication between malware infecting machines and remote bot-masters
or proxies. Being inspired by the emergence of DNS tunneling tools (e.g., iodine [110],
NSTX [206], OzymanDNS [100], Heyoka [173], etc.), cyber-criminals have been mis-
using DNS records, namely, “TXT”,“SRV”,“OPT”, “NULL” and “ANY”, to perpetrate
malicious activities. In the sequel, we present examples how these DNS records can be
abused.
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Algorithm 8 TTL Score Function
Input: T ,cpt
Output: Score
Freq := Frequency(T, T [0])
S := Size(T )
if S = Freq then
if T [0] ∈ [0, 1] then
Score := 1.0
else if T [0] ∈]1, 60] then
Score := 0.9
else if T [0] ∈]60, 300] then
Score := 0.8
else if T [0] ∈]300, 900] then
Score := 0.7






for i := 0; i < S; i++ do
if T [i] ∈ [0, 1] then
cpt[6] + +
else if T [i] ∈ ]1, 60] then
cpt[5] + +
else if T [i] ∈ ]60, 300] then
cpt[4] + +
else if T [i] ∈ ]300, 900] then
cpt[3] + +









RatioChanges := changes/(S − 1)
RatioRanges := 16×S ×
∑6
j=1 j × cpt[j]




DNS tunneling Although being considered as a benign service provided online or by
customized tools, this technique is a good artifact to exfiltrate data from networks that
permit traffic to be sent only through a trusted server or proxy. By having a moderated
bandwidth (110 Kilobytes per second) and latency (150 Milliseconds) [213], attackers
considered DNS tunneling as a good medium to send blocked IP traffic through and con-
duct stealthy communications between bot masters. In [190], Ed Skoudis claimed that
DNS tunneling malware is among the most dangerous attacks.
Malware covert channels In [58], the authors dissected the modus-operandi of Feeder-
bot botnet. Malware belonging to Feederbot family exfiltrates data within DNS query
sub-domain labels and infiltrates attack payloads in DNS response packets. To detect
DNS traffic generated by Feederbot botnet, the authors defined empirically a set of fea-
tures that span over: record data features and behavioral communication features. Based
on these features, they adapted an hybrid approach (clustering & classification techniques)
to detect malicious DNS traffic. In [145], Mullaney introduced another malware family,
namely, Morto, which uses a more resilient method to exchange communication through
covert DNS channels. Morto botnet sends a limited amount of payloads, which makes its
distribution stealthier in comparison with Feederbot botnet.
DNS malicious responses Attackers have put forward tools to send malicious responses
in reply to DNS queries in order to test if DNS look-up servers are vulnerable. For
instance, dnsxss [192] is a tool that returns a string containing JavaScript to “MX”,
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“CNAME”, “NS”, and “TXT” requests. By looking at Passive DNS stream, we have
found a lot of domains having “TXT” records containing script and frame tags. If a vul-
nerable server does not sanitize “TXT” record data returned by such domains, XSS attack
is performed leading to some abnormal behavior in the server side.
Indicators of DNS DDoS attacks In [43], the authors stipulated that “ANY” record is
usually used in amplification DDoS attacks since it has an amplification factor of 52 since
it replies with a response packet with 3, 336 bytes to a request packet of 64 bytes. In [66],
the authors monitored Darknet for the purpose of inferring DDoS attacks. They observed
that “ANY” records are in order of 52.23% of observed records involved in DDoS attacks
during a period of three months. In the prevailing of these facts, we decide to monitor
“ANY” records observed in passive DNS stream of data.
To detect record misuses, we used Spark filter functions on tuples. For instance,
“TXT” record is used to publish email sender policies associated with domains (e.g.,
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [126], Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) [63], Domain-
based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) [125]), or the ver-
ification identifier of different search engines like Google and Yandex. In order to detect
misuse of “TXT” records, we create patterns that identify benign usage of “TXT” record
data. The “SRV” record [12] is used to publish services (service protocols, e.g, LDAP,
Minecraft, SIP, Skype for corporations, etc.) for domains. Based on observations done on
“SRV” record data, we create patterns that identify if the record data is suspicious or not.
In addition, we capture all passive DNS entries that have “OPT”, “NULL” or “ANY” as a
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record type. The reason behind doing so lies in the fact that such records are rare and can
be indicators of compromise.
6.3 Experimental Results
6.3.1 Application Performance
Our passive DNS anomalies identification system has been deployed on a cluster of three
servers. The first server is dedicated to detect PPM domains, “TXT”,“SRV”,“OPT”,
“NULL” and “ANY” record misuses. The second one is committed to monitor countries,
cities and IP changes, as well as TTL values per domains. The third server is employed
to observe PPM domains, countries, cities and IP changes, as well as TTL values associ-
ated with specific top level domains and IPs. All the servers run Debian Operation System
version 7.8. In each server, we use instances of a document-based database, namely, Mon-
goDB [142] to store collections of data. The servers have the following characteristics:
• Server 1: Dell Poweredge T410, 24 CPU cores, 64Gb memory and 3.8Tb space.
• Server 2: HP Proliant DL580 G7, 48 CPU cores, 125Gb memory and 4.5Tb space.
• Server 3: SuperMicro, 48 CPU cores, 125Gb memory and 4.0Tb space.
Hereafter, we provide performance results, which falls into: CPU usage, memory
consumption and time delay. The latter means the sum of scheduling time and processing
times for batches. We use JavaVisual VM [98] to monitor the CPU usage and the memory
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consumption and Spark user interface to observe the processing time delay [70]. We
sampled approximately 18 hours logs of the CPU usage, the memory consumption and
the processing delay time for all servers. We show through these benchmarks that Spark
tool has the ability to cope with passive DNS streams since it uses memory resource to
complete different computations. In the sequel, we provide few observations done on
collected benchmarks.
PPM Detection and Record Misuses
We dedicate the first server to detect PPM domains, record misuses of all passive DNS
records. In the sequel, we describe the application performance in terms of CPU usage,
memory consumption and processing delay time.
CPU Usage We observe for the PPM detection and record misuses application a mod-
erate usage of CPU (see Figure 6.4). This is due to the fact that the batches are done
every minutes and no aggregation is done. In this case, Spark uses a filtering capability to
segregate between benign and suspicious tuples collected from RDD streams. However,
we observe occasionally spikes in CPU usage. This is due to heavy loads of data, which
can reach 2 Gb of passive DNS entries on a minute-by-minute basis.
Memory Regarding memory consumption, we notice that the memory is extensively
used. This is due to the high number of tuples that are loaded for processing. The garbage
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Figure 6.4: Server 1 CPU Usage
Figure 6.5, where the garbage collection is done twice to three times every 3 hours.









Figure 6.5: Server 1 Memory Consumption
Delay Time On sampled data, we observe that delay time may differ from a batch to
another. This is due to the volatility of passive DNS records’ number, which depends
on how much data is received once a minute. The delay varies from 1 minute to 22
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minutes (see Figure 6.5). However, the delay average is 2 minutes and 23 seconds, which
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Figure 6.6: Server 1 Processing Delay Time
Monitoring IPs and Domains Features
The second server is used to observe different DNS features. To do so, we deploy Spark
streaming capability, which reads data in slide batches of 2 minutes and aggregates it in
a window batch of 1 hour. Hereafter, we report the different performance benchmarks
(CPU usage, memory consumption and processing delay time).
CPU Usage We observe from Figure 6.7 that the CPU is intensively used every 2 min-
utes (the period of a slide batch). These batches are created to save different statistical
features, namely, cities changes, countries changes, IP changes and TTL values. The
map-reduce operation is done every hour for TTL values, cities, countries and IP num-
ber changes. Then, scoring functions are applied at the time of insertion into database
collections.
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Figure 6.7: Server 2 CPU Usage
Memory Due to the tremendous computation of statistics, the application employs a lot
of memory (see Figure 6.8). We notice some spikes, where the system uses sometimes
more than 100Gb of memory. The massive use of memory is done usually at the times
when the window batches is considered to be processed. The garbage collection is done
more frequently than previous case since we need to maintain free memory as much as
possible.
Delay Time Unlike the previous application (Server 1 application), this application has
a consequent delay time (see Figure 6.9). This is due to the huge collection of statistics.
However, the average delay time for the sampled data is 40 minutes 48 seconds, which is
less than the batch window period (1 hour). Consequently, we claim that despite the huge
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Figure 6.9: Server 2 Processing Delay Time
Monitoring Top Level Domains and IPs of Interest
In addition to the identification of PPM domains, DNS record misuses and features statis-
tics, we have a keen interest to monitor top level domains and IP spaces of interest. In this
case, we use filter Spark to detect IPs geo-located in specific countries and their top level
domains. We consider all the capabilities integrated in previous servers (Server 1 and
Server 2). As such, we monitor PPM domains, record misuses, DNS features statistics.
The only difference is the fact that we use a batch window of 2 hours instead of 1 hour.
The intent is to collect as much data as we can for feature statistics computations since
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specific top level domains and IP spaces are a small subset of records collected in passive
DNS.
CPU Usage The CPU usage for Server 3 is depicted in Figure 6.10. We notice that the
CPU is not overwhelmed like in Server 2 application. However, we observe spikes every
two hours, which represents the aggregation period.












Figure 6.10: Server 3 CPU Usage
Memory The memory consumption has a linear trend. We note that the garbage col-
lection is dissimilar than the previous cases. It takes longer periods to be performed (see
Figure 6.11).
Delay Time The delay time has the same trend of CPU usage (see Figures 6.10 and
6.12). The processing time before the aggregation period (2 hours) is less than 1 minute.
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Figure 6.11: Server 3 Memory Consumption
However, at the end of the window batch, we discern some overhead in terms of process-
ing time. This is due to Spark map-reduce operations done every two hours to compute
features’ time series. The average delay time is 23 seconds and 658 milliseconds, which
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Figure 6.12: Server 3 Processing Delay Time
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6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a prototype designed and implemented for the purpose of
pinpointing anomalies in passive DNS streams. We use Spark framework to integrate a
near real-time distributed detection system. We use different operations (e.g., filter, map,
reduce) to detect uncommon patterns observed in some DNS records, namely, “TXT”,
“CNAME”, “NULL” and “SRV”. We use the outlier detection algorithm to detect abrupt
changes in DNS “A” and “AAAA” records. This insight is good to detect fluxing domains.
We collect real-time timeseries of TTL values and IP changes to detect fast fluxing of IPs.
We corroborate the system with country and city geo-location of IPv4 addresses as well
as scoring functions to rank potential fluxing activities. We provide different benchmarks
for memory and CPU usages as well as the delay time processing of the deployed system.
Initially, we incorporated some use cases where we illustrated some anomalies detected





The rise of cyber-threats reported by companies and anti-virus vendors has pushed secu-
rity researchers to propose new methodologies to extract intelligence about these threats
to counter them. In this context, we have attempted in this thesis to define a new guideline
to observe and understand the behavior of such threats. We have elaborated four threads of
research, where we provide interesting insights about cyber-threat intelligence. We have
shown how static and dynamic analyses of malware along with passive DNS monitoring
help the security community to identify threats as well as their cyber infrastructures.
We began our research with reverse engineering exercises of two prominent crime-
ware tool-kits, namely, Mariposa and Zeus. We have unveiled their underlying networking
infrastructure. Moreover, we provided detailed description of their components and tech-
niques used to perpetrate malicious activities. The results of these reverse-engineering ex-
ercises are entailed in Chapter 5. This step is important since it allowed NCFTA-Canada
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team to gain an expertise in malware analysis and define new perspectives related to mal-
ware research. Despite the importance of reverse-engineering prominent malware threats.
This process turns to be tedious due to the huge number of observed malware collected
in the wild. To keep track with the huge number of collected malware, we use a dynamic
malware analysis framework to collect malware behavior reports and network traces. We
used the latter as a ground-truth to create models that detects malicious traffic, whereas
malware behavior reports were used to create a situational awareness study about cyber-
threat infrastructures.
In Chapter 6, we proposed a graph-theoretic approach to study cyber-threat infras-
tructures. We used a one-year malware analysis dataset to generate important insights
about cyber-threat infrastructures. Moreover, we characterized cyber-threat infrastruc-
tures through networking graphs. In this setting, we used Google PageRank algorithm to
rank badness of IPs, domains, owners, etc. Thus, we identified key players of cyber-
treat infrastructures. We also utilized Min-hashing technique to monitor the sharing
between cyber-threat infrastructures on a daily basis. As such, we inferred patterns of
cyber-criminal activities. We illustrated a situational awareness of the cyber-threat in-
frastructures. We introduced results related to malware, IPs, domains and organizations,
where we rank their badness. Through patterns inference, we found out that domains are
persistent and periodic, whereas patterns of IP addresses tend to be more ephemeral.
As such, in Chapter 4, we initiated a research effort to fingerprint maliciousness in
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IP traffic. We put forward a comparative study between two traffic maliciousness finger-
printing techniques, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and IP packet headers classification.
We evaluated each approach based on its detection and attribution accuracy as well as
its level of complexity. Both approaches showed promising results in terms of detection;
they are good candidates to strengthen network detection systems since they are based on
ground truth collected from dynamic malware analysis. We used data mining algorithms
to fingerprint maliciousness based on packet header flow features and Deep Packet Inspec-
tion signal processing analysis. Regarding the DPI approach, we used MARFCAT NLP
and wavelets classification to fingerprint maliciousness. This approach has shown some
troubles to classify the generic malware families. However, it exhibited large scalability
and accuracy for less noisy malicious traffic. Regarding flow packet headers approach, we
utilized J48, Boosted J48, Naïve Bayesian, Boosted Naïve Bayesian, and SVM to classify
malicious and non-malicious traffic. The J48 and Boosted J48 algorithms performed bet-
ter than other algorithms. We concluded that these two approaches are not in competition
but they can create a synergy to identify maliciousness in IP traffic. The DPI approach
can classify targets on the fly since it does not need parsing, whereas flow packet headers
can increase subsequently the confidence in maliciousness fingerprinting since it shows
the ability to segregate malicious and benign traffic.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we entailed the design and implementation of a big data mon-
itoring system, which put under the zoom massive passive DNS data to identify potential
attacks. We implemented a prototype on top of Spark cluster computational framework.
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We used its stream monitoring capability to identify suspicious domains, DNS record
misuses, fluxing IPs and domains. We built a capability to generate real-time timeseries
of TTL values and IP addresses changes to detect fast fluxing networks. We integrated a
country and city geo-location of IPv4 addresses as well as scoring functions to rank po-
tential fluxing activities. We have shown the scalability in terms of memory, CPU usages
as well as the delay time processing.
In order to validate the different research efforts illustrated in this dissertation, we
consider the validation classes described in [224], namely, construct validity, internal va-
lidity and external validity. Regarding internal validity, we have to know what is the de-
gree of causality between malware and network cyber-threat intelligence. The answer lies
in the fact that malware samples have the ability to communicate with third parties through
existing network media and protocols, whereas, the analysis of the network traffic may
pinpoint some anomalies and misuses that can be malware indicators of compromises. As
such, we can conclude that both types of cyber-threat intelligence evolves together, and
are causal to each other. Regarding external validity, the different problems tackled within
this thesis are of high importance for the security research community, where we try to
cover the analysis of prominent threats and their underlying infrastructures as well as indi-
cators of maliciousness potentially observed in the network traffic. These research efforts
are published in international peer reviewed journals and conference papers. Regarding
construct validity, in each work, we consider adequate measures to illustrate the different
theoretic concepts; for instance, in Chapter 4, we use PageRank algorithm to rank badness
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of entities based on influence concept, the observed results are highly linked to different
malware families. In addition, we use min-hashing algorithm to abstract complex graphs
and infer patterns, some of them were highly occurring during the analysis period. In
Chapter 5, we use machine learning techniques to fingerprint maliciousness. We inves-
tigated two approaches with many algorithms to cover as much potential candidates that
are good to detect maliciousness. Moreover, we use standard classification metrics like
accuracy, false positives, 10-times cross validation, etc. In Chapter 6, we measured the
memory and CPU consumption of our big data passive DNS anomaly detection system to
gain insight about its performance.
Despite the insights generated from the research efforts discussed in this thesis,
some issues need to be addressed. Concerning the investigation of cyber-threat infras-
tructures, we plan to integrate a near real-time cyber-threat situational awareness dash-
board. In addition, based on the observations found in the evolution of badness scores
for domains and connected IPs, we aim to look for the empirical periods to consider
for domains badness persistence and connected IPs badness sporadicalness. Regarding
malicious traffic fingerprinting, our future works fall into improving classification of the
malicious traffic according to malware types and families, and deploying the model on a
network in order to test its performance on real-time traffic. In addition, malicious traffic
covers a wide range of types: DDoS, C&C channels, and intrusion payloads. It is in our
plan to further refine the classification of malicious traffic into these types. At present,
we only focus on the captured pcaps from known malware to determine maliciousness.
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DDoS can also be aided through other existing means (e.g., built into iptables). In ad-
dition, we have not studied possible evasion from malware trying to avoid detection at the
network level. While we believe the headers-only are robust to detect some share of eva-
sive malware, the extent to which our algorithms are robust, stills a challenging research
question. It is also worth investigating why SVM and its parameters performed worse
in fingerprinting maliciousness in flows. A passive DNS platform has been integrated,
however, we target to identify zero-day attacks on the fly by automating the correlation
with other sources like malware database, Virus-Total. In addition, we need to incorpo-
rate an extendible white-list to eliminate false positives that pollute our database. Thus,
easing the analysis and identification of zero-day attacks, including phishing, spamming
campaigns, identification of C&Cs and correlation with malware database. Moreover, we
look thoroughly into rare records like “TXT”, “ANY”, “SRV” and “NULL”. The exis-
tence of “ANY” records can be an indicator for Reflective Distributed Denial of Service
(DRDoS) attacks, whereas “NULL” and “TXT” records are good candidates to detect
malicious payload communications. A study on malicious payloads is a must to identify
encrypted and encoded messages.
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Appendix A
Signal and NLP DPI Results
Hereafter, we list results of the DPI detection approach. They are based on the whole
packet examination (i.e., headers and payload) that illustrate the precision per algorithm
combinations as well as attribution for the top precise malware types. The methodology
behind them is described in Section 5.4 and the results are discussed in Section 5.5.2. The
algorithms’ options, in addition to those described in [134], are:
• -dynaclass – treat learned classes as labels automatically from the reports (no
predefined classes are set at the beginning),
• -binary – treat data as pure binary non-formatted data,
• -nopreprep – to skip extra pre-pre-processing,
• -sdwt – use separating discrete wavelet transform, and
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• -flucid – generate FORENSIC LUCID expressions for subsequent forensic inves-
tigations and reasoning in an external system [137].
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -cos -flucid 67 154 30.32
1st 2 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -diff -flucid 55 166 24.89
1st 3 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -cheb -flucid 55 166 24.89
1st 4 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -eucl -flucid 50 171 22.62
1st 5 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming -flucid 37 184 16.74
1st 6 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -mink -flucid 34 187 15.38
2nd 1 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -cos -flucid 92 129 41.63
2nd 2 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -diff -flucid 77 144 34.84
2nd 3 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -cheb -flucid 77 144 34.84
2nd 4 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -eucl -flucid 73 148 33.03
2nd 5 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -hamming -flucid 46 175 20.81
2nd 6 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -raw -fft -mink -flucid 47 174 21.27
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 VirTool.Win32.VBInject.gen.bp (v) 6 0 100.00
1st 2 Trojan.Win32.Agent.roei 6 0 100.00
1st 3 BehavesLike.Win32.Malware.dls (mx-v) 6 0 100.00
1st 4 Worm.Win32.AutoRun.dkch 6 0 100.00
1st 5 Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.det 6 0 100.00
1st 6 FraudTool.Win32.FakeRean 6 0 100.00
1st 7 VirTool:Win32/Obfuscator.WJ (suspicious) 6 0 100.00
1st 8 Trojan.Win32.Vilsel.ayyw 6 0 100.00
1st 9 Worm:Win32/Yeltminky.A!dll 6 0 100.00
1st 10 Trojan.Win32.Meredrop 6 0 100.00
1st 11 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Allsum 12 0 100.00
1st 12 Virtumonde 6 0 100.00
1st 13 Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.nndu 6 0 100.00
1st 14 VirTool:WinNT/Protmin.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
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1st 21 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes.aecv 6 0 100.00
1st 22 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A 11 1 91.67
1st 23 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Carberp.C 11 1 91.67
1st 24 PWS:Win32/Lolyda.BF 15 3 83.33
1st 25 Trojan.Win32.Yakes.qjn 8 4 66.67
1st 26 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlnz 5 7 41.67
1st 27 Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.fkvx 6 12 33.33
1st 28 VirTool:Win32/VBInject.OT 6 12 33.33
1st 29 HomeMalwareCleaner.FakeVimes 36 264 12.00
1st 30 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 56 598 8.56
1st 31 Trojan.FakeAlert 6 108 5.26
1st 32 Trojan.Win32.Generic.pak!cobra 0 18 0.00
2nd 1 VirTool.Win32.VBInject.gen.bp (v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 2 Trojan.Win32.Agent.roei 6 0 100.00
2nd 3 BehavesLike.Win32.Malware.dls (mx-v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 4 Worm.Win32.AutoRun.dkch 6 0 100.00
2nd 5 Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.det 6 0 100.00
2nd 6 FraudTool.Win32.FakeRean 6 0 100.00
2nd 7 VirTool:Win32/Obfuscator.WJ (suspicious) 6 0 100.00
2nd 8 Trojan.Win32.Vilsel.ayyw 6 0 100.00
2nd 9 Worm:Win32/Yeltminky.A!dll 6 0 100.00
2nd 10 Trojan.Win32.Meredrop 6 0 100.00
2nd 11 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Allsum 12 0 100.00
2nd 12 Virtumonde 6 0 100.00
2nd 13 Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.nndu 6 0 100.00
2nd 14 VirTool:WinNT/Protmin.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
2nd 21 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes.aecv 6 0 100.00
2nd 22 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A 11 1 91.67
2nd 23 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Carberp.C 11 1 91.67
2nd 24 PWS:Win32/Lolyda.BF 16 2 88.89
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2nd 25 Trojan.Win32.Yakes.qjn 9 3 75.00
2nd 26 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlnz 5 7 41.67
2nd 27 Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.fkvx 18 0 100.00
2nd 28 VirTool:Win32/VBInject.OT 6 12 33.33
2nd 29 HomeMalwareCleaner.FakeVimes 66 234 22.00
2nd 30 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 117 537 17.89
2nd 31 Trojan.FakeAlert 15 99 13.16
2nd 32 Trojan.Win32.Generic.pak!cobra 0 18 0.00
Table A.1: No-Filtering Results by Algorithm Combination and Malware
guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cos -flucid 55 146 27.36
1st 2 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -diff -flucid 41 180 18.55
1st 3 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -mink -flucid 41 180 18.55
1st 4 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cheb -flucid 41 180 18.55
1st 5 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -eucl -flucid 41 180 18.55
1st 6 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -hamming -flucid 30 191 13.57
2nd 1 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cos -flucid 75 126 37.31
2nd 2 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -diff -flucid 56 165 25.34
2nd 3 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -mink -flucid 67 154 30.32
2nd 4 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -cheb -flucid 55 166 24.89
2nd 5 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -eucl -flucid 58 163 26.24
2nd 6 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -sdwt -fft -hamming -flucid 44 177 19.91
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 VirTool.Win32.VBInject.gen.bp (v) 6 0 100.00
1st 2 Trojan.Win32.Agent.roei 6 0 100.00
1st 3 BehavesLike.Win32.Malware.dls (mx-v) 6 0 100.00
1st 4 Worm.Win32.AutoRun.dkch 6 0 100.00
1st 5 Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.det 6 0 100.00
1st 6 FraudTool.Win32.FakeRean 6 0 100.00
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1st 7 VirTool:Win32/Obfuscator.WJ (suspicious) 6 0 100.00
1st 8 Trojan.Win32.Vilsel.ayyw 6 0 100.00
1st 9 Worm:Win32/Yeltminky.A!dll 6 0 100.00
1st 10 Trojan.Win32.Meredrop 6 0 100.00
1st 11 Virtumonde 6 0 100.00
1st 12 Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.nndu 6 0 100.00
1st 13 VirTool:WinNT/Protmin.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
1st 14 PWS:Win32/Fareit.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
1st 15 Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.cxqb 6 0 100.00
1st 16 Trojan.Win32.Menti.mlgp 6 0 100.00
1st 17 Trojan.Win32.Buzus (v) 6 0 100.00
1st 18 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlot 6 0 100.00
1st 19 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes.aecv 6 0 100.00
1st 20 Trojan.Win32.FakeAV.lcpt 11 1 91.67
1st 21 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Allsum 10 2 83.33
1st 22 Trojan.Win32.Yakes.qjn 10 2 83.33
1st 23 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlnz 9 3 75.00
1st 24 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A 6 6 50.00
1st 25 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Carberp.C 6 6 50.00
1st 26 Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.fkvx 5 11 31.25
1st 27 VirTool:Win32/VBInject.OT 5 11 31.25
1st 28 HomeMalwareCleaner.FakeVimes 46 250 15.54
1st 29 Trojan.FakeAlert 8 104 7.14
1st 30 Trojan.Win32.Generic.pak!cobra 1 17 5.56
1st 31 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 18 626 2.80
1st 32 PWS:Win32/Lolyda.BF 0 18 0.00
2nd 1 VirTool.Win32.VBInject.gen.bp (v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 2 Trojan.Win32.Agent.roei 6 0 100.00
2nd 3 BehavesLike.Win32.Malware.dls (mx-v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 4 Worm.Win32.AutoRun.dkch 6 0 100.00
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2nd 5 Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.det 6 0 100.00
2nd 6 FraudTool.Win32.FakeRean 6 0 100.00
2nd 7 VirTool:Win32/Obfuscator.WJ (suspicious) 6 0 100.00
2nd 8 Trojan.Win32.Vilsel.ayyw 6 0 100.00
2nd 9 Worm:Win32/Yeltminky.A!dll 6 0 100.00
2nd 10 Trojan.Win32.Meredrop 6 0 100.00
2nd 11 Virtumonde 6 0 100.00
2nd 12 Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.nndu 6 0 100.00
2nd 13 VirTool:WinNT/Protmin.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
2nd 14 PWS:Win32/Fareit.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
2nd 15 Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.cxqb 6 0 100.00
2nd 16 Trojan.Win32.Menti.mlgp 6 0 100.00
2nd 17 Trojan.Win32.Buzus (v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 18 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlot 6 0 100.00
2nd 19 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes.aecv 6 0 100.00
2nd 20 Trojan.Win32.FakeAV.lcpt 12 0 100.00
2nd 21 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Allsum 11 1 91.67
2nd 22 Trojan.Win32.Yakes.qjn 11 1 91.67
2nd 23 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlnz 10 2 83.33
2nd 24 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A 6 6 50.00
2nd 25 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Carberp.C 10 2 83.33
2nd 26 Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.fkvx 15 1 93.75
2nd 27 VirTool:Win32/VBInject.OT 5 11 31.25
2nd 28 HomeMalwareCleaner.FakeVimes 76 220 25.68
2nd 29 Trojan.FakeAlert 19 93 16.96
2nd 30 Trojan.Win32.Generic.pak!cobra 2 16 11.11
2nd 31 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 62 582 9.63
2nd 32 PWS:Win32/Lolyda.BF 2 16 11.11
Table A.2: Wavelet-Filtered Results by Algorithm Combination and Malware
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guess run algorithms good bad %
1st 1 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -cos -flucid 60 161 27.15
1st 2 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -cheb -flucid 54 167 24.43
1st 3 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -diff -flucid 54 167 24.43
1st 4 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -eucl -flucid 46 175 20.81
1st 5 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -hamming -flucid 35 186 15.84
1st 6 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -mink -flucid 33 188 14.93
2nd 1 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -cos -flucid 88 133 39.82
2nd 2 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -cheb -flucid 74 147 33.48
2nd 3 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -diff -flucid 74 147 33.48
2nd 4 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -eucl -flucid 69 152 31.22
2nd 5 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -hamming -flucid 49 172 22.17
2nd 6 -dynaclass -binary -nopreprep -low -fft -mink -flucid 48 173 21.72
guess run class good bad %
1st 1 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A 12 0 100.00
1st 2 VirTool.Win32.VBInject.gen.bp (v) 6 0 100.00
1st 3 Trojan.Win32.Agent.roei 6 0 100.00
1st 4 BehavesLike.Win32.Malware.dls (mx-v) 6 0 100.00
1st 5 Worm.Win32.AutoRun.dkch 6 0 100.00
1st 6 Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.det 6 0 100.00
1st 7 FraudTool.Win32.FakeRean 6 0 100.00
1st 8 VirTool:Win32/Obfuscator.WJ (suspicious) 6 0 100.00
1st 9 Trojan.Win32.Vilsel.ayyw 6 0 100.00
1st 10 Worm:Win32/Yeltminky.A!dll 6 0 100.00
1st 11 Trojan.Win32.Meredrop 6 0 100.00
1st 12 Virtumonde 6 0 100.00
1st 13 Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.nndu 6 0 100.00
1st 14 VirTool:WinNT/Protmin.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
1st 21 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes.aecv 6 0 100.00
1st 22 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Allsum 11 1 91.67
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1st 23 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Carberp.C 10 2 83.33
1st 24 PWS:Win32/Lolyda.BF 15 3 83.33
1st 25 Trojan.Win32.Yakes.qjn 8 4 66.67
1st 26 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlnz 6 6 50.00
1st 27 Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.fkvx 6 12 33.33
1st 28 VirTool:Win32/VBInject.OT 6 12 33.33
1st 29 HomeMalwareCleaner.FakeVimes 37 263 12.33
1st 30 Trojan.Win32.Generic.pak!cobra 2 16 11.11
1st 31 Trojan.FakeAlert 8 106 7.02
1st 32 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 35 619 5.35
2nd 1 Trojan:Win32/Swrort.A 12 0 100.00
2nd 2 VirTool.Win32.VBInject.gen.bp (v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 3 Trojan.Win32.Agent.roei 6 0 100.00
2nd 4 BehavesLike.Win32.Malware.dls (mx-v) 6 0 100.00
2nd 5 Worm.Win32.AutoRun.dkch 6 0 100.00
2nd 6 Trojan-FakeAV.Win32.Agent.det 6 0 100.00
2nd 7 FraudTool.Win32.FakeRean 6 0 100.00
2nd 8 VirTool:Win32/Obfuscator.WJ (suspicious) 6 0 100.00
2nd 9 Trojan.Win32.Vilsel.ayyw 6 0 100.00
2nd 10 Worm:Win32/Yeltminky.A!dll 6 0 100.00
2nd 11 Trojan.Win32.Meredrop 6 0 100.00
2nd 12 Virtumonde 6 0 100.00
2nd 13 Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.nndu 6 0 100.00
2nd 14 VirTool:WinNT/Protmin.gen!C [generic] 6 0 100.00
2nd 21 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes.aecv 6 0 100.00
2nd 22 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Allsum 11 1 91.67
2nd 23 TrojanDownloader:Win32/Carberp.C 10 2 83.33
2nd 24 PWS:Win32/Lolyda.BF 15 3 83.33
2nd 25 Trojan.Win32.Yakes.qjn 9 3 75.00
2nd 26 Trojan.Win32.Agent.rlnz 8 4 66.67
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2nd 27 Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt.fkvx 18 0 100.00
2nd 28 VirTool:Win32/VBInject.OT 6 12 33.33
2nd 29 HomeMalwareCleaner.FakeVimes 66 234 22.00
2nd 30 Trojan.Win32.Generic.pak!cobra 2 16 11.11
2nd 31 Trojan.FakeAlert 14 100 12.28
2nd 32 Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 105 549 16.06
Table A.3: Low-Pass-Filtered Results by Algorithm Combination and Malware
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